

Individual pay, performance and career stages: A study in the context of the Men's cricket team of India

Girish Balasubramanian

XLRI, Xavier School of Business

Dr. Gloryson Chalil R B

XLRI, Xavier School of Business

Abstract

Extensive research has been done in the field of professional sports and interesting implications have been drawn for organizations. Using Cricket as a professional sport we study the linkage between pay, performance and career stages, based on Equity Theory, Expectancy Theory and Career Stage Theory. Career Stages was operationalized as consisting of three stages- initiation, development and iconic. We found support for Equity theory in both over reward and under reward scenarios for the players identified in development stage of the career. We also found statistical support for over reward leading to increase in performance. Our results also indicate higher influence of Expectancy Theory over Equity Theory during Initiation stage of Career for batting and vice-versa for bowling.

Keywords: Equity Theory, Expectancy Theory, Career Stage, Cricket, Performance

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Introduction

Professional Sports has been used as a metaphor for many organizational studies to enrich our understanding about organizations, management and behaviour (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012). They are analogous to the controlled laboratory settings for organizational studies. Rules are clear and enforced in an unbiased manner, the boundary conditions for the organizations are also clear (Wolfe et al., 2005). Exogenous factors uniformly affect all the teams or individuals involved with the sports. The context of professional sports offers the flexibility to study the exact nature of individual pay and individual performance as elaborate records of performance are maintained at all levels. Therefore the scientific study of behaviour of individuals and groups can be carried out and interesting insights for academia as well as practitioners can be drawn out by studying sports (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). Within professional sports, the themes that have been researched so far include managerial succession and organization performance (Fizzel & D'Itri, 1999), pay for performance, motivation, executive compensation, pay dispersion/dispairity and performance (Matt Bloom, 1999; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012), career transitions (Gordon & Lavalley, 2011; Wylleman, Alferman, & Lavalley, 2004; Wylleman, Knop, Menkehorst, Theeboom, & Annerel, 1993), escalation of commitment (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Staw & Hoang, 1995; Wolfe et al., 2005). The relation between pay and performance is of immense interest to both practitioners and researchers of management. Evidence for pay for performance is mixed and at best inconclusive (Day et al., 2012; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Milkovich, Newman, & Ramanan, 2009; Wolfe et al., 2005). The relation between pay and performance is impacted by factors like tenure with the organization, age, experience in related profession, hierarchy within the organization (Cron, Dubinsky, & Michaels, 1988; Smart, 1998). The attitudes and behaviours towards work changes as one gains

experience, which is the broad focus of the career stage literature (Gordon & Lavalley, 2011; Lynn, Cao, & Horn, 1996; Sonnenfeld & Kotter, 1982). Our understanding of the relation between pay and performance would be enhanced by considering the career stages of the individual which is one of the contributions of this study.

The sports contexts that have been extensively researched are the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Major League Baseball (MLB), and the National Football League (NFL). Lord and Hohenfeld (1979) has done a longitudinal study of 23 MLB players without a signed contract, Simmons and Berri (2011) has studied the effects of pay dispersion in the context of NBA, Harder (1992) has done a comparative study of NBA and MLB from the perspective of team member interdependence. Baseball and cricket are very similar sports. However the rules in cricket are slightly complicated. The 10th edition of the Cricket World Cup drew a record viewership of about 162 million (Mukherjee, 2011). Brand Finance, a popular Brand valuation consultancy has valued the Indian Premier League at US \$ 2.99 billion (Glover, 2013). Cricket too is a popular sport and has an immense fan following and India is no exception to the Cricket mania. It would be no exaggeration to say that Cricket in India is like a religion, and Sachin Tendulkar is God of Cricket. But Cricket in spite of its popularity, has been rarely used for deriving managerial implications which is the second contribution of this study.

This paper is an attempt to understand the effect of career stages on individual pay and individual performance. It is also perhaps one of the first studies to test the Equity Theory and the Expectancy Theory in the context of Cricket. We found statistical support for Equity Theory for the players identified in the development stage. We have also found support for over reward prediction of Equity Theory. The organization of the paper is as follows: We first give a brief theoretical background for Equity Theory, Expectancy Theory and Career Stage Theory leading

to the hypothesis formation. Next we explain the operationalization of key variables, followed by the results. Discussion of results is carried out and we finally conclude with the theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and directions for future research.

Theoretical background and hypothesis development

Motivation theories form the basis for pay for performance studies. Extensive research has been carried out to study the link between motivations, performance and extrinsic rewards specifically monetary rewards. Amongst the various theories of motivation that have been put to test are the Theory of Hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943a, 1943b), the Two Factor Theory (Herzberg, 1987), Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964), the Equity Theory (Adams, 1965). Equity Theory and Vroom's Expectancy Theory are the most tried and tested theories in pay for performance studies in professional sports (for eg. Duchon & Jago, 1981; Harder, 1992; Hauenstein & Lord, 1989; Howard & Miller, 1993). It is assumed that pay elicits the required behaviour as a result of which the output should be increased effort leading to better performance of the individual.

