




# Working Paper



OB FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT :  
A POSITION PAPER

By

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## OB FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT : A POSITION PAPER\*

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### Abstract

The thesis of the paper is that OB can contribute richly to socio-economic development of poor Third World societies. It can do so through research on OB-related problems of the strategic organizations of these societies and on the strategic individuals and groups in these organizations. The concept of the strategic organization, individual, and team is expounded. Interesting OB research questions pertaining to strategic organizations are delineated in the areas of motivation and control, coordination and collaboration, boundary management, management of growth, institution building, innovation and change, and sickness and revitalization.

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## OB FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT : A POSITION PAPER

### OB and the Third World

Organizational Behaviour (OB) is a field of knowledge rather than a unified theory. It consists of a growing clutch of concepts, approaches, models, and tools pertinent to the structure and functioning of organizations within their socio-economic contexts, and the study of individuals and groups within their organizational contexts.<sup>1</sup> Thus, OB spans macro-organizational concerns like inter-organizational system and organizational level goals, strategies, climates, cultures, structures, management styles, and performances, and how these are influenced by one another and by task environments, societal values and institutions, technology, size, dependence, etc. OB also looks at organization - wide processes like decision making, socialization, and institution building. OB is equally concerned with the motivations, attitudes, skills, and interactional dynamics of individuals and groups operating within organizations, and the linkages between macro-organizational variables and these micro-organizational concerns. OB is a highly differentiated field, rife with contending theoretical perspectives, multiple levels of analysis and diverse research philosophies and methods.<sup>2</sup> It has generated a rich variety of management tools and technologies. These range from OB types of interventions to various kinds of training, MBO, human resource management systems, modes of decision making, ways of making the job more interesting, organizational design gestalts, etc. Some of these tools and techniques are indicated in Table 1.

(Table 1 about here)

The organizations of poor societies seeking development tend to be replete with "people" problems. The combination of scarcity-ridden economies, high development aspirations of social elites, and the traditionalism and kinship orientation of the "masses" is a fascinating context. It often spawns bizarre organizational behaviour. Scarcity breeds, under a proactive social leadership, institutionalised means for alleviating it. Thus, a broad range of governmental, quasi-governmental, voluntary, and private commercial organizations come into existence with scarcity-alleviation goals. But these organizations are commonly staffed by members of the traditional, kinship-oriented, impoverished masses, and often the clients of these organizations are also segments of the masses. Add to that public funding of many of these organizations, and what emerges is a queer cocktail: of organizations with entrepreneurial, developmental aspirations at the top, bureaucratic structures, nepotistic staff cultures, fairly modern operations technologies and installation of some professional management tools and systems. The organizations of developing societies, especially the larger, strategic ones, tend to be melting pots struggling to understand the modalities of internal coherence. They are the microcosms of the growth adventure of some 3000 million human beings.

Most of the tools and techniques of OB have originated in the West; but they have become important elements of management software in many of the larger organizations of the Third World.<sup>3</sup> In India, for instance, such tools as survey feedback, action research, organization development (OD), management by objectives (MBO), human resource development systems (HRDS), stress management techniques, achievement motivation training, creative problem solving training, etc., have been used

in a number of organizations.<sup>4</sup> While selective use of these tools and techniques in appropriate organizational situations is unquestioned, there are doubts about their wholesale applicability in Third World countries because of their apparent conflicts with the cultural economic, and political realities in these countries.<sup>5</sup>

The main normative focus in OB is on effectiveness. At the organizational level, criteria used in Western research have, by and large, emphasised organizational performance variables like profitability and growth rate, system effectiveness variables like adaptability and success in acquiring resources, staff well-being, and occasionally also corporate social responsibility-related criteria.<sup>6</sup> A criterion of special relevance to the developing world is the effective contribution of the organization to socio-economic development.<sup>7</sup> Developing countries commonly suffer from scarce managerial skills, low work ethic, a weak cooperation ethic, high dependency proneness, conservatism, and so forth.<sup>8</sup> Organized action - as distinct from sporadic individual or group level action - offers vast possibilities for expediting socio-economic development. This is because the formal organization brings under one roof all the human, material, financial, and technological resources needed to undertake relatively unfamiliar long-range, nation-building tasks. Also, formal organizations have the intrinsic ability to build up rapidly whatever additional resources they need. Indeed, most developing societies have set up a variety of special-purpose organizations whose main objective is contributing to various facets of socio-economic development. In India, for example, early after Independence, the government set up the Planning Commission at the national level, and organizations to promote community development in the rural sector, organizations to provide projec

finance to new industries, and organizations to produce goods and services basic to rapid industrialization (such as steel mills, equipment producing organizations, basic chemicals producing units, etc.). Besides, most governmental administrative organizations were sought to be reoriented from merely providing routine services like revenue collection and maintenance of law and order to also contributing to socio-economic development by drawing up developmental plans.<sup>9</sup>

