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# Technical Report

ANALYSIS OF DISTURBANCES IN GUJARAT
(Jamuary 1-28, 1974)
The Food Problem and Suggestions
by
D.K.Desai

GSFC Professor for Management in Agriculture

WP 1974/23





# INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AHMEDABAD

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Chairman (Research) IIMA

## Technical Report

Title of the report ANALYSIS.OF.DLSTURBANCES.IN.GULARAT
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ABSTRACT (within 250 words)
The recent disturbances in Gujarat were analysed and it was observed
that the major cause of the disturbances was mon-availability of
foodgrains and from the fair price shops particularly in the urban
areas of Gujarat. This happened because both the State and the
Central Governments failed to appreciate the acuteness of the
problem and could not manage the procurement and distribution of
foodgrains. The analysis shows that the disturbances were restricted
to the urban areas because after the wheat takeover the normal channels
of foodgrain distribution in the open market had dried up and the
public distribution could not supply foodgrains to the vulnerable
sections. Suggestions are made how the problem could be tackled in The
short run and in the long run.
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ANALYSIS OF DISTURBANCES IN GUJARAT

(From January 1, 1974 to January 28, 1974)

- The Food Problem and Suggestions

### D. K. DESAI GSFC Professor for Management in Agriculture

(The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and he alone is responsible for them).

#### 1.1 Introduction

It is dangerous and difficult to analyse the current events which have not yet been completed and which have multi-facet complexities. The information about the current events is inadequate and not without bias. The situation at present in Gujarat, however, is so grave that inspite of all the dangers and difficulties in using inadequate and biased information, I have ventured to analyse the current events because I feel it as my duty.

My source of information is the news published in the local newspapers and it suffers from all the inadequacies in reporting and biases of the news papers.

#### 1.2 Objectives

The major objectives of this analysis are to understand

- A (1) the sequence of events
  - (2) the types of events
  - (3) the agencies connected with the events
  - (4) the actions undertaken by different agencies.
- B from this understanding to infer the probable reasons for the occurrence of the events.

#### 1.3 Method of Analysis

From the local news papers, information about the news on disturbances and agencies which were connected with the disturbances was collected for the period from January 1, 1974 to 28th January, 1974

and classified as follows:

- (1) Place of event
- (2) Type of event
- (3) Agency connected with the event
  - (4) Action envisaged by the agency as a result of which the event may have occurred.

In all 18 different types of agencies were identified

(Appendix 1). About 22 different types of events were noted (Appendix :) and 31 different types of actions were observed (Appendix 3). The places of events were classified according to the districts to which they belonged. The events had taken place in 17 out of 18 districts of the Gujarat State and out of 206 towns of Gujarat the events were reported from as many as 72 towns in 28 days. In many towns events had occurred many times during this period. Appendix 4 gives the details of places where events had occurred.

In order to analyse the events we have prepared a calendar of events showing the sequential order of events classified by agencies with which they were reported to be connected. Under each agency we have shown the place of an event by two numbers in a rectangle, the first number denoting the district and the second number denoting the place of the event within the district as shown in Appendix 4. The type of an event is shown in a symbol of a triangle with a number in it. The number denotes the particular type of the event as shown in Appendix 2. The calendar of events is shown in the chart.

#### 1.4 Results of Analysis

A. Relationship between events and agencies

The chart shows that of the 18 agencies which were identified major roles were played by only five agencies:

- (1) State Government
- (2) Students
- (3) General Public
- (4) Jan Sangh
- (5) Khedut Samaj.

The following discussion deals with each of these agencies.

#### 1. State Government

In Valsad, Mr. Amul Desai the Finance Minister declared on 2nd January that government would be very strict for the levy of paddy and take stern action against the illegal exports of foodgrains.

On Jamuary 3, he had discussion with rice millers and merchants and there was some agreement between the Government and the rice millers and merchants. At the same time some mills were raided for procurement of levy to show the firm determination of the government.

On January 4, the reports indicated intensification of government's efforts of procurement for bajari in Kheda district. The government also raided few rice mills in Kheda district.

On January 4, the government declared scarcities in some villages of Jamnagar, Rajkot, Surendranagar and Kutch districts.

On January 8, the State government sought cooperation from farmers in Banakantha district to give bajari in lovy. Farmers agreed to give 10,000 tonnes of bajara. The government also declared that

efforts would be made to give 5 kilos of bajara per head per month through the fair price shops to ration card holders.

On January 9, the government discussed with the students who had agitated against the increase in food bill. It had discussion with oil-millers to give 20 per cent of their oil stock to government for distribution through the fair price shops. There was an agreement between the millers and government.

Between January 11 and 13, because of the disturbed conditions, the State government applied section 144 in Nadiad, Kapadvanj and Cambay in Kheda district. In Vadodara city during this period curfew was imposed for varying periods. The Chief Minister informed the Central government that if adequate food supply was not made available to Gujarat the situation would deteriorate.