Equity Theory

Equity Theory is a special case of cognitive dissonance (Adams, 1963; Festinger, 1954). Equity theory posits that a feeling of inequity is created in a transaction in which service is exchanged for pay. In the context of professional sports, one can safely assume that efforts translate into performance (Day et al., 2012). Efforts and rewards should be positively related. Since efforts leads to performance, performance and rewards should be positively related. In the context of work an individual constantly evaluates the fairness of job inputs and outputs, the inputs being the effort leading to performance and the output being pay. This comparison is also carried with respect to the co-workers. The output should generally be in proportion to the input.

Equity theory posits that when, the individual perceives that the output is not in proportion to the input then; (s) he would try and balance the input accordingly. This implies that for almost similar kind of jobs, almost similar pay should be awarded or else a feeling of inequity is created because of cognitive dissonance. Adams (1963, p. 3) defined inequity as, “*Inequity exists for a person whenever his perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he perceives are the inputs and/or outcomes of Other*”. Thus there is a comparison with the other, who can be a co-worker, team member or a person doing a similar kind of work. This gives rise to two possible situations of inequity. First, the inequity caused because of under reward which leads to adjustment of input (effort/performance) to match the output (pay received) and second is the inequity caused due to the over reward which should also lead to adjustment of the input in proportion of the output. The condition of under reward is harmful because the individual reduces input to match the output which implies that effort and hence performance would reduce. The condition of over reward is beneficial because performance is likely to improve. This implies that this feeling of inequity that arises under conditions of over reward and under reward can be inferred from the outcomes. Most often the outcomes used to infer are the performance parameters.

Extensive research has been carried out on the effects of pay and performance on the basis of Equity Theory in the context of sports, but results are inconclusive (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). For eg. Lord and Hohenfeld (1979), M Bloom and Michel (2002), Harder (1992) found support for predictions related to decrease in performance due to a feeling of under reward while Duchon and Jago (1981) and Howard and Miller (1993) could not find complete support to the Equity Theory. All these studies were conducted in the context of MLB. Drawing close parallels between the two sports, the averages in terms of batting and bowling are good

indicators of performance. Both the skills are equally necessary in the game of cricket; however it has been found that some players excel in either one or both the skills. For the purpose of this paper these two skills have been taken as separate indicators of performance. In the context of Equity Theory, the batting and bowling averages are good indicators for inferring performance and hence effort.

Expectancy theory

The equity theory has a limitation as there is ambiguity with regard to the individual's action (to leave, or to change the comparison set) when a feeling of inequity is there (Miner, 1980; Mowday, 1996; Opshal & Dunnette, 1966). Equity Theory is a process theory of motivation, i.e. on the basis of this theory, manager uses the outcome to motivate the employees. Another process theory of motivation is the Expectancy Theory. According to this theory, motivation is the result of the employee's perception of their ability to perform a job, the probability of being rewarded for good performance, and relative importance attached to the rewards given by the organization. Motivation is the product of expectancy, instrumentality and valence (Lawler, 1966; Vroom, 1964). According to this theory the link between pay and performance is very critical. Moreover the line of sight in terms of rewards becomes one of the key factors in motivating the employees. The reward based on performance should be large enough to act as a significant motivator (Milkovich et al., 2009). In line with the rationality and opportunistic behaviour assumption of economics, an individual would choose the behaviour that leads to the maximum reward. Moreover the individual should believe that (s)he can influence the performance targets. It is expected that performance would not be impacted by current rewards only but also the expectations of future rewards. In spite of receiving low monetary rewards, performance might still be improved because of expectations of future rewards.

Sportspersons have been offered contracts based on the performances in the initial stages of the careers (Day et al., 2012; Rosenbaum, 1979) and Cricket also is not an exception. Based on the line of sight argument and the rewards being sufficiently high to elicit better performance, one can expect that the players who are relatively young would always try to perform better irrespective of the current rewards. They expect future rewards in terms of promotion to a higher grade, long term contracts, and other rewards in terms of endorsements. Thus for relatively young players, based on the Expectancy Theory, we can infer that the performance in terms of batting averages and bowling averages would not depend on the perception of current reward.

The career stage theory

The aspects of motivations are not constant throughout the career. Research indicates that the needs and motivations at the starting of the career might be quite different in the other stages of careers (Lawler, 1966; Maslow, 1943a, 1943b). The career stage investigation is not only an area of interest amongst researchers in the field of professional sports but also a widely researched area in the organizational context (Day et al., 2012; Gordon & Lavalley, 2011; Wylleman et al., 2004). Research points towards evidence of individuals' preference towards various rewards changes according to the career stages (Lynn et al., 1996). The assumptions while developing the career stage models are that individuals go through specific developmental cycles, the work attitudes and behaviours are different in different career stages. The factors like age, tenure with the organization, and experience in related profession all contribute in different ways to the learning, and the work attitudes. Hence these factors can be clubbed under one head the career stage. It is expected to affect the relation between pay and performance (Bedeian, Pizzolatto, Long, & Griffith, 1991; Cron et al., 1988). In the context of professional sports, performance is not stable and past performances do not necessarily point towards potential future