### Concept of the Strategic Organization, Group, and Individual

A large amount of work has been done in OB on different kinds of organization, and on different facets of organizations and their functioning.<sup>10</sup> But work on the strategic organization, as a separate category, has been negligible. If, within each class of organization, we were to array organizations on their potential contribution to positive change and development within their respective domains or sectors, then strategic organizations would be the top scorers in each array. Thus, organizations that are research and development oriented, organizations that pioneer into a sector needed products, services, and technologies, organizations attempting a change in the social status quo, organizations in the business of modernizing social values and attitudes-in short, organizations whose outputs and actions have a long term, developmental impact in their domains-may be considered strategic organizations.<sup>11</sup>

The potential of organizations to contribute to socio-economic development of poor, under-developed societies may vary enormously. To survive, all organizations need to meet some social need or the

other.<sup>12</sup> But there is a special need that only a few organizations are primarily concerned about: society's need to transform itself towards some ideal. While societies surely differ on cherished utopias, the consensus appears to be to equate socio-economic development with greater strength and autonomy for the society as a whole as well as for individuals and groups in that society, greater social justice and equity, and greater per capita availability of at least essential goods and services.<sup>13</sup> Inter-organizational comparisons on the "fuzzy" criteria of social development are difficult. However, it is possible to say that an administrative organization set up to promote literacy or family planning or adoption of better health practices is more strategic than one collecting revenues or keeping civil peace; or that an organization set up to identify, develop, and disseminate new products, processes, and practices in an industry is more strategic than most firms in that industry; or that voluntary organizations seeking to conscientize the exploited and mobilize them for collective amelioration and development are more strategic than voluntary organizations merely promoting the interests of privileged castes or communities; or that organizations producing the means of further production, such as machinery, are more strategic than organizations producing cosmetics; and so on.

This is not to say that non-strategic organizations are unimportant - on some criteria they may well be even more important. The army, the tax department, and the corporation marketing cigarettes and contributing billions in taxes to government coffers are obviously important. However, their importance vis-a-vis the developmental and transformational goals of a society may be less, or less direct, than the research laboratories, the institutes for training technologists,



professional managers, and developmental administrators, social development programme organizations, and public enterprises producing equipment for the chemical, fertilizer, engineering, and metal industries. Table 2 lists, for illustrative purposes, some strategic Indian organizations.

(Table 2 about here)

Strategic organizations cannot be evaluated on just the more common criteria of organizational effectiveness, namely, financial performance, growth, staff well-being, system viability and adaptability, or good corporate citizenship.<sup>14</sup> They need to be evaluated also - perhaps primarily - on a new class of criteria pertaining to their socio-economic developmental impact. The latter may be measured in terms of how far they have pioneered or innovated new (but appropriate) products and technologies of production as well as management, strengthened (and not merely exploited profitably) underdeveloped client systems, created significant positive externalities, collaborated with other organizations in furthering national priorities, promoted social change and awareness about alternative, more science-based life styles, inculcated a culture of innovation, achievement, social concern, meritocracy, and participative decision making, etc.<sup>15</sup> Not that every strategic organization should be evaluated on all these criteria, but as a reinforcement mechanism, evaluation should be tilted in favour of the appropriate development-related criteria.

Just as there are strategic and non-strategic organizations, we can think of strategic and non-strategic organizational members and groups. Those individuals and groups within organizations that have the greatest

potential for achieving the developmental, strategic objectives of these organizations may be deemed, respectively, strategic individuals and strategic groups. Thus, strategic individuals may consist of an assortment of managers, technocrats, stakeholders, and union leaders; and strategic groups may also consist of such diverse teams as the top management team, the corporate planning group, the research and development group, the human resource development group, the market research group, and so forth. Of obvious importance are strategic individuals and teams in strategic organizations, and from an OB point of view, their skills, values, attitudes, and motivation.

The thesis of this paper is that OB can most contribute to socio-economic development of the world's poorer societies by greater concentration on their strategic organizations, and within these strategic organizations, on strategic individuals and groups. Making this sort of an impact through OB implies a program of research on the structure functioning, adaptation, boundary spanning, effectiveness, and revitalization of strategic organizations, on the leadership, communication, innovation, and institution building processes within these organizations, on the values, motivations, attitudes, skills, and competency of strategic individuals and teams, and on the interrelations of these variables.<sup>16</sup> It implies greater emphasis on OB as a tool of social transformation. And it implies that OB scholars and practitioners must get busy developing, testing, and deploying the technology of transformation.

In the following sections I have tried to probe into the nature of the strategic organizations of developing societies, and explored

briefly key OB-related issues in their design and functioning in order to identify some high potential research areas.

### The Nature of Strategic Organizations in Developing Societies

A better understanding of the nature of strategic organizations in developing societies may clarify how OB could be pressed into their service. Most strategic organizations in the developing world are likely to share three characteristics: (1) resource dependency on the government; (2) transformational or developmental role; and (3) unfamiliar tasks.

