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**INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT
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A SEQUENTIAL STRATEGIC SEARCH MODEL
FOR IDENTIFYING INTERNATIONALISATION
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIAN BUSINESS

By

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A SEQUENTIAL STRATEGIC SEARCH MODEL
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INTERNATIONALISATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIAN BUSINESS

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This paper is presented in two parts. In part I, the term "internationalisation" is explained, Indian experience to date is examined, and the basic issues are identified. In part II, an attempt is made to conceptualise an approach to identify the strategic options available to Indian firms in their internationalisation efforts.

Part I: THE ISSUES

Internationalising

What is "internationalising?" Is it becoming an active exporter of commodities, manufactures, capital equipments, or projects? Is it setting up overseas marketing offices, assembly plants, fully or partially owned subsidiaries, or majority or minority owned joint ventures? Is it joining hands with Multinational Corporations (MNC's) from advanced countries for technology, access to world markets, or jumping tariff barriers in various countries? Is it finding and exploiting opportunities to become international suppliers of inputs and intermediates? Is it providing international backup services for our other efforts, in the form of banking, shipping, insurance, credit guaranteeing etc? It is all of these and perhaps more. And, what is more is attitudinal -- transcending narrow ideologies and developing a global perspective in our strategic thinking both in identifying and exploiting opportunities.

Export -- Just One Dimension

Of these multiple dimensions of internationalisation, we, in India, have been primarily concentrating on just one -- exports! Overseas joint ventures, project contracts, and overseas banking are three additional dimensions which had come under our tentative exploration

in the recent past. Many other dimensions are yet to be explored. Reluctance to chart out unexplored territories, hesitant attitude towards risk taking, and excessive adherence to ideology for ideology's sake are some of the reasons for this "backwardness" in our internationalisation efforts. Centuries of colonial exploitation and perpetual poverty accentuated by the perennial shortages provided us handy excuses -- often legitimate -- for our inadequate progress in this direction.

However, as mentioned above, we have been active in our efforts on one front -- exports. But, where has this unidirectional effort taken us so far. Five years ago there was a spurt of seminars, conferences, and inter-ministerial deliberations to explore new dimensions to India's export effort. All these deliberations also tried to project the future prospects. Though the projections varied, the variations were within a relevant range. It was estimated that India will reach a target of about Rs.8,000 crores of exports by 1980-81. Alternatively it was said that India will have to aim at a target of Rs.8,000 - Rs.10,000 crores of exports by 1980-81 to sustain a minimum economic growth rate and to meet the galloping import requirement. But, how do the actual results look like?

After crossing the Rs.5,000 crore mark three years ago, the total export figure seems to shy away from crossing the Rs.6,000 crore mark, let alone reach even the lower range of the Rs.8,000 - Rs.10,000 crore target. The export data for the decade of the seventies is presented in Exhibit 1.

After maintaining a 20 plus percentage annual growth rate for five consecutive years since 1972-73, the growth had fallen into a trickle for the past two years. Even the peak annual growth rate for the five year period 1972-77 is rather misleading, since it does not reflect the real competitive position of India's exports. During the same period, the growth in world's total exports was considerably higher than India's. In fact, our market share fell from an already meagre figure of 0.79% in 1971 to an all time low of 0.53% by 1977. There is no sign of any major reversal in this poor trend, as yet.

We also had been proudly flaunting our comfortable foreign exchange reserves in recent years, thanks to the unexpected boom in the remittances of the overseas Indians. But for these remittances, the future of which is under a mild cloud in recent months, we would have been in a dire strait.

The data on India's exports, imports, balance of trade, and foreign exchange reserves during the '70s is presented in Exhibit 2. Throughout the decade, except for two minor exceptions, our balance of trade had been negative. Declining market share in exports and increasing import bill accentuated by the OPEC countries' frequent crude oil price hikes contributed to this.