On Jamuary 14, the government had discussion with rice millers and merchants and there in agreement for the sale of rice to government.

The State government complained to the Central government for inadequate supply of foodgrains and the Central government agreed to give more quantity of foodgrains.

On January 15, the Chief Minister took away the Supply portfolio from the Supply Minister and assumed direct responsibility for the Supply department.

On January 17, the State government liberalised levy rules and also liberalised interdistrict movement of bajari.

On January 18 th State government had to impose curfew in Jambusar in Broach district because of the disturbed conditions.

On January 19, because students had taken to violence in Ahmedabad, the government tried to negotiate with the students to abstain them from violence. There was an agreement between the students and the Chief Minister. This was subsequently refuted by the students' leaders.

On Jamuary 20, because of the disturbed conditions, curfew was imposed in Santrampur of Panchamahals district and in Jamuagar. In Ahmedabad, students leaders were arrested.

On January 21, the government started discussion with Shramjivi Samiti but there was no agreement. The State government arrested more students' loaders. The curfew was imposed in Rajkot and Junagadh.

On January 22, curfew was imposed in Surat and Rajakot.

On January 23, reports about the imposition of curfew in Surendranagar, Morvi, Fravezgar, and Anand were received. Curfew and police firing were reported from Kadi, Kalol, and Sidhpur of Mehsana district, and Dholake of Ahmedabad district.

On Jamary 24, reports of the imposition of curfew in Talod and Prantij of Sabarkantha district, Fatan of Mehsana district, Umreth and Anand of Kk ela district were received.

The State government declared that the Central government had agreed regarding the liberalisation of inter-state movement of coarse grains.

On January 25, because of the call of Gujarat Bandh, the state government imposed curfew in the following towns and cities:

- 1. Ahmedabad, 2. Dhandhulka, 3. Bavala, and 4. Virangam of Ahmedabad district.
  - 5. Rajkot, 6. Jasdan, 7. Morvi, 8. Dhoraji, and 9. Uplata of Rajkot district
  - 9. Savarkundala of Bhavnagar district
  - 10. Surendranagar
  - 11. Amreli
  - 12. Jamnagar
  - 13. Mahsana, 14. Patan, 15. Unja, 16. Kalol, 17. Sidhpur, and
  - 18. Kadi of Mahesana district
  - 19. Himatnagar, 20. Prantij, 21. Talod,/22. Modasa of Sabarkantha district.
  - 23. Palanpur, 24. Deesa and 25. Radhanpur of Banaskantha district.
  - 26. Vadodara
  - 27. Nadiad of the andistrict
  - 28. Godhara and 29. Lunavada of Panchamahals district
  - 29. Surat

On January 26, the State celebration of the Republic Day was performed at Gandhinagar for the first time instead of Ahmedabad. But the students had created trouble there also. The Chief Minister was hackled.

On January 27, the State government decided to call Army to bring peace and order in the city of Ahmedabad.

On January 28, the Army took over the control of Ahmedabad City after 12.00 p.m. A strict curfew was imposed from 12.00 p.m. on 28th to 1.00 p.m. on 29th January. The public was warned that anybody breaking the curfew order was liable to be shot.

#### 2. Students

Initially students' agitation was not an organised movement.

The first report during this trouble period (January 1 to January 28) was on 2nd January when students of Morvi Engineering College had agitated against the college authorities and burnt furniture.

On January 3, the students of L.D. Engineering College at Ahmedabad agitated against the increase in the food bill and burnt the furniture of the hostel and hackled the rector. The police used tear gas and lathicharge to bring the situation under control.

On Jamuary 8, it was reported that the students in Ahmedabad city had organised themselves in an organization call Nav Nirman Saniti and protested against the price rise in the state. They continued their agitation against the increase in the food bill in the hostels and for their grievances against the university authorities.

The students of I'ar in Sabarkantha district joined the movement against the price rise.

On Jamuary 9, the students in Ahmedabad organised "a students' curfew" from 9.00 a.m. to 12.00 p.m. in the city. This was successful and peaceful.

On January 10, reports were received from Himatnegar in Sabarkanta district that students had indulged in stone-throwing and violence.

Between January 11 and 13, the situation in Ahmedabad became very tense. Students had indulged in stone throwing and other acts of violence.

On January 15, the students in Ahmedabad continued their protest against price rise.

On January 19, students had discussion with the Chief
Minister at Ahmedabad. A kind of agreement was reported to have been
reached according to which the students were to withdraw their agitation
and join colleges.

On January 20, the students' leaders: futed this agreement and continued their agitation.

On January 21, the students in Ahmedabad indulged in violence and were lathi-charged. Students' leaders were arrested.