#### Resource dependency on the government

Throughout the developing world, many strategic organizations have been created by governments. As an example, the Government of India has set up, in the last 30 years, over 200 public enterprises, most of which could be regarded as strategic organizations. These account for roughly half of the nation's total industrial production, and a higher percentage of goods and services considered basic to rapid industrialisation.<sup>17</sup> The provincial governments in India have set up perhaps three times this number.<sup>18</sup> But this is scarcely all. A number of project finance institutions have been set up, and these in turn fund hundreds of strategic organizations in the private sector. Additional strategic organizations in the cooperative sector, the voluntary sector, the health and educational sectors, etc., are all heavily dependent on government funding. In India, and possibly throughout the developing world, the vast majority of strategic organizations are either government - spawned or heavily dependent upon the government or its agencies for fun

The implication of resource dependency on the government is extensive government control, that is, political and bureaucratic control over strategic organizations. In turn, these have further implications: the appointments and tenures of the top executives of strategic organizations are often politically mandated; and there is a nearly irresistible pressure on strategic organizations to adopt the bureaucratic structures and procedures of the government.<sup>19</sup>

The usually large size of strategic organizations provides further impetus to bureaucratisation.<sup>20</sup> Thus, strategic organizations often are prone to the well-known dysfunctions of the bureaucratic organization, namely, rigidity, suboptimization and interfunctional conflicts, close supervision and staff alienation, the emergence of a conformist, bureaucratic staff personality, etc.<sup>21</sup>

On the plus side, being strategic, and therefore enjoying high social priority and legitimacy, also implies a large capacity to raise resources, and therefore, a large loss-bearing capacity.<sup>22</sup>

This resource abundance in a scarcity-ridden poor society and this large loss bearing capacity make it possible for the strategic organization to be venturesome.

#### Developmental role and unfamiliar, non-routine tasks

While strategic organizations tend to get bureaucratized, and to suffer from the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, they must, paradoxically, operate in entrepreneurial and organic modes in order to fulfil their developmental missions and to cope with unfamiliar, non-routine tasks.<sup>23</sup> These strategic organizations, given their developmental

missions, programs, products, technologies, and processes must innovate; they must make bold moves; they must take calculated risks; they must be impelled by a social vision rather than by just mundane considerations; they must operate flexibly in an unfamiliar terrain; they must operate as "open" and participative systems; they must win over their often conservative, traditional, poorly educated, and ignorant clients by persuasion and participative methods; they must adapt to local situations and resist excessive standardization; and they must instil in their rank-and-file the kind of work, cooperation, and innovation ethic so vital to mission accomplishment.

To summarise: Strategic organizations in developing societies usually have access to large governmental and government - controlled resources. Their missions and their loss-bearing capacity enable them to make entrepreneurial moves; but they are frequently hobbled by bureaucratic structures and dysfunctional practices generated by large size and resource dependency on the government, and afflicted by weak organizational work cultures and resistance from conservative beneficiaries.

### 8 Issues in Strategic Organizations

Strategic organizations should become a major arena of OB research and effectiveness technology. I have briefly examined below several fairly well-worked OB issues for their research implications for strategic organizations in developing societies. These issues are: motivation and control; coordination, collaboration, and conflict resolution; boundary management; management of growth; institution building; innovation and change; and revitalization of sick organizations.

## Motivation and control in strategic organizations

Motivation of organizational members is one of the more extensively researched areas in OB.<sup>24</sup> People join organizations to satisfy their needs. The organization employs people to achieve its goals. It does so through structures, procedures, and systems that often frustrate human needs by making work monotonous or meaningless. So long as the psychic and monetary inducements offered by the organization balance the psychic and monetary contributions made by the staff, so goes Western theory, there is motivation to remain with the organization; and so long as the employee expects that the organization will meet his or her needs if he or she meets the organization's demands, he or she would be motivated to contribute to the organization.<sup>25</sup> Western motivational models have incorporated the concept of a hierarchy of needs,<sup>26</sup> a dynamic aspiration level as an influence on the strength of motivation,<sup>27</sup> early socialization into certain enduring motives like the achievement, power, and affiliation motives,<sup>28</sup> etc. In conceptualising motivation in work situations, distinctions have been drawn between durable "intrinsic" motivators like challenge in job, and more ephemeral "extrinsic" motivators like pay and authority.<sup>29</sup>

Strategic organizations, thanks to their governmental links, tend to have restricted capacity to offer attractive hiring terms, to fire staff at will, or to remunerate staff handsomely for outstanding performance. In other words, their capacity to provide attractive extrinsic motivators is limited. But their mission and social relevance, and their pioneering, innovative, and developmental activities can provide powerful spurs for the idealistic and the enterprising. Generally speaking, therefore, strategic organizations may have few

charms for the money-minded but ample attractions for those with a high need for socially relevant achievement. Those strategic organizations that stress opportunities for challenging work, for learning on the job, for socially relevant work, etc., are likely to be able to attract, retain, and energise staff; those that fail to do so, may be blighted by an alienated or apathetic staff, high absenteeism, etc. Further research on work dedication, work commitment, achievement need, the pioneering-innovating motive, extension motivation, and social conscience may help the strategic organizations of developing societies to recruit and promote the right kinds of staff.<sup>30</sup>