Our share in the international exports looks meagre even compared to many countries of similar economic development and much smaller size. This unfavourable comparison is valid both in absolute terms as well as in the annual growth rate. Recent trend in the exports of a few

selected countries is presented in Exhibit 3. Brazil, Korea, and Singapore, for example, show much better export performance compared to India. While Indian exports increased from \$4.4 billion in 1975 to \$6.4 billion in 1978, Korea's increased from \$5.1 billion to \$12.7 billion during the same period. It is interesting to note that these countries, particularly Korea, did not confine its efforts to exports. They not only diversified exports from the traditional items to the non-traditional items as India had been trying to do, but also developed other international dimensions. Korea also succeeded in almost all the new dimensions of internationalisation.

Tentative Indian Efforts

Though the actual targets for the coming decade and beyond are yet to crystalize owing to the recent changes in the political set up and the concomitant policy redefinitions, one cannot escape from the fact that the targets are going to be ambitious. With the ever recurring price increases of crude oil, and with the gloomy prospects of the drying up of the remittances, do we really have an alternative other than setting up ambitious targets to earn foreign exchange through exports or through other new and creative means? Can we afford to move from one crisis to another? Can we continue to put our sights on the short-term foreign exchange earnings, ignoring long-term strategic moves to improve our country's international competitive posture? Do we have to think of developing new teeth to get a better and firmer bite to have a larger slice in the world trade pie? Answers to these questions are obvious.

Export of More Value Added Items

At a mundane level, let us take a quick look at the directions in which India already conducted its search in the past. The need to push export of manufactured goods had become obvious for quite some time. If we take the public policy since independence, the latter one and a half decades not only showed a shift from an import substitution emphasis to an equally dominant export promotion emphasis, but also showed a definite desire to change the export basket mix in favour of more value added items through both production and export incentives. However, the burgeoning domestic scarcities overshadowed the incidence of such efforts to a trickle. In such an environment, at the micro level, the firms preferred the soft option of catering to the easy domestic markets, compared to the hard choice of developing new products and markets for exports.

Overseas Joint Ventures

Efforts were also made by some Indian firms to set up joint ventures in overseas locations; but mostly as a defensive move to protect the losing export markets. Two decades' efforts had resulted in a balance sheet tilting more to the side of failure, as the summary data on joint ventures presented in Table 1 would indicate.

Table 1
Proposals for Overseas Joint Ventures from 1960 to 1980

	Approved	In Produc- tion	Under Imple- menta- tion	Abandoned/ Did not implement
Number of projects	359	107	95	157
Number of countries covered	50	24	30	40
Indian equity participation (Rs. crores)	102	31	44	27

The proposals which were not implemented or abandoned are considerably more than the proposals which ultimately fructified. The track record also suggests that a larger proportion of the units, which are said to be under implementation, is likely to end up in the abandoned category. The total cumulative returns from these units are just Rs.9.7 crores (Rs.2.6 crores of dividends and Rs.7.1 crores in technical and managerial fees).

Projects and Construction Contracts

In recent years, we had made some success in the export of services -- projects and construction contracts. Three distinct observations in this area, taken together, dampen the spirits somewhat: First, we had lesser success in projects than in construction contracts. Secondly, there is very little export component (of capital goods and manufactures) in the construction contracts. Thirdly, our success in either category is poor in all regions, except South Asia. In South Asia, the pace of increase in demand for such services seems to be outstripping the pace with which supplies are reaching the point of consumption, and anyone

with an abundant supply of cheap manpower would and should automatically get a share in the pie.

The share of market should be used as a more relevant indicator of success than the absolute growth. All indications are that the share is not only small, but is also declining. We are being edged out not only by advanced countries, but also by firms from the giants from other developing countries like Korea who compete in collaboration with the giants from Japan and other western countries.

We also happened to be our own enemy in two distinct ways. For one, our fragmented efforts and internal competition, almost degenerating to denigrating each other, did not add to our image in the kind of competition where image is the key to get business. Secondly, our own shoddy performance, both in terms of delays in completion and poor performance standards dampens the possibility of repeat business. Even public sector units have contributed to this inadequate performance.