Students had got colleges, schools and shops closed at Kamrej in Surat district and Deogadh Baria in Panchamahals. In Bhavnagar they made merchants to agree to sell foodgrains and oil at lower prices. In Ahmedabad they joined with the general public in creating disturbances and indulged in violence.

On January 22, students' violence spread to Rajkot, Anand and Navsari. They joined with the general public in Ahmedabad and Surat in indulging in violence. In Ahmedabad students were severely lathicharged.

On January 23, students' violence in Ahmedabad city intensified. They created trouble in Kadi, Sichpur, and Kalol in Mahesana district, in Dholake and Dahegam in Ahmedabad district, in Bhavnagar, in Jetpur of Rajkot district, in Himatnagar of Sabarkantha and in Deesa of Banaskantha districts.

In Ahmedabad, there was stone throwing, burning of buses and looting of shops, Police researted to lathicharge and tear gos.

Police opened fire at Kadi. In Rajpipala of Bhroach district students indulged in stone throwing and looting grain shops. Police resorted to lathi charge. In Moravi students indulged in stone throwing. In Jan Khambhoia of Jannagar district students were reported to indulge in stone throwing and looting of grain shops. In Surat they joined hands with the general public in stone throwing and burning of shops.

In Borsad, Bhadaran and Ankalav towns of Kheda district students organised hartal.

On January 24, it was reported incidents of stone throwing by students in Borsad and Betlad of Kheda district, Patan and Kalol of Mehsana district, and Himatnagar of Sabarkantha district took place.

Shops were looted in Umreth and Chhipani village of Kheda district. Students indulged in violence in Kalol and Fatan of Mehsana district. Police arrested some students in Patan and used teargas. Curfew was also imposed. Grain shops were looted in Umreth and curfew was imposed. In Prentij of Sabarkantha district, students indulged in violence, hence teargas was used and curfew was imposed.

On January 25, Gujarat Bandh was declared by the 14th August Committee. This was supported by the Nav Nirman Samiti of students.

The students joined hands with the general public in Ahmedabad in acts of violence. Police had to resort to teargas several times.

On January 26, the students participated with the general public in looting of grain shops, burning buses and shops and including in wiolence in Ahmedabad. Police had to open fire several times. Some students were killed. Students used violence in Vadodara, Dharangdhara,

Dakor, Lunawada, Godhara, Patan, Deesa, Imbadi, Rajpipala, Cambay and Dahegam. Police resorted to firing in Lunawada, Godhara, Patan, Rajpipala, Cambay and Dahegam. Shops were looted in Anand, Godhara, Cambay, Patlad and Kalol. Schools and colleges were forcibly closed in Rajkot and Amreli.

#### 3. General Public

During the disturbed period, the first indication of the acuteness of the non-availability of foodgrains at the fair price shops in Ahmedabad was obtained by the protest in the meeting of Ahmedabad Jilla Panchayat on 3rd January.

On January 5, the violence errupted in Ahmedabad City. It continued on January 6. Police used lathic harge and teargas.

On January 7, the police could not quell the disturbance in handabad city. Stone throwing and violence continued. Police had to resort to gring several times.

It was reported on January 8 that several grain shops in the city area of Ahmedabad were looted. The public responded to the call of Bandh on January 9. The bandh was peaceful.

On January 10, it was reported that in Wankaner several persons were arrested for inculging in violence. In Vadodra, Nadiad and Kapadvaj grain shops were looted. There was police firing in Kapadvanj b tween January 11 and 13.

On January 15, the general public in Ahmedabad city committed several acts of violence. In Dohad the public inculged in violence and police had to open fire.

On January 17, reports did not indicate any stoppage of violence in Ahmedabad. The general public indulged in violence in Surat, Januagar, Surendranagar and Wadhvan. It spread to smaller towns like Bareja in Ahmedabad district and Modasa in Sabarkantha district.

On January 18, it was reported that police opened fire to stop the acts of violence by the general public. Some persons were killed.

On January 20, violence by the public continued in Ahmedabad.

It spread in Rajkot and smaller towns such as Jetpur and Dhoraji. Violence was indulged in by the public in Januagar and Amrali. Police firing took place in Rajkot, Jetpur, Dhoraji and Januagar.

On January 21, people continued acts of violence in thmedabad and Januagar. Shops were looted in Ahmedabad. The public in Bhavnagar also indulged in violence. Incidents of violence were reported from Godhara and Dohad towns of Panchamahals district. Police opened fire in Dohad.

On January 22, in Ahmedabad the public continued to indulge in violence and grainshops were looted. Violence by the general public was reported from Surat.

On January 23, the incidents of violence in Ahmedabad and Surat continued. In Ahmedabad stone throwing and looting of shops were reported.

Police used lathic harge and opened fire. Some persons were killed.