performances. Sports persons are often offered long term contracts on the basis of the performances in early career stages. Henry and Hulin (1987) found that there was a decreasing trend in the relationship between past performance and performance in subsequent seasons for the professional baseball players. Career theory divides the career into broadly five stages namely growth, exploration, establishment, maintenance and decline stages (Super, 1980). Growth and exploration stages are more related to learning the skills. Establishment stage is related to honing and fine tuning one's skills. Maintenance stage is related to application of the skills that have been learnt. And finally the decline stage is related to the exit from the career (Super, 1980; Super & Hall, 1978). Another view divides the career into four stages. Stage I is concerned with learning and helping, stage II as an independent contributor, stage III concerned with imparting training and mentoring and finally stage IV is concerned with shaping the future of the organization (Dalton, Thompson, & Price, 1977). Research has also found individuals progress through distinct career stages and in each stage the developmental challenges, the psychological needs, and career concerns are unique (Dalton et al., 1977; Hall & Nougaim, 1968). The effect of rewards on performance also depends on the career stage. Extensive research has been conducted in order to study the effect of career stage on rewards and performance (Lynn et al., 1996; Smart, 1998). In the context of sports also career transitions do occur, which points out to the presence of career stages. There are two distinct patterns found which have been named as normative and the non-normative career transitions (Day et al., 2012; Wylleman et al., 2004). The non-normative transition is more unpredictable and unanticipated. However both type of transitions lead to some distinct stage in career. The context of sports also follows the other career models albeit the careers at international level or professional level are

relatively shorter compared to the careers of individuals in organizations because of fitness, and age related issues.

Based on various career models and research conducted in the field of professional sports the three broad career stages that can be observed are the initiation stage, the development stage and the mastery or iconic stage (B. S. Bloom, 1985; Leonard, 1996; Wylleman et al., 1993). The initiation stage of the career is more concerned with learning the skills and tips and tricks of the trade. The development stage of the career is more related to developing and fine tuning the skills learnt and finally the iconic stage is a stage which leads to extensive application of skills learnt. Mastery of the required skills leads to challenge seeking. Prior studies have looked at career stages from the view point of age, tenure with organization and hierarchy. In the context of Cricket as a sport there is no such hierarchy except for the captain of the team and the rest of the players hence hierarchy cannot be used to determine the career stage. Besides as the players play more and more matches in any format of the game, the skills of the players tend to improve.

The focus of this paper is on the aspects of individual pay and individual performance in the context of Indian Men's Cricket team. Based on the three career stage theory and the expectancy theory, in the early stage or the initiation stage of the career individuals are still learning the ropes of the trade. Individuals are also aware about the future rewards that can be earned in terms of promotion to a higher grade and long term contracts based on the performance. Moreover the rewards in terms of future contracts and movement to higher grades and are sufficiently large enough to motivate the players to perform better even if the players feel under compensated or under rewarded. According to the Equity Theory, we expect under rewarded players to report lower levels of performance but based on Expectancy Theory as discussed above during Initiation Stage of the career, we hypothesize that

Hypothesis 1: Under rewarded individuals in the initiation stage of the career will not report lower levels of performance.

The development and iconic stages are associated with extensive application of the skills learnt. Hence the individuals are expected to perform better. In the development and the iconic stages the Equity theory comes into play, where in the individual compares himself/herself with his/her peers or the co-workers. Thus feeling of inequity is created when the rewards do not seem to be in proportion to the efforts which in turn are reflected in the performance. This inequity leads to two possible situations out of which one is the feeling of inequity created due to under reward, which leads to the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2a: Under rewarded individuals in the development stage of the career would report lower levels of performance

Hypothesis 2b: Under rewarded individuals in the iconic stage of the career would report lower levels of performance.

A feeling of inequity is created when an individual is over rewarded. However the over reward is beneficial as individuals tend to increase their effort ultimately leading to increase in performance. Thus for the individuals identified in the development and iconic stages, over reward should lead to increase in efforts leading to increase in performance. This leads to the next set of hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3a: Over rewarded individuals in the development stage of the career would report higher levels of performance

Hypothesis 3b: Over rewarded individuals in the iconic stage of career would report higher levels of performance.

Data and Sample

The list of contracted players for the period of 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 (till 31st May 2013) was collected from espncriinfo.com. The fixed pay offered to players in Grade A was INR 10 million, Grade B received INR 5 Million and Grade C players received INR 2.5 million. The contracted players received a variable pay of 0.7 million per test match, 0.4 million per one day international and 0.2 million per T-20 international. For the purpose of this paper we have considered the performance year from 1st October of the current year till the 30th September of the following year ("BCCI," 2013; staff, 2012; "Statsguru," 2013). Table 1 gives the details for the number of players in each grade-year wise, total number of contracts offered year wise, number of promotions/demotions to a higher/lower grade, number of players who have announced retirement and the number of players who have been reoffered/newly offered a contract.