Tie-Ups with MNC's

Opportunities for Indian firms to collaborate with advanced country firms for exploiting business opportunities in third countries did come up occasionally. Such feelers came from many countries including USA, Japan, and Italy. Particular interest was shown by Japan in electronics and Italy in industrial chemicals. Sears Roebuck of USA showed considerable interest in getting India as a production base supplying to their international marketing network. But, most of these remained as vague suggestions or unimplemented proposals. Collaborations with MNC's for producing goods in India at cheaper cost for

meeting the world market requirements is an ideal theoretical possibility which often met with resistance on political and ideological grounds. This is again another area where the Korean model worked wonders. City nations like Hong Kong and Island countries like Singapore thrive on this strategy.

Some Strategic Questions

Our experience so far raises several key questions.

- * What are the typical barriers faced by LDC's in adding to their international dimension?
- * Which competitive advantages can be exploited by the LDC's and their firms independently?
- * Which are the competitive advantages, where exploitation of opportunities can be achieved only through collaboration with MNC's or advanced countries?
- * What are the opportunities for third-world co-operation, particularly for inter LDC technology transfers and joint ventures?
- * What are the necessary conditions to facilitate direct export of manufactures from LDC's?
- * Which are the areas where very little can be done by LDC's?

In the second and concluding part we will try to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the international business opportunities for LDC's in general, and India in particular. The proposed model will be a qualitative framework to help the decision makers at the enterprise level and policy makers at the national level to ask the strategic questions raised above, which might help them identify new and exciting avenues for internationalisation.

Part II: A Conceptual Model

Imperfect Competition

Classical international trade theories emphasized comparative cost advantage in labour and capital. These were found to be lacking in the real world to adequately explain and/or predict international trade and investment flows. The classical models' failure arose from the market imperfections. Market imperfections were mostly the result of technology/information gaps, imitation lags, and governmental policies. These also lead to the strengthening of the oligopolistic market structure, dominated by a few firms/countries who were the early entrants and as such beneficiaries of an imperfect market system. However, those firms and countries which, through historical facts and distortions, ended up in the lower rungs of the oligopolistic world system found it difficult to enter new markets or increase their shares in the existing markets, stifled by what is generally known as "barriers to entry." India's difficulties in gaining a decent share of the world trade in manufactures is the result of these barriers.

Barriers to Entry

What are the barriers to our free/easy entry into the world markets?

It is easy to find some answers if we look at the factors which helped multinational corporations (MNC's) from advanced countries in capturing a lion's share of the world markets. Literature is abundant in this area to illustrate the growth of multinational enterprises using these barriers to entry to their best advantage. These barriers helped MNC's to establish themselves in world trade, and subsequently in international investment. By influencing the government policy in many countries, the MNC's also succeeded in creating additional barriers, setting in motion a vicious circle for the less fortunate ones. Even if we find it difficult to break this vicious circle in the immediate future, we could still ^{improve our effectiveness by} identifying the existing barriers faced

by our firms and by delineating the actions which can be taken by us to penetrate the highly competitive world markets. We can also identify, in advance, areas where we have very little chance of success.

The barriers to entry faced by the developing nations can be broadly classified into four groups:

- * Technology Barrier
- * Marketing Barrier
- * Scale Barrier
- * Tariff Barrier

Technology Barrier

Theoretically, scientific discoveries can occur anywhere in the world, but in practice R&D has become a big-budget affair, precluding poorer nations and their firms from making much headway. Some large MNC's spend over \$500 million per year on R&D, more than the total national R&D spending of most of the LDC's. IBM, for example, spent \$726 million on R&D during 1972 alone and operated 32 laboratories throughout the world. Polaroid spends unbelievably huge amounts to come up with new models of cameras and new photo-sensitive technologies. Compared to these, it is interesting to see the total spending on R&D in India — \$106million in 1965-66, and \$750 million (an all time high for India) in 1978-79. Out of this \$750 million, 89 per cent was spent by public sector and 11 per cent by the private sector.