Looting of shops took place in Surat. Police opened fire in Dholaka to quell the disturbances.

On January 24, the incidents of stone throwing and looking of shops by the public were reported from Rajkot.

On Jamuary 25, there was curfew in several towns. But the public did indulge in violence in Ahmedabad. This continued on Jamuary 26 when people also indulged in looting of grain shops. Police used teargas, opened fire and some persons were killed.

#### 4. Jan Sangh

Jan Sangh had organised Bandhs before and during the period of disturbances.

The events connected with Jan Sangh start with the Bandh in Jetpur in Rajkot district. On January 3, disturbances were reported from Jetpur. There was violence and stone throwing and police had resorted to firing. On January 4, in Jetpur Jan Sangh organised bandh in protest of police attrocities and it was peaceful. On January 5, in Ahmedabad Jan Sangh protested against police attoricites in Jetpur.

On January 7, the report said that violence had errupted on account of the call of bandh by Jan Sangh in Dhrangadhara in Surendranagar district. Police had to use teargas. In Januagar Jan Sangh organised a meeting to protest against the police attrocities in Jetpur. Some persons were arrested.

On January 8, reports of Bandhs organised by Jan Sangh in Valsad and Nadiad were received. At both the places bandhs were successful and peaceful.

On January 10, the reports of Jan Sangh Bandhs in Valsad, inkleshwar and Waghodia said that they were peaceful in all the three towns.

Between January 11 and 13, Jan Sangh had organised Bandhs at Vadali and Vapi in Valsad district and at Rajkot.

On Jaruary 14, it was reported that Jan Sangh had given call for Banch in Bhuj, Anjar, Bhachav and Naliya towns of Kutch district, and also Bardoli in Valsad district, Dhandhuka of Ahmedabad district, Usreth of Kheda district and Halo 1 of Panchmahals district.

On January 17, it was reported that Bandhs were successful in all the above said towns.

On January 19, Bandhs were reported from Junesadh, Veraval, Porbandar and Kesod towns of Junesadh district. They were all successful. From Surat also reports were received about a successful hadh organised by January.

On Jamuary 21, it was reported that Bar has were organised in Halol and Shivrajpur in Panchmahals district. They were successful.

On January 24, the reports were received that Bandh organised by Jan Sangh in Bavala in Ahmedabad district was successful.

On January 27, Jan Sangh protested against police attractities in Valsad. In Rajpipala, Jan Sangh workers undertook hungerstrike as a protest against police attractities.

#### 4. Khedut Samaj

Khedut Samaj is an organisation of farmers. It had organised agitation against the policy of high compulsory levy of paddy. Its activities were localised in Surat and Valsad districts.

On January 1, Khedut Sanaj had organised a meeting at Kanrej in Surat district to protest against the levy price of government. Some persons were arrested. On January 2, the agitation was continued in Bardoli.

On January 4, two leaders of Khedut Sanaj were arrested at Bardoli.

On Jamuary 6, there was a conflict between farmers and agricultural labourers in Malekpur village. In Navsari a hartal was organised by Khedut Sanaj. It was successful and peaceful.

With liberalisation of levy of foodgrains, Khedut Sanaj withdrew its agitation. The Khedut Sanaj leaders were released.

#### Other Agencies

From the chart it will be clear that other agencies had not played a major role except Shramjivi Samiti along with other organisers had given a call for Gujarat Bandh on 25th.

#### B. Relationship between Events and Political Parties

The description of the events and their connection with different agencies makes it very clear that no organised political party was behind the disturbances. Jan Sangh was the only party which had organised Bandh in different towns of Gujarat as a well planned programme. Except for Jetpur everywhere Bandhs were very peaceful. It will be therefore not correct to blame Jan Sangh for disturbances.

CPI was reported to be responsible for organising Bandhs in Bhavnagar and Mahuva. At both the places Bandhs were peaceful.

At no other place CPI seems to have teen involved.

Congress (0) was responsible for organising bandh in Lunawada of Panchmahals district. The influence of Congress (0) in the disturbed towns seems to be minimal.

1.75

Students and the general public were largely connected with the events of violence, stone throwing, and looting of grain shops in Ahmedabad and other towns. The way the events have taken place clearly indicates that they were more of a spontaneous nature rather than a well thought out planned programe. It is therefore difficult to infer that a particular political party was behind these disturbances.

#### C. Causes of Disturbances

If we reject the hypothesis that no particular organised group was behind the disturbances, we must search for the causes of the disturbances somewhere else. What could be the reasons for the spontaneousness of the violent disturbances? The spontaneousness is explained partly by the fact that the disturbances were connected with the non-availability of foodgrains at reasonable prices in the open market and at controlled prices from the fair price shops.