	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
Grade A	9	12	9
Grade B	7	5	9
Grade C	8	20	19
Total players offered contract	24	37	37
Players Promoted	6	6	4
Players demoted	2	1	3
New Players offered Contract	2	14	4
Players announced retirement	0	0	2

Table 1: Details of number of players' grade wise for the years 2010-11 2011-12 and 2012-13

Data was collected in terms of age, tenure, experience in terms of total matches played, the career batting average, career bowling average, runs scored throughout the career, wickets taken

throughout the career, total matches played in the previous year, total runs scored in the previous year, wickets taken in the previous year and the pay as a part of the contractual obligations with BCCI for the years 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 (till May 2013) a total of 98 players all the three years taken together.

Measures

Career Stage

For the purpose of this paper, career stages have been taken to be made of three stages namely the initiation stage, the development stage and the iconic stage. Prior studies have operationalized career stages on the basis of age, tenure and hierarchy in organization (A. Cohen, 1991; Smart, 1998; Smart & Peterson, 1994). Bedeian et al. (1991) have found inconsistencies in the measures of career stages. Experience in terms of the total matches seems to be the best indicator to observe these transitions and stages as one would be able to learn the ropes only be actually participating and playing in international matches. The players who had played up to 35 international matches (all formats of the game included) were categorized in the initiation stage, players who had played up to 150 international matches were categorized in the development stage and players who had played more than 150 international matches were categorized in the iconic stage.

Inequity

Inequity has been operationalized in terms of over reward or under reward in terms of the pay received by the players. Pay is taken as the addition of the grade related pay and the pay received in terms of each match appearance for the year under consideration, in other words salary for the year is the total pay received as a part of the contractual obligations with BCCI. As a first step pay was modelled based on Harder (1992) study in the context of MLB. A similar

method was used by (Levine, 1993). A log model for salary was determined. The expected equation is as mentioned in equation 1. It was expected that the salary paid would depend on the age, total matches played in the career, total matches played in the last year, tenure, total runs scored throughout the career, wickets taken throughout the career, runs scored in the last year, wickets taken in the last year and batting and bowling averages last year and throughout the career. It was expected that batting average should be positively related while bowling average should be negatively related. However it was found that the runs scored and the wickets taken in the last year were the only two significant predictors of salary with adjusted R² of 67%. Equation 2 gives the final model that was used as a predictor for salary.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln salary = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 tenure + \beta_3 total\ matches\ in\ career \\
 & + \beta_4 total\ matches\ in\ last\ year + \beta_5 batting\ average\ in\ last\ year \\
 & + \beta_6 bowling\ average\ in\ last\ year + \beta_7 runs\ scored\ in\ last\ year \\
 & + \beta_8 wickets\ taken\ in\ last\ year + \beta_9 career\ batting\ average \\
 & + \beta_{10} career\ bowling\ average + \beta_{11} runs\ scored\ in\ career \\
 & + \beta_{12} wickets\ taken\ in\ career \quad (eq. 1)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln salary = & 14.87 + 0.488 * runs\ scored\ last\ year + 0.325 \\
 & * wickets\ taken\ last\ year \quad (eq. 2)
 \end{aligned}$$

Multicollinearity checks, heteroskedascity checks, and auto-correlation checks were performed and found not to affect the equation 2. The residual values (difference between actual and predicted values) obtained were used to operationalize under and over reward. For operationalization of under reward the negative values for residuals from equation 2 multiplied by 100, along with sign were taken and rest of the values were taken as zero. Over reward was

operationalized as the positive residuals obtained from equation 2 multiplied by 100 and the other values were taken as zero.

Dependent variables

Current year batting average: Current year batting average is the overall batting average in all formats of the game for the year under consideration.

Current year bowling average: Current year bowling average is the overall bowling average in all formats of the game for the year under consideration.

Control Measures

Control measures used are age (in years), tenure with the national team, total number of matches played in all formats of game up to the year under consideration, the runs scored throughout the career, wickets taken throughout the career, runs scored in the previous year and wickets taken in previous year. Tenure has been taken as total number of years the player has been associated with the team from the time the player played the first international match. Batting average is the ratio of total number of runs scored and the number of dismissals. Bowling average is the ratio of runs conceded to the wickets taken. Low bowling average indicates a better performer. The career batting average indicates the overall batting average for all formats of the game, throughout the career; the career bowling average indicates the overall bowling average for all formats of the game, throughout the career; the batting average in the previous year i.e. if the year under consideration is 2010-11, then the batting average in the last year would be the ratio of total runs scored in all formats of game played in the year 2009-10 and the number of times a player has been dismissed; the bowling average in the previous year i.e. if the year under consideration is 2010-11, then the bowling average for the previous year would be the overall bowling average in the year 2009-10.

Analysis

Separate multivariate regressions were carried out for each career stage for two dependent variables. For each regression first the control variables were submitted and the model was tested. This was followed by adding the independent variable (over reward or under reward) to test the impact of the new variable added. For the players identified in the initiation career stage, first the current year batting average was regressed with control variables like age, tenure, batting averages bowling average and runs scored and under reward. The batting average and bowling average specifically for the previous years were taken to take care of the performance related recency effect while the career related averages were used to take care of the reputation related factors. The same procedure was repeated for performance in terms of current year bowling average.