Performance control in bureaucratic organizations tends to be effected mainly through hierarchical supervision, budgets and quantitative targets, and emphasis on following laid down procedures.<sup>31</sup> Strategic organizations, too, therefore tend to rely heavily on these control mechanisms. But an over-emphasis on these mechanisms may lead to staff alienation, and to such distortions as short term targetry, neglect of quality, neglect of hard-to-quantify developmental objectives, etc. However, important additional means of control are available to strategic organizations. The first is control through pre-entry socialization,<sup>32</sup> commonplace among professionals, and possible in a strategic organization because of its need for professional expertise. The second is control through careful selection of staff with a strong identification with the missions of the organization,<sup>33</sup> also available to the strategic organization because of its missionary goals. The third is peer group control, also available to the strategic organization because developmental tasks are often best accomplished through work teams. Thus, the distortions

wrought by hierarchical, budgetary, and procedural control can be limited by the strategic organization emphasising self, peer, and ideological control. Greater research on strategic organizations that have successfully harnessed these latter forms of control should yield good dividends.

#### Coordination and collaboration in strategic organizations

The very character of formal organizations - vertical differentiation due to a hierarchy of authority and horizontal differentiation through extensive functional specialization, role specialization, and division of labour - predisposes organizations to coordination difficulties. Western research has uncovered a variety of structural as well as behavioural mechanisms of coordination, conflict resolution, and collaboration.<sup>34</sup> Structural mechanisms include the hierarchy of authority, division or profit center concept, standardised operating procedures governing relations between potentially conflicting work groups, advance joint planning of operations to anticipate and rectify potential areas of conflict, profit sharing systems etc. Behavioural mechanisms include participatory decision making in which people with potentially conflicting interests come together to tackle problems jointly, training in interpersonal competence and team building, accentuation of superordinate goals, confrontation meetings to articulate and iron out differences, organizational socialization and identification creation, etc.

Strategic organizations tend to be large and have diverse goals. Therefore they tend to have relatively high levels of functional and role specialisations.<sup>35</sup> This may impede inter-role and inter-functional coordination. On the other hand, strategic organizations tend to



have missionary goals, and these superordinate goals can engender identification with the organization and promote cohesion within the staff. Continuing emphasis by management on the organization's strategic missions, and on communication to the staff of performance on mission-related objectives should offset conflicts engendered by specialization.<sup>36</sup> Besides, adroit institution building can create a distinctive organizational "clan" culture<sup>37</sup> that tends to contain inter-role and inter-personal conflicts.

Strategic organizations in developing societies often face a couple of distinctive coordination-related problems. As strategic, government-funded organizations, they find it difficult to practice nepotism. Norms of qualifications-based hiring tend to imply a culturally polyglot organizational membership. In these islands of cultural "cosmopolitanism" work relationships and kinship - based relationships often get out of step.<sup>38</sup>

A second problem area is the generation gap that some of these strategic organizations in developing countries suffer from. This generation gap arises because in many developing countries the strategic organizations set up during the initial period of planned development are staffed by the available senior bureaucrats or generalists with little technical training, but staffed at lower rungs by young technocrats, and later by professionally trained managers. The work identities of the senior managers may differ sharply from the work identities of the junior managers.<sup>39</sup> The former may be more traditional and obedience seeking, possibly more intuitive as decision makers, while the latter may seek change, innovation, growth, participation, and professional ways of decision making.

Greater research on how some strategic organizations have melded polyglot personnel, and how they have bridged the generation gap could lead to more effective strategies of organizational integration.

### Boundary management

Operating as "open systems", organizations must create structures and processes for obtaining the needed inputs and for marketing their outputs.<sup>40</sup> Besides, they must establish their institutional legitimacy with the outside world.<sup>41</sup> For controlled organizations it may be especially important to manage their interface with their controllers.<sup>42</sup> Thus, the management of the various boundaries of the organization is an important element of organization design.<sup>43</sup>

As far as strategic organizations in developing societies are concerned, there are several interfaces with the environment that are particularly critical. The first is the interface with the control environment, usually the government and its agencies and institutions. The second is the interface with the intended beneficiaries of the strategic organization, its client system. The third is the interface with the suppliers of technology or know-how. The fourth is the interface with networks of organizations useful for accomplishing the missions of the strategic organization.

Concerning boundary management vis-a-vis the control environment, there are two facets: the management by the control environment of the interface with the strategic organization, and the management by the strategic organization of its interface with the control environment. As progenitor and main purveyor of resources, the control

environment has a legitimate interest in mission performance by the strategic organization. This generally translates into periodic performance reporting by the strategic organizations, appointment by the control environment of the top executives and board members of the strategic organization, etc. Additional useful mechanisms may be periodic review meetings with the top management of the strategic organization, some sort of performance related contracting between the control environment and the strategic organization,<sup>44</sup> participative fixation of the goals of the strategic organization that takes realistic note of the latter's situation, considerable operating autonomy for the strategic organization, great care by the control environment in picking the right kind of dedicated professionals for top posts in the strategic organization, and a simultaneously nurturant (in crises) but demanding (in normal circumstances) treatment of the strategic organization.<sup>45</sup>

The strategic organization also needs to know how to deal effectively with the control environment.<sup>46</sup> It need not be obsequious; but it pays to cultivate powerful elements in the control environment and create a support network in it. It pays to take the control environment early into confidence about impending difficulties or crises. It also pays to educate the control environment about the traits of the strategic organization or of its operating environment that require special consideration.