In understanding the problem of non-availability of foodgrains, we will have to understand the characteristics of the places where disturbances have taken place and of the people who had participated in these disturbances.

It is somewhat surprising that in the whole month of disturbances, reports were not received indicating that the trouble had spread to villages or smaller towns. Several studies have shown that of the

people living below poverty line a majority lives in villages and small towns as agricultural labourers, small farmers and artisans.

Why is it that these people did not participate in the agitation against the rising prices of food grains and non-availability of food grains from the fair price shops?

The answer is neither simple nor easy.

Before we try to answer this question, we should try to analyse the data of 72 towns from which disturbances were reported.

Table 1 gives the districtwise details. Although the major disturbances had started in Ahmedabad city, they have not spread in all the towns of Ahmedabad district. The highest percentage of affected towns to total towns was in Panchmahals (77.7%) followed by Sabarkantha (71.1%)

Table 1: Number of Disturbed Towns

Sl. No.	District	Total No. of towns	Disturbed Towns	%
3.5	100			
1	Ahmedabad	. 11	6	54.5
2.	Kheda	17	7	41.2
3∔	Mahesana	13	7	53.8
4.	Vadodara	12	3	25.0
5.	Panchmahals :	9	7	77.7
ô.	Surat	11	2	18.1
7.	Junagadh	21	4	19.0
8.	Rajkot	12	6	50.0
9.	Valsad	14	4	21.4
10.	Bhavnagar	14	4	28.5
11.	Banaskantha	8	3	37.5
12.	Sabarkantha	7	5	71.1
13.	Jamnagar	15	2	13.3
14.	Bharuch	7	4	57.1
15.	Kutch	11	3	27.2
16.	Amreli	12	1	8.3
17.	Surendranagar	12	4	36.3
18.	Gandhinagar	1	<b>1</b> .,	
		206	72	<del></del>

This can be attributed to the relative poverty of town people in these two districts compared to other districts. The higher proportion of disturbed towns in Mehesana, Rajkot and Kheda districts could be attributed to greater anti-Congress(R) feeling in these districts. The small proportion of disturbed towns in Amreli, Januagar, Surat, Junagadh and Valsad may be due to the influence of Congress (R).

The geographical distribution of disturbed towns might have some relationship with the political influences. But the major factor which seemed to have a higher influence on the occurrence of disturbances in different towns is the population.