Results

Table 2 gives the table of correlations. Tables 3 to 7 provide the regression results for multiple models run to test the hypothesis 1, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b respectively. Results for the players categorized into the initiation stage with current year batting average as the dependent variable are presented in Table 3 which were not even weakly significant. We found the regression model for current year bowling average as dependent variable to be moderately significant. While none of the control variables were significant, the reported results indicated a strong positive relationship with under reward in an unexpected direction. Since under reward was operationalized as a negative residual, we were expecting a negative significant relationship. This led us to conclude that there is partial support for hypothesis 1.

According to table number 4, the models involving the current year batting average as the dependent variable reported a very strong fit while the model involving the current bowling

Correlations		Mean	Std. Dev	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	age	27.6224	4.36366														
2	tenure	6.2857	5.24257	.847**													
3	total matches played last year	14.8163	12.9769	0.185	.346**												
4	last year batting average	22.442	20.2687	.318**	.425**	.475**											
5	last year bowling average	23.7132	27.373	-0.08	0.08	.320**	0.062										
6	runs scored last year	404.908	566.631	.373**	.508**	.734**	.737**	0.16									
7	wickets taken last year	11.7857	17.9921	-0.016	0.054	.382**	-0.164	.271**	-0.155								
8	career runs	3707.99	7102.29	.743**	.822**	.330**	.579**	0.055	.667**	-0.191							
9	career wickets	83.6429	150.303	.336**	.459**	0.18	-0.13	0.179	-0.052	.570**	0.106						
10	career batting average till the year	23.2947	14.336	.415**	.534**	.495**	.835**	-0.005	.766**	-.256*	.662**	-0.14					
11	career bowling average till the year	30.2876	24.8846	0.185	.301**	.375**	.306**	.384**	.366**	0.101	.281**	0.075	.266**				
12	under_reward	-23.256	34.9029	0.084	0.144	0.067	0.132	-0.032	0.182	-0.026	.212*	-0.004	0.111	0.013			
13	over_reward	23.2557	31.7163	-0.134	-0.127	-0.074	0.003	0.017	-0.1	0.097	-0.076	0.005	-0.123	-0.015	.494**		
14	current year batting average	20.4669	26.1403	0.124	0.168	.233*	.407**	-0.084	.391**	-.207*	.298**	-0.166	.444**	0.116	.333**	0.059	
15	current year bowling average	19.4524	26.5447	-0.096	0.075	0.17	0.064	0.17	0.06	.222*	0.051	.212*	-0.033	.230*	.357**	.316**	0.05

** indicates significance at 0.01 level * indicates significance at 0.05 level Table 2: Table of correlations

Variables	Dependent variable: Current year batting average		Dependent variable: Current year bowling average	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
N	39	39	39	39
Constant	27.244 (68.191)	11.119 (66.695)	6.022 (33.22)	-8.801 (27.609)
Age	-0.381 (2.389)	0.387 (2.785)	0.327 (1.383)	1.033 (1.153)
Tenure	3.793 (4.494)	3.196 (4.364)	0.022 (2.189)	-0.527 (1.806)
Total matches played in last year	-1.802 (2.852)	-1.462 (2.768)	0.153 (1.389)	0.465 (1.146)
Last year batting average	-0.224 (0.732)	-0.007 (0.72)	0.141 (0.357)	0.341 (0.298)
Last year bowling average	-0.217 (0.356)	-0.258 (0.346)	0.212 (0.174)	0.175 (0.143)
Last year runs scored	0.045 (0.134)	0.038 (0.13)	-0.008 (0.065)	-0.021 (0.054)
Last year wickets taken	0.542 (1.528)	0.388 (1.481)	-0.13 (0.744)	-0.271 (0.613)
Runs scored in	-0.042	-0.024	-0.011	0.006

career	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Wickets taken in career	-0.196 (0.19)	0.041 (0.206)	-0.001 (0.093)	0.141 (0.085)
Career batting average	0.904 (1)	0.741 (0.973)	-0.518 (0.487)	-0.668 (0.403)
Career bowling average	-0.207 (0.266)	-0.113 (0.264)	0.13 (0.13)	0.217 (0.109)
Under reward		0.348 (0.207)		0.32*** (0.086)
R²	0.164	0.245	0.305	0.547
Adjusted R²	-0.177	-0.103	0.022	0.338
F-Statistic	0.48	0.705	1.076	2.618**

Figures in parenthesis indicate standard error *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 3: Table indicating the Results for Hypothesis 1 players in the initiation stage

average as the dependent variable reported a weakly significant result for the individuals identified in the development stage of the career.