The highly risk bearing markets, risk bearing capital, and risk bearing public policy prevailing in the advanced countries (which they can also afford to) further enhanced their successful inventions and innovations. In such situations, the lavishly spe

MNC's would not wish to surrender their oligopolistic advantage, by parting with the benefits of their exclusive know-how, till they recoup all their R&D efforts and some monopoly profits. In such high technology sectors developing countries and their enterprises can make little impact. Computers and drugs provide two good examples. Many more can be cited.

The Marketing Barrier

Once we cross the technology barrier and identify products where no new and revolutionary R&D is occurring, we still face a barrier in marketing. This occurs in brand image/loyalty as well as worldwide distribution network. Even Europeans are finding it difficult to face the challenge of the superlative strengths of the Americans and the Japanese in this area. Consumer electronics is a good example in this regard.

Scale Barrier

In many industries, the barrier for new entry stems from economies of large scale. Aluminium smelting, crude oil refining, automobiles, and pulp and paper are examples. Most of the capital intensive products belong to this category. Least unit cost can be achieved in such cases only through highly automated large volume based production techniques and technologies. Lack of technology, inadequate capital, inadequate maintenance facilities, and the public policy favouring disbursement of production facilities prevented LDC's and their firms from acquiring any significant strength in this area.

Tariff Frontier

Every country tries to protect its domestic industry from the onslaught of international competition by imposing import duties. India has been doing so ever since its independence. Many developing countries adopted this policy with great vigour. Even advanced countries take recourse to this to protect their industries from periodical recession or to overcome occasional spurts in unemployment.

The tariff barrier need not necessarily be arising out of tariffs (import duties), but could also be arising from import bans and quota restrictions. The tariff barrier works to both our advantage and disadvantage. On the negative side, the tariff walls may be total or so high that our comparative cost advantage in direct export gets nullified and no export results. On the positive side, those smaller countries with low aggregate demand could become the best targets for us to take our adapted low volume technologies to set up our overseas joint ventures. This point would be elaborated later.

Facilitating Factors

The four sets of barriers to entry mentioned earlier can be viewed as either as weaknesses of the Indian firms or as the threats they face in the international scene. Similarly, one can also look at their strengths or opportunities. One may classify these positive factors also into four categories:

- * Largeness of the Market: Many LDC's have large populations. Though the number may not reflect the purchasing power in many products. However, for some products the large population may reflect a large

market, and this can give a major bargaining strength to strike beneficial deals with advanced countries and their firms

- * Cheaper Cost of Production: Labour cost is becoming expensive in advanced countries. For products which are labour intensive in nature, countries like India with abundant skilled and unskilled labour and at cheaper costs, could provide an ideal production base.
- * Cheaper Inputs: There could be a situation where the cost of production of the finished product in an LDC may not be competitive for various reasons such as non-availability of some specialized manpower, diseconomies of low volume, etc. However, they could still provide cheaper inputs either in raw material or processing. They could provide labour intensive components and intermediates on competitive costs. The manner in which Indonesia used its abundant supply of timber is a case in point. What we attempt to do at Khudremukh will be our own example. International disbursal of engineering components, particularly automobile components, and the productive role played by countries like Mexico are well known facts.
- * Adapted Technology: Countries like India, over a period of time, have adapted many mature technologies to suit local volume (which is low) and local inputs (both in material and labour). If there is no constraint on volume, such adapted technologies may not have a competitive advantage, as the high volume highly automated production techniques can churn out products in millions

with the least unit cost. However, if volume constraints prevail (as it happens when smaller nations encourage indigenisation of industry for domestic consumption), these adapted technologies for lower volumes will have a comparative cost advantage. It is also true in the case of technologies adapted for typical LDC inputs - either in raw materials, quality of work force, or other maintenance and infrastructural support.

A Search Model

A sequential search model for identifying international business opportunities for LDC firms (particularly Indian firms) is provided in the attached flow chart. This flow chart primarily uses the four barriers and the four facilitating conditions described earlier. The chart is only illustrative. The sequences could be rearranged and yet used. More positive and negative factors could be incorporated. The 10 situations identified are not "end positions." Further series of questions on similar lines could be asked beyond the 10 illustrative situations.