Table 2 gives the distribution of towns according to population.

	~~~~	,		
Disturbed	Not Misturbed	Total		
52	11	63		
20	123	143		
72	134	206		
	52 20	Disturbed         Not Disturbed           52         11           20         123		

Table 2: Distribution of Towns according to Topulation

The chi square test showed that there was a positive association between the population and the occurrence of disturbances. Higher the population higher was the probability of the occurrence of disturbance.

Because students were in the forefront of disturbances, an attempt was made to find out whether higher education was associated with disturbance. The percentage of literate population of a town was used as a proxy variable for higher education.

 $X^2 = 90.3$  Significant at .001%

Table 3 gives the details.

Table 3: Distribution of Towns according to Literacy Groups

Literacy Groups	No. of Towns							
areaps	Disturbed	Not Disturbed	7. 5.	To tal				
> 50%	62	46		108				
< 50%	<b>10</b>	88		98				
	72	134		206				

 $x^2 = 28.4$  Significant .001%

The chi square test showed that there was a high association between education and disturbance.

As literacy percentage and population of a town were correlated, we disaggregated data of literacy groups for particular population groups. Table 4 gives the details.

Table 4: Mistribution of Towns

Literacy groups	Disturbed	d Not Disturbed	Total
	Of Fopulation nore	than 20,000 persons	
>50%	47	6	<b>5</b> 3
₹50%	<u>5</u> <u>52</u>	<u>5</u> 11	<u>10</u> 63
$x^2 = 8.7$	Significant .005%		
*	Of Population less	than 20,000 persons	•
> 50%	15	<b>40</b>	55
< 50 %		83 123	<u>88</u> 143
x <sup>2</sup> = > 为集	Significant .001		

The results of chi square tests showed that there was a high association between literacy and disturbance but in the towns with more than 20000

population higher literacy was associated with disturbances and in towns with less than 20000 population lower literacy was associated with no disturbances.

Although students had played an important role in disturbances they appeared to be more as symbols rather than the cause of the trouble.

The disturbance was mainly caused by the shortage of foodgrains in the public distribution system and non-availability of foodgrains in the open market at reasonable prices.

Everyone asks the question: why should this happen when Gujarat had a bumper crop this year?

The fact of the bumber crop is yet to be established. It is true that Kharif crops in 1973-74 were such better than those in 1972-73, which was one of the worst years. Unfortunately the authentic data of the Kharif production are not available. Whatever data I was able to gather leads me to believe that the Kharif production during 1973-74 was not extraordinary.

The production of foodgrains in Gujarat state from 1966-67 onwards was as follows:

Table 5: Production of Foodgrains

				(in thou	sand tonne	es)
Year	Rice	Wheat	Bajara	Jowar	Maize	Total food- grains
1966-67	294.3	456.9	756.0	324.0	145.2	2185.9
1967-68	463.5	706.4	1182.0	400.5	275.8	3330.4
1968-69	230.0	620.5	0.008	316.6	149.1	2345.9
1969-70	447.4	591.6	1204.7	386.6	289.1	3221.0
1970-71	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	4406.0
1971-72	N.A.	N.A.	N. 1.	N. 1.	N. 1.	4220.0
1972-73	N.1.	N.1.	N.A.	. N.A.	N • 1 •	1970.0
1973-74	440.3	N.A.	1235.8	N.A.	177.2	

The production of Kharif bajara and paddy in 1973-74 is more or less at the same level as in 1969-70 which had the total production of 32 lakh tonnes. Looking to the paucity of fertiliser and diesel oil, one cannot expect that wheat production would be much higher than 1969-70 level. Thus the total production in 1973-74 would not be more than 30 lakh tonnes.

The annual requirement of foodgrains of 1971 population of Gujarat would be about 38.98 lakh tonnes at the rate of 400 gms per day per capita. Hence there is an overall shortage of foodgrains. Gujarat has been traditionally an importer of foodgrains. After the imposition of restrictions on movement of foodgrains from one state to the other, the Central government had taken the responsibility of meeting the deficit of foodgrains of the State at least in the public distribution

Unfortunately we do not have complete data of foodgrains made available by the Centre to the State. It is also not known whether the Centre and the State government had allowed the private trade to import foodgrains in Gujarat after the imposition of zonal restrictions.

The data of issues for public distribution in Gujarat State which we have obtained through published sources throws some light on the problem of acuteness of the deficit of foodgrains.

Table 6: Issue of Foodgrains to Gujarat State

Yea <b>r</b>	Production of Foodgrains	, Issues
1966-67	2185.9	2092
1967-68	3330.4	799
1968-69	2345.9	643
1969-70	3221.0	253
1970-71	4406.0	?
1971-72	4220.0	?
1972-73	1970.0	?

It will be seen that the quantity issued to the public distribution system was declining from 1966 onwards. Perhaps by 1971-72 it must have reached a negligible quantity. In 1972-73, the State government must have been forced to get foodgrains from the centre. Because of substantial production of foodgrains the normal trade channels in 1970-71 and 1971-72 must have taken off the pressure from the public distribution system. This might have led to complacency on the part of the authorities for procuring foodgrains for the public distribution system. This must have caused great difficulties in supplying adequate

quantities of foodgrains to the public distribution system in 1972-73 and 1973-74.

Super imposed on this is the situation created by wheat take over in April 1973. There was a talk of rice take over after the harvest of kharif paddy in 1973-74. This must have led to a psychological breakdown of the normal market channels of foodgrains. Farmers who normally sell their produce to merchants must have either entered in collusion with the merchants in not bringing their produces in the open market or they must have stored foodgrains and tried to release it at a much slower pace. The data of market arrivals would prove this.