Variables	Dependent variable: Current year batting average		Dependent variable: Current year bowling average	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
N	30	30	30	30
Constant	33.547 (21.896)	26.601 (20.211)	94.825 (85.736)	61.879 (80.467)
Age	-1.885** (0.787)	-1.265 (0.764)	-5.859* (3.083)	-3.576 (0.256)
Tenure	0.342 (0.937)	-0.462 (0.921)	2.392 (3.668)	-0.569 (3.666)
Total matches played in last year	0.754*** (0.245)	0.957*** (0.239)	0.856 (0.958)	1.605 (0.953)
Last year batting average	0.001 (0.211)	-0.097 (0.196)	0.739 (0.825)	0.377 (0.779)
Last year bowling average	-0.166 (0.097)	-0.157* (0.088)	-0.800** (0.382)	-0.768** (0.352)
Last year runs scored	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.059 (0.037)	-0.07* (0.035)
Last year wickets taken	-0.195 (0.13)	-0.27** (0.123)	-0.274 (0.51)	-0.552 (0.488)
Runs scored in career	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.015)	0.011 (0.014)
Wickets taken	-0.021	-0.021	0.311	0.312

in career	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.208)	(0.191)
Career batting average	0.823** (0.363)	0.772** (0.329)	1.559 (1.421)	1.37 (1.31)
Career bowling average	0.405*** (0.114)	0.372*** (0.104)	1.047** (0.445)	0.924** (0.414)
Under reward		0.077** (0.034)		0.283* (0.137)
R²	0.896	0.92	0.505	0.605
Adjusted R²	0.833	0.863	0.203	0.325
F-Statistic	14.172***	16.286***	1.671	2.166*

Figures in parenthesis indicate standard error *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 4: Table indicating results for Hypothesis 2a - Players in the development Stage

The adjusted R² values for current year batting average as dependent variable has shown improvement from 0.833 to 0.863 and under reward was found to be statistically significant at moderate level. The adjusted R² values for current year bowling average as dependent variable also has shown improvement from 0.203 to 0.325 and under reward was found to be weakly significant. Thus we can conclude for players identified in the development stage that under reward leads to reduction in performance. Hypothesis 2a has statistical support.

Table 5 shows the results for hypothesis 2b, i.e. for individuals identified in the iconic stage of their career. The regression results for the players identified in the iconic stage of the career, with current year batting average as the dependent variable and under reward as the independent variable along with other control variables were strongly significant, however the coefficient for under reward was not statistically significant. Under reward was not found statistically significant with the current year batting average as dependent variable. The regression result for current year bowling average and under reward along with other control variables was not found statistically significant. Thus there is no statistical support for hypothesis 2b i.e. for the individuals identified in the iconic stage of the career under reward does not statistically explain any dimension of performance.

Variables	Dependent variable: Current year batting average		Dependent variable: Current year bowling average	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
N	29	29	29	29
Constant	94.547 (67.18)	81.069 (64.51)	572.177*** (159.977)	545.676*** (157.868)
Age	-1.211 (1.402)	-1.573 (1.353)	-11.558*** (3.338)	-12.27*** (3.312)
Tenure	-0.238 (1.796)	-0.25 (1.711)	2.293 (4.278)	2.269 (4.186)
Total matches played in last year	0.205 (0.49)	0.235 (0.467)	-1.101 (1.166)	-1.043 (1.142)
Last year batting average	0.167 (0.227)	0.18 (0.217)	0.773 (0.541)	0.799 (0.53)
Last year bowling average	-0.114 (0.086)	-0.121 (0.082)	-0.458** (0.204)	-0.472** (0.2)
Last year runs scored	0.004 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.031 (0.026)	0.024 (0.026)
Last year wickets taken	-0.267 (0.24)	-0.189 (0.233)	-0.733 (0.571)	-0.578 (0.571)
Runs scored in career	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Wickets taken in career	-0.048 (0.04)	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.089 (0.095)	-0.036 (0.102)
Career batting average	-1.485 (1.285)	-0.741 (1.306)	-8.368** (3.06)	-6.905** (3.197)
Career bowling average	0.3* (0.144)	0.301** (0.137)	0.318 (0.342)	0.321 (0.335)
Under reward (hypothesis 2b)		0.218 (0.134)		0.428 (0.328)
R²	0.737	0.777	0.553	0.598
Adjusted R²	0.556	0.598	0.245	0.277
F-Statistic	4.079***	4.344***	1.796	1.861

Figures in parenthesis indicate standard error *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 5: Table showing results for hypothesis 2b- for players in the iconic stage

Table 6 shows the results for hypothesis 3a i.e. the players identified in the development stage of career. The regression results with current batting average as dependent variable and over reward as the independent variable along with control variables were strongly significant.

The coefficient for over reward was also found to be weakly significant. The adjusted R^2 has improved marginally from 0.833 to 0.858.

Variables	Dependent variable: Current year batting average		Dependent variable: Current year bowling average	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
N	30	30	30	30
Constant	33.547 (21.896)	10.051 (23.840)	94.825 (85.736)	-51.227 (79.530)
Age	-1.885** (0.787)	-1.258 (0.791)	-5.859* (3.083)	-2.267 (2.638)
Tenure	0.342 (0.937)	0.379 (0.866)	2.392 (3.668)	2.603 (2.888)
Total matches played in last year	0.754*** (0.245)	0.961*** (0.248)	0.856 (0.958)	2.045** (0.828)
Last year batting average	0.001 (0.211)	-0.58 (0.197)	0.739 (0.825)	0.400 (0.657)
Last year bowling average	-0.166 (0.097)	-0.226** (0.095)	-0.800** (0.382)	-1.142*** (0.316)
Last year runs scored	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.059 (0.037)	-0.89** (0.031)
Last year wickets taken	-0.195 (0.13)	-0.257 (0.124)	-0.274 (0.51)	-0.627 (0.414)
Runs scored in career	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.015)	0.013 (0.012)
Wickets taken in career	-0.021 (0.053)	-0.010 (0.049)	0.311 (0.208)	0.372** (0.164)
Career batting average	0.823** (0.363)	0.991 (0.345)	1.559 (1.421)	2.520** (1.152)
Career bowling average	0.405*** (0.114)	0.47*** (0.111)	1.047** (0.445)	1.455*** (0.369)
Over reward (hypothesis 3a)		0.096* (0.048)		0.552*** (0.159)
R^2	0.896	0.917	0.505	0.710
Adjusted R^2	0.833	0.858	0.203	0.506
F-Statistic	14.172***	15.559***	1.671	3.176**