The 10 situations, in five pairs, are briefly explained below to illustrate the use of the model. The first pair primarily deals with internationalisation for domestic production and consumption. The rest of the situations deal with international business opportunities for external markets.

Situations 1 and 2

The model starts with a situation where India does not possess the technology and does not provide adequate market to attract the possessor of technology to set up manufacturing facilities within India. Advanced computers or sophisticated cameras could be examples. Very little can be done by LDC firms in this area (See chart: Situation 1).

The second situation is where the LDC's do not have access to technology, but have abundant potential market. In such situations LDC's and their firms can use their market power to lure the high technology firms from advanced countries for possible collaborations. The motivation for the technology inventing MNCs to collaborate with us would be even more, after they had recouped most of their R&D costs from the more stable and high income advanced country markets.

All foreign collaborations and joint ventures in India belong to this situation. Even a country like communist China has started successfully exploiting its market power to strike fruitful technical collaborations. If one can discard ideological hang-ups, India can also identify several more areas for such collaborative efforts. New technologies to tackle problems in providing agricultural inputs, nutrition, family planning, rural reconstruction, environmental and ecological management, etc., can be attracted from the possessors of such technology using our market power.

Situations 3 and 4

In the third situation, the technology is not a barrier, but selling for world markets is. In addition to the market barrier if

we also do not possess a competitive advantage in the cost of production very little could be done by the Indian firms (See chart: Situation 3).

Once we cross the technology barrier and identify products where no new and revolutionary R&D is occurring, we still face a problem to penetrate world markets. For example, Jay Engineering's Usha sewing machines, despite their good brand image within India, neither have an international brand/image nor a worldwide distribution network to make any significant dent in Singers' world market share. India's failure in successfully running a blade manufacturing unit in Kenya is another example. However, among the marketing oriented products, we can identify those where we have a comparative advantage in cost of production and seek market tie-ups with advanced country firms possessing worldwide marketing strengths. For example, JK group's readymade garments unit in Mauritius is gradually penetrating the highly fashion-conscious western markets through collaboration with a successful European marketing firm. ITC is setting up a similar unit in USA for promoting the sale of Indian products.

Situations 5 and 6

In many industries, the barrier stems from economies of large scale as mentioned earlier. If the technology is a constraint for the LDC firm to set up units in these industries, in our search model we go back to "Square One". If finance is the constraint in setting up such large units, we cannot do much in several developing countries, as rich nations have the competitive advantage over us. We can perhaps collaborate with the new rich among the developing nations. However,

the juicy nature of the new rich markets have already attracted the most aggressive style of MNC competition to those countries. Of course, we could try to be the sub-contractors for part of the equipment which could be manufactured in India at a cheaper cost. If we have the raw materials in abundance we could seek profitable collaboration arrangements to supply our competitive inputs. The nature of collaboration we sought with Iran to develop iron ore mining in India, using financial loans from Iran and setting up jointly owned steel mill in Iran, is an excellent example of such possibilities. (Of course, it is not working out the way we anticipated for different reasons). For many automobile components where labour intensive operations are required, LDC's like India could become the world's suppliers even if they find it difficult to provide international base for production of automobiles.

Situations 7 and 8

Situations 7 and 8 primarily deal with international opportunities in other developing countries, arising from the barrier of host-country's tariff walls.

The '50s and early '60s saw Afro-Asian countries becoming politically independent and expressing keen desire to march towards economic independence. For many among them, India provided not only a political model but also a model for national economic development. They actively pursued a policy of import substitution and encouraged setting up local manufacturing facilities.

The domestic demand in these countries, however, did not warrant the large scale manufacturing operations. Their aggregate demand happened to be more in line with the typical volume of production we are familiar with in India. Moreover, these countries are also as much keen on employment generation as they are on industrialisation. These considerations demand typically low volume labour intensive technologies.

The question to be asked is whether the adapted technology of the typical Indian firm matches with the domestic demand of the host-country. If it does not, very little can be achieved in this area leading towards situation 7. If the host-country's demand is considerably higher than the typical volume for an Indian firm, the host-country may go for more advanced and higher volume technologies than what we possess. On the other hand, if the host-country's demand is considerably below even the typical volume for the Indian firm, we may not be in a position to successfully run our units in these countries. There are several examples of Indian-owned overseas joint ventures winding up their operations owing to inadequate demand.