It is this phenomenon which explains why prices of foodgrains are rising inspite of "good" crops. The problem of money supply during this period should not be ignored.

With this background of the food supply if we try to enswer why the disturbances were limited to towns of population of more than 20000 only and why farmers and agricultural labourers did not participate in the agitation, we can offer the following hypothesies.

- (1) Movement of foodgrains from local production is restricted upto mandi towns upto which the farmers and merchants can have "controlled distribution".
- (2) Agricultural labourers, small farmers and artisans must have been paid in terms of grains in rural areas.
- (2) If "cheap" foodgrains are made available in towns and cities through the public distribution system a part of the local production would flow in the open market.

(4) If the normal market channels are activised and given the confidence that the state does not intend to interfere unless absolutely required, a larger flow of foodgrains to the open market would take place.

If these hypotheses could be validated, the causes of the current agitation are then restricted to the urban areas. The major cause is the food problem of the urban poor.

The urban poor in Gujarat would include

- (a) the unorganised labour which earns its livelihood by daily wages, (These are badali workers, hanals, domestic servants and others)
- (b) the service class in the lower income group
  - Government and other institutions' servants in Class IV and III categories

  - (ii) Shop assistants(iii) Frinary School Teachers
  - (iv) Employees in Small Scale industries
- (c) self employed persons such as Cobblers, vendors, mickshaw drivers and others
- (d) shall shop owners

The organised labour particularly the unionised textile labour does not fall under the classification of the urban poor. It is noteworthy that the textile labour did not participate in the agitation.

The classification of the parental occupation of the majority of students studying in Ahmedabad and other towns will show that they belong to the urban poor.

It is understandable therefore that in the current agitation students and the people belonging to the urban poor had participated.

proceedings of the party

It is a sad commentary on the present political system that these people were frustrated to the point that they could not see any other alternative to mitigate their grievances but through the violent means.

The failure to provide adequate quantity of foodgrains to the urban poor at controlled prices from the fair price shops is the failure on the part of the State and the Central governments. The State government has to take the blane for not managing the public distribution system properly. If the state government could not manage the public distribution system of foodgrains because of the failure on the part of the Central government to provide foodgrains in time, this should have been made known to public and pressure brought on the Centre.

The present disturbances have raised questions about the Central-State relationship in the management of the public food distribution system. It is important to study this problem in details.

#### 1.5 Suggestions ...

At present the more important question is how to tackle the current crisis.

The short-term solution of the present problem is to obtain foodgrains at the rate of about one lake tonnes per month and "flood" the fair price shops with foodgrains. Along with the foodgrains other essential commodities such as kerosene, oil, and sugar should be obtained on emergency basis and distributed through fair price shops.

The long-term solution is the creation of a buffer stock of foodgrains at the state level. Gujarat is a deficit state and considering the present political situation it should not remain at the merchy of the Central government or other surplus states.

Gujarat has a comparative advantage in production of cotton and groundnut and in coarse grains such as bajara. It should concentrate its efforts on these crops.

- 1. Massive investments should be made in research on production of cotton, oil seeds and coarse grains. This should be on the lines of International Rice Research Institute (Phillippines) or International Crop Research Institute at Hyderabad.
- 2. With the increased production of cotton and groundnut, the government should impose levy on these crops and procure about 10 per cent of the produce at controlled price.
- 3. The State corporation should be set up for the procurement of cotton and oil seeds and buffer stock operation of foodgrains.
  Profits realised from the sale of oil seeds and cotton either within or outside the State should be used for the operation of buffer stock of foodgrains.

Foodgrains should be obtained from the Central government and open market from within and outside the State to build up the buffer stock.

#### 1.6 Conclusions

- 1. The analysis of the disturbances shows that they were of a spontaneous nature and caused mainly by the failure of distribution of foodgrains through the fair price shops in the urban areas of Gujarat.
- 2. No political party seemed to have a hand behind the disturbances.
  - 3. Jan Sangh had organized a programme of Bandhs in different towns of Gujarat. This programme was successful and peaceful.
  - 4. Students who had spearheaded disturbances in different towns of Gujarat were demonstrating the frustration of the urban poor and acted more as symbols rather than the causes of disturbances.
  - 5. The State government had failed to sense the acuteness of the food problem faced by the urban poor.
    - 6. Instead of concentrating on obtaining food supplies from outside the state for distribution through the fair price shops in the urban areas, the State government blew hot and cold with the farmers and merchants in the state to procure from the local production.