Another boundary management that needs special study is the management of the interface with client systems. Many strategic organizations are set up to develop tradition-ridden, apathetic client systems -

NDDB, IRDP, ATIRA, block development administrations, etc., are ready Indian examples of such organizations. Too often, however, clients are seen as objects for head counts, so that physical or financial targets may be met but the essentially human, change and development targets are not.<sup>47</sup> It may be useful to coopt representatives of clients into the strategic organization's decision making processes. An even more radical possibility may be to set up special organizations whose business it is to organize fragmented and apathetic clients into making demands on the strategic organization. Thus, in developing societies, a prerequisite for developing the client system may be to conscientise it, and make it more cohesive and vociferous.<sup>48</sup> Such an investment may pressure the strategic organization not only into providing better services, but also may make it more dynamic, progressive, participative, etc. This external pressure may be a good substitute for the commonplace lack of competitive pressure on the strategic organization. Besides, if there is competition, a strong client system would tend to induce greater competition, and thereby improve both the performance and management of the strategic organization.<sup>49</sup>

Know-how and technology are highly valued resources of many "high tech" strategic organizations of developing societies. These are usually availed of from developed countries. Technology acquisition is a complex process, with the strategic organization, the host government, the supplier's government, and the supplier being often involved in protracted and fluid interactions.<sup>50</sup> A significant boundary management problem for the strategic organization is to familiarize itself with the global technology market. A useful

technology choosing heuristic in the early phase of the organization may be to "satisfice" : confine choice to "reputed" suppliers in "friendly" countries; formulate some broad cost and performance criteria; and choose the first supplier who meets these criteria. Further, as experience and skills accumulate, the technology acquisition decision can be delegated to specialists, comprehensive criteria can be formulated, and the attempt made to optimise on these criteria through global, systematic technology shopping.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, the strategic organization, though often a monopoly, is often just one element in a multitude of organizations that must collaborate for optimal mission accomplishment. Take the ambitious Integrated Rural Development Programme of India. Unless the program organization elicits the cooperation of the nationalised banks, the local governmental administrative organizations, the local self-government organizations, and so forth, there would be minimal impact in the target area on the target population. Thus, the strategic organization must be competent at networking vis-a-vis the other organizations on which it is dependent for mission accomplishment but over which it has often no formal authority at all.<sup>52</sup> It must be able to play a change agent role in an inter-organizational network through appropriate environmental sensing, opportunity spotting, achievement drive, creativity, resourcefulness, collaboration, horse trading, planning, etc.

To summarise : some very significant areas of OB research on strategic organizations in developing societies pertain to effective management of the interface with the control environment, with development - oriented interface with the client system, with

foreign purveyors of technology, and with inter-organizational networks critical for mission accomplishment.

### Management of growth

The management of growth has become a significant topic of the field of both business policy and organization theory. Western work has explored strategies of diversification and their structural consequences;<sup>53</sup> phases of growth and their organizational implications;<sup>54</sup> entrepreneurial strategies;<sup>55</sup> modes of strategy making,<sup>56</sup> etc.

As far as strategic organizations in developing societies are concerned, there are some distinctive features to their growth management. First of all, the goals of growth differ. Wealth, size, or profit maximization (subject to constraints) may be the principal goals of Western corporate growth management; maximization of positive externalities and development of targetted socio-economic sectors (subject to viability constraints) are the usual principal goals of strategic organizations in developing societies. Often, therefore, strategic organizations go in where corporate angels may fear to tread.

Second, the charters of strategic organizations tend to be more restricted; so opportunistic conglomerate diversification is less feasible for strategic organizations.<sup>57</sup> This may be fortunate because conglomerate diversification has generally been found to lead to poorer performance than related diversification.<sup>58</sup>

Third, subject as strategic organizations in developing societies are to governmental controls, effective boundary management for growth and diversification vis-a-vis the control environment is extremely important.<sup>59</sup> Establishment of goal congruence with the control environment before embarking on growth plans is an essential step.

Fourth, given government-mandated ceilings on remuneration, strategic organizations in developing societies tend to have poor availability of, and access to, top class growth managers.<sup>60</sup> This, combined with being very much in a learning situation vis-a-vis professional management systems, and relative unfamiliarity with daunting developmental missions, implies great emphasis on a speedy and effective organizational learning strategy. Thus, learning through pilot projects, often in the most difficult operating terrain, starting in a modest way with a single goal rather than starting in a big way with too many goals, "sticking to the knitting"<sup>61</sup> until management capabilities are built up, phasing expansions investing in good performance feedback systems, etc., may be elements of an effective learning strategy.<sup>62</sup>

Fifth, their developmental thrust and client heterogeneity imply that the impulse to expand by replicating programs or products must be kept in check. Much growth needs to be decentralized to tap local opportunities creatively.