However, there are several developing countries and several industries where the domestic demand of the host-country matches the scale of the typical Indian firm. They are also willing to sacrifice a little on unit costs for encouraging industrialisation and indigenisation of production capabilities. This is Situation 8, where Indian joint ventures abroad could thrive and progress for the mutual benefit of India and the host-country. Systematic efforts can be made to

identify many specific opportunities in this area. Political compatibility could provide further impetus to possible collaborations in this direction.

This possibility has already been recognised as evidenced by the fact that 50 different countries attracted 359 joint venture proposals from 200 odd Indian firms. However, the high failure rate overshadows the success rates indicating that no systematic effort was made either at the enterprise level or at the national level to identify the characteristics of the countries where we could successfully go and the characteristics of the products we could successfully take.

Situations 9 and 10

These two situations primarily deal with direct export of manufactured goods from India. To facilitate this, we should have crossed the technology barrier, marketing barrier, the scale barrier, and the tariff barrier. The first three are natural barriers, and the fourth one is imposed by the policies of the target countries, which could provide drastic fluctuations in our efforts. The American and European quota restrictions and the frequent changes in the same for Indian textiles is the worst example. Even after we cross these barriers, one should ask the question whether India possesses the cost advantage in the long run. If the landed cost for Indian products in the target countries are likely to be much higher than that of our competitors, Situation 9 arises and very little can be done by Indian firms unless public policy props up such efforts through costly subsidies and other assistances. Such

assistances are theretically and practically justifiable to provide "infant-exporter-protection," but should not be taken recourse to as long term crutches, as they are likely to result in long-term drain on national resources at best and perpetual inefficiency at worst.

Situation 10 indicates the possibility where we could possess a comparative advantage in landed cost (including marketing and shipping) in the target countries, despite the barriers. And, this is the situation which provides the maximum opportunities for direct export of manufactured goods from India by Indian firms. A closer examination of the engineering and textile industry may enable us to identify several products where we might be able to boost our long-term comparative cost advantage, by setting up exclusive export based large volume production facilities.

Conclusion

The simple qualitative model presented in this paper provides an opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses of Indian firms and the opportunities and threats they face in their efforts for internationalisation. We also identified 10 different situations arising out of various combinations of these strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, each of which demanding a different strategic thrust. It is up to the policy makers in government and decision makers in firms to explore these opportunities systematically for future development and implementation. In many situations, political or ideological biases may blind our rationality resulting in loss of several opportunities. In a dynamic environment like the international business scene, timing is of essence and even if we realise the folly of our narrow outlook at a later date, it may be too late to retrieve precious ground already lost.

Exhibit 1
Internationalising Indian Business
India's Exports in the '70s

Year	Exports (Rs. crores)	Growth over the previous year	India's Share in World's Total Export Market*		
			World Exports (In million \$)	India's Exports (In Million \$)	Market Share %
1971-72	1,608	4.8	315,800	2,502	0.79
1972-73	1,971	22.5	376,100	2,439	0.65
1973-74	2,523	28.0	523,200	3,162	0.60
1974-75	3,329	31.9	767,300	5,276	0.69
1975-76	4,036	21.4	791,700	5,960	0.75
1976-77	5,146	23.2	961,200	5,567	0.62
1977-78	5,404	5.0	1,923,200	5,649	0.53
1978-79	5,544	2.6	1,188,300	6,400	0.54

*These columns give data for the calendar years. For example, data for 1971 is shown against 1971-72.