    - 7. It was clear that the procurement from local production would not have solved the problem of supplies of foodgrains to the public distribution system.
    - 8. The State government failed to make the Central government understand the seriousness of the food problem.

- 9. The Central government failed to sense the acutness of the food problem and was reluctant to either supply adequate quantities of foodgrains in time or allow the state government to purchase foodgrains from the surplus states.
- 19. This raises the question about the correctness of the present food policies of Government of India. It appears that the state governments are made to suffer the consequencies of the failure of actions of the Central government.
- 11. The psychological effect of wheat take-over on the normal market channels of foodgrains is yet to be measured. It is not known whether the attitude which Gujarat farmers and merchants have shown in slowing down the flow of foodgrains to open market is a temporary phenomenon or a sign of the beginning of the break-down of the whole system.
- 12. The short-term solution for the present crisis is to "flood" the fair price shops in the urban areas in Gujarat with foodgrains.
- 13. The long-term solution is to build up a buffer-stock of foodgrains at the State level. Gujarat can undertake this operation by taking advantage of its cotton and oil seeds crops. It is suggested that a State corporation be set up to procure cotton and oilseeds (say upto 10 per cent of the total produce) at fixed prices and sell the produce after processing to generate enough surpluses to operate buffer stock of foodgrains which may be procured from within and outside the State.

14. Except for the operation of public distribution system for the weaker sections of the society, the normal channels of foodgrains distribution should be allowed to function which could be indirectly controlled by buffer stock operations.

	Appendix 1 Types of Agencies
Code No.	
1	Khedut Samaj
2	Jan Sangh
3	Students
4	CPI
5	Shram Jivi Samiti
6	Congress (a)
7	Congress (R)
8	State government
9	Central Government
10	MPs
11	Rice millers and Merchants
12	Dil millers and merchants
13	Majoor Mahajan
14.	Others
15	Agricultural labourers
16	Farmers
17	Gujarat University Authorities
18	Grain Merchants

#### Appendix 2 Types of Lents

#### Code No.

- 1 Peaceful Hartal
- 2 Peaceful Bandh
- 3 Stone throwing
- 4 Burning of buses and shops and other places: violence
- 5 Shop looting
- 6 Grain shop looting
- 7 Arrests
- 8 Lathi charge by police
- 9 Firing by police
- 10 Persons killed
- 11 Breaking furnitures in colleges
- 12 Government raid on rice mills and morchants
- 13 Agreement between rice millers and government
- 14 Tear gas
- 15 Curfew
- 16 Central Government agreed to supply additional food grains
- 17 Agreement between students and State Government
- 18 Agreement between students and State Govt refuted
- 19 Agreement between students and memchants
- 20 No agreement between State Government and Shramjivi Samiti
- 21 Forcible closure of shops
- 22 Forcible closure of schools and colleges

#### Appendix 3 Types of Actions

- 1 Government levy efforts strengthened
- 2 Discussion with merchants and rice millers
- 3 Discussion with students
- 4 Discussion with oil millers
- 5 Discussion with Shramjivi Saniti
- 6 Public distribution of foodgrains
- 7 Declaration of of scarcity conditions
- 8 Negotiation with central government
- 9 Satyagrah against levy
- 10 Protest against price rise
- Protest against police atrocities
- 12 Bandh against price rise
- 13 Meetings for protest
- 14 Processions
- 15 Hunger strike
- 16 Students agitation
- 17 Tightening measures against illegal exports of foodgrains
- 18 Complain about inadequacy of foodgrains in fair price shops
- 19 Protest against arrests
- 20 Not to purchase paddy from farmers till government procured paddy according to target
- 21 Cooperation from farmers to give 10,000 tons of bajri
- 22 Liberalisation of levy rules
- 23 Appeal against bandh
- 24 Application of section 144

#### Appendix 3 contd.....

- 25 Demand for President's Rule
- 26 Liberalised supplies to hostels
- 27 Change in Supplies portfolio
- 28 Liberalised inter-district m. vement of bajra-
- 29 Discussion regarding selling foodgrains and oil at prescribed rates
- 30 Liberalised interstate movement of coarse grains
- 31 Demand for fresh elections

Appendix 4 Places where events have occurred

	Places						
	Districts		Town	ns/	cities		•.
1	Ahmedabad	1.	Ahmedabad	2.	Dhandhuka	3.	3areja
		4.	Dholaka	5.	Dajegen	6.	Bavalı
		7.	Viramgam				
2	Kheda	1.	Nadiad	2.	Umreth	3.	Kapadvanj
		4.	Cambay	5.	Anand	ó.	Borsad
		7.	Bhadran	8.	Ch <b>hi</b> padi	9.	Petlad
		10.	Dakor				
3	Mehsana	1.	Mehsana	2.	Sidh pur	3.	Radi
		4.	Kalol	5.	√ <b>i</b> snagar	6.	Unja
		7.	Patan				
4	Vadodara	1.	Vadodara	2.	Waghodia	3.	Karaj <b>an</b>
. 5.	Panchmahals	1.	God <b>hera</b>	2.	Lunawada	3.	Halol
		4.	Santrampur	<b>5</b> .	Devgarh Beria	5.	Shivarajpur
		7.	Dohad	8.	Jhalod	9.	Vejalpur
		10.	Kalol				
6	Surat	1.	Surat	2.	Kamr <b>e</b> j	3.	Bardoli
7	Junagadh	1.	Junagadh	2.	Veramel	3.	Porbander
		4.	Prabhas-Pata	an :	. Kesod		
8	Rajkot	1.	Rajkot	2.4	Jetpur	3.	Moravi
		4.	Dhoraji .	5.	Wankaner	6.	Jasd <b>an</b>
		7.	Upleta				
9	Valsad	1.	Valsad	2.	Mavsari	3.	Vacali
		4.	Vapi	5.	Melekpur		
10	Bhavnagar	1.	Bhavnagar	2.	Mahuva		
11	Baneskonthi	1.	Alanpur	2.	De e 🖘	3.	Radhanpur
12	Sakarkantha	1.	Himatnagar	2.	Modasa	3.	Idar
		4.	Talod	5.	Prantij		

#### Appendix 4 contd.....

13 Jamnagar

1. Jamnagar 2. Jam Khambholia

14 Bharauch

1. Bharauch 2. Ankleshwar

3. Janbusar.

4. Rajpipala

15 Kutch

1. Bhuj 2. Anjar

3. Bhachan

4. Naliya

16 Amreli

l. Amreli

17 Surendranagar

1. Surendranagar

2. Dharangandhra

3. Vadhvan

4. Limbadi

18 Gandhinagar

19 The Dangs

20 Delhi

21 Gujarat

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