Finally, limited managerial and other resources imply a strategy as much of penetration as of withdrawal from areas in which the developmental missions have been achieved. The strategy is not just of

withdrawing from "loser" activities, but also from "winner" activities that now some other organization(s) can handle reasonably well.

Effective corporate growth management of the Western variety may have only limited relevance for growth management by strategic organizations. Research on how effective strategic organizations manage growth, especially their learning strategies, and how they disengage from a sector once their missions are accomplished, should be rather useful.

#### Institution building in strategic organizations

Institution building is the gradual transformation of the formal organization with its mundane concerns into a distinctive, well-accepted social institution that stands for some core values.<sup>63</sup> corporation for example, becomes an institution when beyond its customary profit or growth goals, it internalizes values like being a path breaker, or dedication to national priorities, or the growth of its human resources, or trusteeship, etc. These values are held not just by the top management; they are shared by the rank-and-file, and concretely express themselves in the organization's policies and internal as well as external transactions. Criteria for assessing the effectiveness of institution building may be diverse; some that have been suggested are capability development, innovative thrust, and domain penetration.<sup>64</sup> A number of processes and choices that contribute to institution building have been identified. These include birth processes such as idea origination and nurturance, and choice of institutional form; developmental processes, such as culture creation through initial recruitment, decision-making, leadership,



structuring, boundary management, etc.; renewal processes encompassing leadership changes, mission redefinition, etc.; and institutionalisation processes such as relevance building and environmental impact.<sup>65</sup>

Institution building is of obvious importance to the developing world, for formal, strategic organizations are the instruments of the developing world not only for achieving specific developmental missions but also for charging traditional and conservative societies with the new values of innovation and science-based modernization, democratic functioning, primacy of human growth, professionalism, and the growth and development of under-developed client systems.

Vis-a-vis institution building, strategic organizations in a developing society are at an advantage; for, compared to a run-of-the-mill corporation or a government bureau, they start with transformational missions. The initial choices, however, are important. If persons with bureaucratic or political orientation are put in charge of the fledgeling strategic organization, the chances are that the organization will get 'set' as a bureaucracy or as a "spoils system". If, however, persons with a sense of mission, a team building, participative decision making orientation, and strong networking capabilities are put in charge, it is likely that they will recruit like-minded persons, and institution building values will get set.<sup>66</sup> More often than not, the resource dependency of the strategic organization on the government takes its toll, and the strategic organization degenerates into a sick organization, heavily bureaucratized and politicalised. Thus, the strategic organization may have two sharply differing

alternative life cycles:<sup>67</sup> an organic youth with a bureaucratic or political head, goal displacement,<sup>68</sup> the institutionalisation of bureaucratic values or the values of the "spoils system", decay and degeneration into sickness; versus, an organic youth with a dedicated, participative professional as head, capability development, team building, goal elaboration, innovative thrust, and market or domain penetration and impact.

Research on alternative institution building life cycles should provide many insights into effective transformation of blueprints and bureaucracies into living bridges to human growth.

#### Innovation and change in strategic organizations

Large and bureaucratic though the strategic organization may often be, its business is innovation and change culminating in socio-economic development. As perceptive observers of bureaucratic organizations have noted, their bureaucratisation impedes introduction of innovations; but once the initial resistance is overcome, the pressure for standardisation can expedite organization-wide adoption of the innovation or change.<sup>69</sup> The trick, therefore, is to create a precedent. Thus, attempts to create innovative precedents in marginal parts of the bureaucratized strategic organization or in its marginal activities should facilitate the diffusion of the innovation in the rest of the organization. Decentralization and local action research should, therefore, be useful.<sup>70</sup> The organizational leadership may play a critical role; whether it is entrepreneurial and development oriented or conservative and bureaucratic should make a very large difference to the strategic organization's innovativeness. Preference for novel outputs, creativity, experimentation, dynamic

young managers, and simultaneously for discipline and efficiency may be the strategic policy choices needed to generate a powerful innovation impulse in the organization.<sup>72</sup> A relatively flat structure, the creation of small work groups, and a reasonably effective formal as well as informal information, control, and planning system may be the structural devices necessary for innovations to take place.<sup>73</sup> Certain mechanisms can speed up organizational learning in new ventures, such as pilot projects and phased expansions, parallel efforts and "shoot outs".<sup>74</sup> Like other large, bureaucratic organizations, strategic organizations tend to accumulate once useful, currently obsolete practices, policies, and structures. A major opportunity for innovation may be for management to ask periodically the question: if the organization were to start all over again, which of its products, technologies, goals, strategies, policies, structures, and practices that it now has would it acquire.<sup>75</sup> Such a question opens up vast opportunities for spring cleaning, and for replacing the obsolete with the currently and futuristically useful. Periodic informal meetings between the top level managers and junior, younger managers may be productive. At these, the latter may be encouraged to share their aspirations and ideas for the organization, and the top level managers may provide briefing on the organization's missions, goals, opportunities, threats, and constraints. Such meetings would help institutionalise a culture of innovation. The diffusion of innovations within a strategic organization (or a group of similar strategic organizations) can be expedited if details of innovations, both successes and failures, are quickly circulated throughout the organization (or group of organizations).<sup>76</sup>