- Sources:
1. Various publications of the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.
 2. Various publications of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Exhibit 2Internationalising Indian BusinessIndia's Balance of Trade and Foreign Exchange Reserves in the '70s

Year	Imports (Rs. crores)	Exports (Rs. crores)	Balance of Trade (Rs. crores)	Foreign Exchange Reserves (Rs. crores)
1970-71	1,634	1,535	- 99	732
1971-72	1,825	1,608	- 217	849
1972-73	1,867	1,971	+ 104	847
1973-74	2,956	2,523	- 433	948
1974-75	4,519	3,329	- 1,190	969
1975-76	5,265	4,036	- 1,229	1,885
1976-77	5,074	5,146	+ 72	3,242
1977-78	6,025	5,404	- 621	4,861
1978-79	6,606	5,544	- 1,062	5,322

Sources: 1) Press Notes from the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.

2) Documents of Reserve Bank of India.

Exhibit 3
Internationalising Indian Business
Trend in Export of Selected Countries

		(in billion US \$)				
Sl.No.	Country/Region	...	1975	1976	1977	1978
1.0	World Total*	...	796.4	906.7	1,028.1	1,189.3
2.0	Industrial Countries	...	537.8	598.0	676.6	814.1
2.1	United States	...	107.6	115.0	121.2	143.7
2.2	Canada	...	34.1	40.5	43.4	47.9
2.3	Japan	...	55.8	57.3	81.1	98.4
2.4	Austria	...	7.5	8.5	9.8	12.2
2.5	Belgium	...	28.8	32.9	37.5	44.9
2.6	Denmark	...	8.7	9.1	10.1	11.9
2.7	France	...	53.1	57.2	65.0	79.4
2.8	Germany	...	90.3	102.2	118.1	142.5
2.9	Italy	...	34.8	37.3	45.3	56.1
2.10	Netherlands	...	35.1	40.2	43.7	50.1
2.11	Norway	...	7.2	7.9	8.7	10.0
2.12	Sweden	...	17.4	18.4	19.1	21.8
2.13	Switzerland	...	12.9	14.8	17.6	23.6
2.14	United Kingdom	...	44.5	46.7	58.2	71.7
2.15	Other Europe	...	32.0	36.5	42.0	48.7
2.16	Finland	...	5.5	6.3	7.7	8.6
2.17	Greece	...	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.4
2.18	Portugal	...	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.4
2.19	Spain	...	7.7	8.7	10.2	13.1
2.20	Yugoslavia	...	4.1	4.9	5.3	5.7
2.21	Australia	...	11.9	13.2	13.4	14.4
2.22	New Zealand	...	2.2	2.8	3.2	3.7
2.23	South Africa	...	8.9	8.0	10.0	12.8
3.0	Oil Exporting Countries	...	109.7	132.9	145.3	141.2
3.1	Algeria	...	4.7	5.3	5.8	5.9
3.2	Iran	...	20.2	23.5	24.2	22.7
3.3	Iraq	...	8.3	9.3	9.7	11.0
3.4	Kuwait	...	8.6	9.8	9.8	10.5
3.5	Libya	...	6.0	8.3	9.8	9.5
3.6	Nigeria	...	7.8	10.1	11.8	10.4
3.7	Saudi Arabia	...	28.0	36.4	41.2	37.9
4.0	Other Less Developed Areas	...	93.9	115.3	135.6	153.2
5.0	Other Western Hemisphere	...	33.0	38.4	45.5	49.0
5.1	Brazil	...	8.7	10.1	12.1	12.7
5.2	Mexico	...	2.9	3.4	4.2	5.7
5.3	Other Middle East	...	7.1	7.7	9.0	10.0
5.4	Bahrain	...	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9
5.5	Egypt	...	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7
5.6	Israel	...	1.9	2.4	3.1	3.9
6.0	Other Asia	...	39.3	52.9	62.9	76.0
6.1	Republic of China	...	5.3	8.2	9.3	12.7
6.2	India	...	4.4	5.5	6.3	6.4
6.3	Korea	...	5.1	7.7	10.0	12.7
6.4	Malaysia	...	3.8	5.3	6.1	7.4
6.5	Pakistan	...	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.5
6.6	Singapore	...	5.4	6.6	8.2	10.1
6.7	Thailand	...	2.2	3.0	3.5	4.1

* Excluding Soviet Block

Source: Various publications of the International Monetary Fund and the

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