Figures in parenthesis indicates standard error *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 6: Table showing results for Hypothesis 3a- players identified in the development stage of career with over reward as an independent variable

The regression results for current year bowling average as dependent variable and over reward as independent variable was strongly significant. Adjusted R^2 values also have improved from 0.203 to 0.506. Hypothesis 3a is statistically supported for both dimensions of performance

Table 7 shows the results for hypothesis 3b i.e. players identified in the iconic stage of the career. The regression results for current year batting average along with other control variables for the players identified in the iconic stage of career was strongly significant, however the coefficient for over reward was not statistically significant. Moreover adjusted R^2 values reported a reduction from 0.556 to 0.553. We did not get statistically significant results for the model with current year bowling average as dependent variable hence it can be concluded that hypothesis 3b did not find statistical support.

Variables	Dependent variable: Current year batting average		Dependent variable: Current year bowling average	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
N	29	29	29	29
Constant	94.547 (67.18)	84.134 (68.358)	572.177*** (159.977)	554.802*** (164.968)
Age	-1.211 (1.402)	-1.313 (1.412)	-11.558*** (3.338)	-11.735*** (3.407)
Tenure	-0.238 (1.796)	0.204 (1.865)	2.293 (4.278)	3.062 (4.500)
Total matches played in last year	0.205 (0.49)	0.326 (0.508)	-1.101 (1.166)	-0.892 (1.226)
Last year batting average	0.167 (0.227)	0.112 (0.236)	0.773 (0.541)	0.677 (0.569)
Last year bowling average	-0.114 (0.086)	-0.111 (0.086)	-0.458** (0.204)	-0.454** (0.208)
Last year runs scored	0.004 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.031 (0.026)	0.033 (0.027)
Last year wickets taken	-0.267 (0.24)	-0.290 (0.242)	-0.733 (0.571)	-0.772 (0.584)
Runs scored in career	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Wickets taken	-0.048	-0.044	-0.089	-0.082

in career	(0.04)	(0.040)	(0.095)	(0.097)
Career batting average	-1.485 (1.285)	-1.420 (1.292)	-8.368** (3.06)	-8.255** (3.118)
Career bowling average	0.3* (0.144)	0.361** (0.158)	0.318 (0.342)	0.425 (0.382)
Over reward (hypothesis 3b)		0.094 (0.101)		0.164 (0.243)
R²	0.737	0.752	0.553	0.566
Adjusted R²	0.556	0.553	0.245	0.218
F-Statistic	4.079***	3.783***	1.796	1.628

Figures in parenthesis indicates standard error *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 7: Table showing results for Hypothesis 3b - players identified in the iconic stage with over reward as an independent variable

Now we move to the discussions and implications based on above mentioned results.

Discussion and implications

We explored how career stages in pay performance relations. We found support for hypothesis 2a and 3a which specifically relate to performance of individuals in the development stage. During this stage we anticipated the Equity Theory to play a major role i.e. under reward leads to a drop in performance, which is amply supported by earlier studies from the context beyond Cricket (Matt Bloom, 1999; Harder, 1992; Howard & Miller, 1993; Lord & Hohenfeld, 1979). We also found support for over reward leading to increase in performance, an area where empirical support is relatively rare. (Lawler, 1968; Mowday, 1996; Sweemey, 1990).

We found that the results related to development stage of career are entirely different from the results reported for the initiation and the iconic stages of career. There by this paper also enhances our understanding of the link between pay and performance and career stages. In the development stage, the player is supposed to have learnt the ropes sufficiently and apply the learning. As the specific skills are developed, performance also increases. At this stage individuals expect a fair reward for the performance they are able to attain. Absence of fair