There may be much potential for innovations at middle management levels in strategic organizations because these levels are commonly staffed by relatively young technocrats and professional managers raring for change. But the adoption of innovations at lower rungs may be a difficult process in strategic organizations because it requires considerable coalition building activity that cuts across functional and role specialization barriers. Innovation agency may require a variety of skills relatively scarce even in professional managers : ability to diagnose innovation opportunities; generate creative / and relevant ideas; market ideas to colleagues and superiors; understand and manage the politics of innovation; build a team for implementing the innovation, etc.<sup>77</sup>

Some important research areas vis-a-vis innovation and change in strategic organizations are how centralization and decentralization affect the adoption of what kinds of innovations, the role of top management ideology, spring cleaning as a spur to innovation, vertical two-way communications and innovation, strategic policy choices and innovation, and effective change agency at middle management levels.

#### Revitalization of sick strategic organizations

Organizational sickness may have become a global phenomenon. Organizations, even in the developed West, despite easy access to high quality technocrats and managerial personnel, fall victims to too fast a change, too much complexity, too much competition, or too many restrictions.<sup>78</sup> Sickness seems to be rampant in the developing world. In India alone nearly 100000 manufacturing units (mostly

small-scale units) are sick; a significant percentage of its public enterprises remain loss making; and sickness in its large, quasi-governmental institutions and governmental departments seems rampant. Fortunately, turnaround research, both in the West and in the Third World, especially in India, has led to the identification of useful models of effective turnaround management.<sup>80</sup>

Because of large size, complex, unfamiliar, long-term missions, and a strong interface with the government, strategic organizations are quite prone to organizational sickness, manifesting as low morale, in-fighting, a poor public image, sacrifice of quality for the sake of targetry, and mission failure. Given the often fuzzy goals of strategic organizations, the recognition of sickness itself may take a long time.<sup>81</sup> If a spoils system has got installed, the beneficiaries in the political system and in the organization may resist curative actions. Therefore, even if there is recognition of sickness, an effective consensus to do anything may take long to emerge. These delays may, of course, aggravate sickness. It may not be easy to find the right person to revive a sick strategic organization, partly because of the high risk of failure, but partly also because the kind of manager needed to revitalize a sick organization may be very different from the run-of-the-mill professional manager.<sup>82</sup> The turnaround manager needs to be something of an entrepreneur who can quickly see, and seize, opportunities in a murky situation, something of a missionary who can mobilize a demoralised work force for the heroic efforts required for turnaround; something of a team builder who, through participative decision making, can put together a team of dedicated managers for operating the turnaround; something of an expert negotiator who can negotiate concessions and support from the

organization's various stakeholders for speeding turnaround; something of a professional manager who can plug the biggest loopholes in the operating management systems; something of a creative learner who comes into an unfamiliar organizational system, learns the ropes fast, and puts together a custom-tailored turnaround strategy; and something of an institution builder who gives a great deal of importance to the values he or she prizes, and disseminates them by setting a personal example. A right sort of top management team, instead of an individual, may find it easier to turnaround a sick strategic organization.<sup>83</sup> It may make sense for developing countries to raise a cadre of turnaround managers.

A number of research questions come to mind. Why is it that a disproportionately large number of strategic organizations do not seem to have an internal capability to prevent sickness or cure themselves and must pathetically wait for outsiders to set them right?<sup>84</sup> What could be the sizing up strategies of strangers who come in as rescuers? What initial actions of rescuers could unfreeze a sick organization; what actions would ensure a direction change; and what actions could consolidate a turnaround? How can a society provide its strategic organizations with the right kinds of turnaround managers?

### Concluding Comments

OB for social development is an exciting and over due paradigm shift from organizational narcissism. The primary instrumentality of this paradigm shift is research focus on the strategic organizations of the developing world, especially on motivation and control, coordination, boundary spanning, innovation and change, growth management,

institution building, and sickness and revitalization. Such a paradigm shift would not only make OB immeasurably more relevant to over two-thirds of the globe's population, it should bring in its train exciting new concepts, approaches, data, and techniques that may revolutionise OB.

Fortunately, the opportunities for studying strategic organizations in Third World countries may be sizeable. The strategic organization tends to be rife with "people" problems thanks to its daunting missions, bureaucratic structure, kinship oriented staff, and conservative clientele. Both the control environment and the strategic organization's management should generally be keen to get whatever help they can from the social scientist in order to tame the beast.

Besides this, the strategic organization in a developing society is perpetually trying out something or the other. One year it is diversification; another year it is computerisation; a third year it is structural reorganization; a fourth year it is MBO, or quality circle, or T-group, or stress management, or creativity training, or OD, or whatever else. The point is that strategic organizations of developing societies offer exceptionally rich sites for natural experiment type research. All that the OB researcher has to do is to contact the strategic organization intending to do an experiment and negotiate "before" and "after" measurements of structure, strategy, style, culture, leadership, values, or whatever else the OB researcher fancies. An extensive natural experiment based research strategy should provide invaluable causal grist for OB conceptualising and technologising. Table 3 summarises some significant OB research issues pertaining to the strategic organizations of the Third World.

(Table 3 about here)

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TABLE 1ILLUSTRATIVE OB TOOLS FOR USE IN STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONS

Diagnostic tools: action research, survey-feedback, search conference.

Individual level tools: Leadership and supervisory training, achievement motivation training, creativity training, stress management training, entrepreneurship training, change agency training, job enrichment and task design.

Group effectiveness tools: Participative decision making, team building, process consultation, confrontation meeting, conscientisation.

Structure-related tools: Role clarification, decentralization, differentiation and integration, design of organizational chart.

System tools: Management by objectives system, human resource development system.

TABLE 2SOME EXAMPLES OF INDIAN STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONSGovernment

Planning Commission; the cabinet; the various ministries, especially the development - oriented parts of these ministries.

Financial Institutions

The apex financial institutions, especially IDBI, IFCI, ICICI, LIC, Unit Trust; the nationalized banks, particularly their merchant banking divisions.

Manufacturing

Public enterprises set up to produce means of further production or to pioneer new products and technologies; private enterprises operating in the "core" sector of the economy or in "sunrise" industries; research and training institutions set up for industries (e.g. ATIRA, CMERI).

Services

Key educational institutions like the IITs, IIMs, and research oriented post-graduate university departments; key health institutions, especially the research oriented ones; development-oriented voluntary organizations and cooperative societies.

TABLE 3

SOME OB ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES VIS-A-VIS

STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONS

OB Issues in Strategic Organizations

Significant Opportunities for Further OB Research

1. Motivation and control in strategic organizations

- 1. Capacity to offer extrinsic and intrinsic motivators, particularly challenging, socially relevant jobs
- 2. Research on such other powerful and durable motivators as work dedication and conscientiousness, extension motivation, patriotism, pioneering-innovative motivation
- 3. Research on inspiring, charismatic, missionary type of leadership found more commonly in military organizations in war time and among political leaders of revolutionary movements
- 4. Predisposition to use bureaucratic forms of performance control (hierarchy, budgets, rules). Potential for using self, peer group, and ideological forms of control.

2. Coordination, conflict resolution, and inter-personal collaboration in strategic organizations

- 1. Effect on coordination and collaboration of functional and role specialization, "fair", qualifications based, non-nepotistic hiring practices, "generation gap", etc.
- 2. Potential for improving coordination and collaboration through greater emphasis on missionary motivation of selected personnel, indoctrination of staff into organizational mission, institution and team building processes
- 3. Need to research the right mix of bureaucratic, behavioural, and culture - specific coordination, conflict resolution, and collaboration inducing mechanisms



Boundary management  
in strategic organi-  
zations

1. Control environment's management of interface with strategic organization
2. Strategic organization's management of interface with control environment, especially networking within the control environment for support to the organization
3. Client development by human services oriented strategic organizations
4. Technology acquisition management by "high tech" strategic organizations
5. Networking with other organizations for mission accomplishment.

Growth management in  
strategic organizations

1. Rapid organizational learning strategies for growth in unfamiliar areas (pilot projects, single goals, phasing, starting small, starting small in the most difficult part of the domain)
2. Organizational strategies for withdrawing from domains in which developmental missions are completed
3. Establishment of criteria of success for mission accomplishment
4. Negotiation of support from control environments for growth goals and initiatives
5. Implications of growth for organizational structure, staff motivation, coordination, etc.
6. Leadership needed at operating levels to manage growth.

Institution building  
in strategic organi-  
zations

1. The long-term effects of initial policy, structure, and other choices for institution building
2. Socialization processes for institution building
3. Leadership style for institution building
4. How strategic organizations can capitalize on their inherent external legitimacy

5. How core values get introduced and institutionalised in the strategic organization
  6. How institutionalised core values affect the strategy, structure, performance pattern etc., of the strategic organization.
  7. Alternative institution building life cycles of strategic organizations.
6. Innovation and change in strategic organizations
1. The role of precedents in the diffusion of innovations within strategic organizations. Facilitators of precedent creation.
  2. Creation of a culture of innovation in the face of bureaucratic structure. The role of top management leadership, strategic choices
  3. Organizational structure and control systems that are congruent with innovationist emphasis
  4. Innovation spurring practices-periodic junking of obsolete practices, periodic informal meetings between top level and junior managers, circulation of diagnoses of organization successes as well as failures within the organization, etc.
  5. Innovation change agency within the strategic organization at operating levels.
7. Revitalization of sick strategic organizations
1. Proneness of the strategic organization to fall sick (because of large size, bureaucratisation due to external dependency, etc.)
  2. Internal and external recognition of the sickness of the strategic organization and the development of indicators of organizational sickness
  3. Traits and abilities of effective turnaround managers/teams
  4. Initial actions for "unfreezing" a paralysed strategic organization
  5. Actions for initiating a change of direction
  6. Actions for consolidating a revitalization
  7. Mechanisms for preventing recurrence of sickness.