rewards creates a sense of inequity and hence any player who considers himself/herself as under rewarded may gradually report lower levels of performance. Similarly an over rewarded player will try to raise the levels of performance to reduce inequity. But for iconic stage (hypothesis 2b and 3b focusing respectively on under reward and over reward) we could not find any statistical support. Iconic stage of career is more related to mastery of the skill. In this stage the needs and motivations change and monetary rewards fail to elicit higher performance. The players in the iconic stage constantly seek higher challenges and are probably motivated by larger goals like setting up new records that may not be captured as a part of existing standards of acceptable performance. Such levels of excellence in performance include a player trying to score maximum number of centuries, highest number of wickets or mentoring the junior players. It also indicates the difficulty in replacing a highly reputed player due to the past achievements or proven career track record against an opponent or some specific playing conditions. Reputation and status (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013) of some players who are in iconic stage of career, can result in deviation from pay and performance relationship as suggested by Equity Theory. For some of them, higher order needs may take precedence over the lower order needs (Maslow, 1943a, 1943b), which can also explain the unexpected results associated with the iconic stage of career. Hypothesis 1 specifically deals with under reward and performance for the players in the initiation stage of the career. Our results pertaining to current year batting averages indicate that the players are not overly concerned with any inequity in performance reward relationship. Hence even under rewarded players do not exhibit any drop in performance and they may be expecting the rewards to catch up while they move into development stage. But this trend was not visible in the performance of the players in terms of current year bowling averages. This indicates the necessity to study the features and differences in career paths belonging to bowling

and batting domain. Our results indicate that Expectancy Theory plays a major role than the Equity Theory in explaining the pay performance relationship as far as the batting performance during initial career stage is considered. To make Cricket attractive, rules are being changed and the pitches are being made batsman friendly (Atkinson, 2009) (example the rule related to power plays, and the fielding restrictions), as a result the bowlers might feel that they lack the ability to influence the outcome. Hence we expect significant difference between batting and bowling in terms of application of the Expectancy Theory (Lawler, 1966; Vroom, 1964). This might explain the observed differences for the two dependent variables of hypothesis 1. The chances for the players in the initiation stage to come across an over rewarded scenario are rare and hence we limited our hypothesis to under reward scenario. Aspects of intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000) may play an important role in motivating the players in any career stage. The game of cricket is hugely popular in India and the players who get to represent the country become famous instantly. The players are constantly under pressure to perform as they are keenly followed. This may also help in understanding the difference in results for different career stages.

Interesting implications can be drawn out for practitioners and managers. The first clear cut implication is that pay for performance does not follow a one size fits all approach rather it has to be customized (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Mehta, Emerson, & Dubinsky, 2000; Milkovich et al., 2009). Based on our paper it is recommended to consider the career stages while designing the pay for performance plans. Pay seems to motivate till a certain level leading to increase in performance but after that the other larger goals seem to take precedence. The needs and response (both cognitive and behavioural) are different for individuals in different career stages (Dalton et al., 1977; Miao, Lund, & Evans, 2009).

Limitations

Our study also has some limitations. Compared to other professional sports, Cricket lacks exhaustive data resources. Lack of reliable data has resulted in limitation of operationalization of critical variables. We measured performance in terms of batting and bowling averages and we haven't considered the impact of fielding, an essential skill for any player. We have used the three stage career model based on earlier studies of sports. There is wide inconsistency in previous published literature with regard to the measurement of career stages (Bedeian et al., 1991). Previous studies have operationalized career stages in terms of age, tenure and hierarchy. We operationalized career stages as experience gained in terms of total number of matches, which might have led to slight variation in results. After confirming that our data is not suffering from auto correlation issues for multiple models we used step wise multiple regression for this study. Recency effect has been taken care by choosing multiple control variables. Modelling based on repeated measure regression or panel data analysis are other possible options worth consideration. Another important limitation is that we have considered all formats of the game together although the three formats have different skill requirements. We have not considered aspects of intrinsic motivation because our research is entirely based on secondary data and it is indeed a challenge to reliably infer aspects of intrinsic motivation from secondary data.

Directions for future research

Future studies can consider the variations and mini cycles within a single stage as proposed by Super (1980). There is inconsistency in the measurement of career stages. Since the operationalization of the career stage differs, the results also differ (Bedeian et al., 1991). Thus an exclusive measure for the career stage would be a good way to eliminate these inconsistencies. An important performance measure fielding has not been considered. Future

research can also look into developing a measure for the performance in terms of fielding. Future research can also look at defining the utility function in terms of the salary, monetary rewards, endorsements and any other source of monetary income. The requirements and the skill sets vary for the three formats of the game (Parker, Burns, & Natarajan, 2008). Hence future research can look into the three formats of the game separately in terms of the application of Equity Theory and the Career stages. The future research can also look at improving the methodological limitations of this current study. Future studies could look at the moderating effects of career stages on the relation between pay and performance using Aiken and West (1991) or J. Cohen and Cohen (1983). We have not used these methods as our research method is to study the relation between pay and performance within a career stage identified.

Conclusion

We explored the effect of career stages on pay performance relationships in the context of cricket as a professional sport. Career stages were conceptualized as consisting of three stages, and it was operationalized based the total number of matches played by the player. This is perhaps one of the first studies to test the three stage career model and Equity Theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and Expectancy Theory (Lawler, 1966; Vroom, 1964) in the context of Cricket. This paper also extends our understanding of generalizability of these theories in other contexts. Partial support was found for Equity Theory, Expectancy Theory and the impact of career stages in determining their relative importance. We also found support for over reward leading to increase in performance. Based on the results it can be concluded that career stages do seem to play a role in determining and administering performance based pay. The impact of Equity Theory and Expectancy Theory on batting and bowling performances during multiple career stages were found to be different.

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