


Working Paper



M.A., A & A : W. S. R. D. M. L. L.

W. P. No. 710

OCT., 1987

8103 50/2

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MANAGING ACCESS, ASSURANCE AND ABILITY:
WHAT SHOULD RURAL DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS
LEARN AND UNLEARN?

By

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WP710

1987
(710)

W P No. 710

October 1987

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INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT
AHMEDABAD-380015
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MANAGING ACCESS, ASSURANCE AND ABILITY: WHAT SHOULD RURAL DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS LEARN AND UNLEARN?

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ABSTRACT

Training of rural development managers has attracted considerable attention in the recent past in light of the drive in the Central Government for upgrading the professional skills of development managers. However, the thrust is either training people at the lower levels or sending senior managers including public servants abroad. The relationship between political economy, socio-ecological context and the training pedagogy have neither been systematically analysed nor pursued.

The paper makes a case for building upon experiential knowledge of the rural development managers and suggest alternative training approaches which can demystify the expert knowledge and at the same time provide a basis for greater collegiality between trainer and trainees. The match between theory and practice will also improve if further refinements in the methodology suggested here is attempted. Need for innovations in designing curricula and training strategies for senior as well as junior level of development bureaucracy cannot be over-emphasized. It is strongly suggested that top bureaucracy in the central and state government as well as public corporations, banks etc. need far more training to modify their perceptions of the problem and likely solutions than the middle managers. Likewise the last level of functionaries also need much greater attention. Excessive emphasis on training middle managers is bound to prove counter-productive. The paper is edited into four parts. In part one the conceptual framework link space, season, sector and social stratification besides access, assurance and ability are discussed. In part two the issues which have arisen during various training programmes in which administrators were asked to share their dilemma are given. Part three includes review of rural development programmes in some of the institutions and finally alternative approaches for future training strategies are given in part four.

/training

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What should Rural development Managers Learn and Unlearn

The access to resources (natural and otherwise), ability to convert resources into investments (i.e. skills) and assurance regarding future returns from present investments (i.e. risk adjustment options) are the three fulcra on which the decision making options of the majority of the poor people rest.

The rural development managers have to anticipate the conflicts inherent in organizing fair access to the resources in the given historical socio-ecological context. They have to identify the technological imperatives of converting access into investments and build upon the traditional or the upgraded skills of the people. Most importantly they have to recognize the need for assurance mechanisms that will converge conflicting choices through accountable institutions. The ecological resources and markets, technology and the institutions are thus the means to organize and manage access, ability, and assurance for the disadvantaged rural populations .

It is obvious that any policy designed at central level would require considerable adaptation to suit local socio-ecological realities. Making adaptations requires making judgments. New meanings have to be identified into the relationships that have been forged or evolved over a long period of time between politicians, officials and people (with "p" and "P"). Many compromises do not pose any moral, professional or ethical dilemma. But many do!
How do managers resolve these dilemma? What are the assumptions

which prevent many managers from even taking note of the conflicts inherent in the rural development? What should be the purpose of training such managers?

A training strategy that generates an acknowledgement of inadequacy amongst managers will require that they become sensitive to those dilemma that are observed but not experienced.

The search for skills, perspectives, yardsticks (for making judgements -- moral or value) and tools that help managers overcome that feeling of inadequacy at one level to notice inadequacies at another level becomes the central issue.

It must be mentioned here that good management is not a substitute for bad policies. However, what is possible is that managers can be made sensitive to the 'room for maneuver' that always exists for those who want to be the developmental deviants.

This paper is divided into four parts. In part one we present the conceptual framework in which decision making options of the rural development managers can be identified. In part two we present issues which arose when we asked the administrators undergoing training to document the dilemma that they faced. These incidents have been collected since 1978-79 at various training institutes^{*1}. The training strategies contemplated by

*1 The institutes include IMG, IIPA, IIM-A, HCMIPA, SPIPA etc. The theoretical perspective in which these incidents were shared with me was not of course same all these years. However, some issues were common such as related to the monitoring of social effects of developmental projects (Gupta, 1981).

the central government with regard to rural development are discussed in part three. This part also includes authors' perceptions of training styles in vogue at various institutions.

These views have neither been shared with the concerned Institutions nor are intended to represent their formal positions.

Part four summarizes some alternative approaches for future training strategies that could be tried to demystify the expert knowledge and building upon the experiential knowledge of the practicing managers^{*2}.

*2 The experiential knowledge, as Montgomery argues can bridge the gap between theory and praxis. However, as we have mentioned earlier which experience is valid in what context will have to be determined by prior theory. The problem of etic and emic meanings also becomes relevant in this regard.

1. Conceptual Framework

The Problem of managing rural development programmes and projects can be analysed at three levels:

- a) Defining the Environment: The manipulable, influenceable and appreciable variables in the proximal project/ programme environment (Smith et al, 1980).
- b) The spatial, sectoral, seasonal and social stratification aspects.
- c) The household risk adjustment strategies vis-a-vis organizational and managerial risk adjustment strategies. The existing framework of access, assurance and the ability of household as well as the ways of dealing with imperfection in each aspect.

The training strategies will have to equip rural development managers (RDMs) with the capacity of a) analysing the environment of their decision making arena, b) identify the policies of various contending forces affecting the outcome of the project or programme and c) influencing, manipulating, modifying or just neutralizing the social forces inimical to the interests of the disadvantaged. Suppose the purpose of the development is to widen the decision making horizon of the disadvantaged i.e. add atleast one more degree of freedom, elongate the time frame in which low return but ecologically and economically more sustainable options become viable and in the process modify the expectations of those who have had historic advantage, then training for rural development can not ignore these concerns.

(a) Defining the Environment: (From whose point of view?)

Certain features of the project or programme environment are amenable to manipulation by the managers for instance those resources which are directly controlled by them may be more easily reorganised or recombined for greater reach-down effect than the resources which they can merely influence. Given the fact that most rural developmental programmes are inter-organizational in nature, one has to learn to influence rather than control the behaviours of others. This is a problem which often arises with many IAS officers particularly collectors who seek to control rather than influence when trying to coordinate the actions of multiple actors in a programme. There are other areas of professional activities which a manager may often be able to merely appreciate and adjust. He or she can neither manipulate nor influence these changes in the short run. Such factors include both natural factors such as climate and macro-economic factors such as macro-policies at international or national level. However, despite these cautions, the above discussion suffers from a major limitation given below.

As argued in an earlier study (Gupta, 1981) the tendency to define influenceable, manipulable and appreciable aspects of proximal environment from the point of view of managers only may often generate misleading options; e.g. it is not uncommon to find bureaucrats criticizing political interference in the discharge of their responsibilities. But if the problem is seen from the point of view of the people, it would appear that the

manager were refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of a representative democratic polity.

No body would argue that politicians always represent the genuine, long term interests of the most disadvantaged. But then why should one assume that managers of a rural development programme would like to do so either. Just as there can be good and bad politicians, in the same way there can be good and bad managers. Perhaps, what is necessary is to accord a role to those social forces i. e. the perceptions of the disadvantaged which can not be merely manipulated, influenced or appreciated to achieve the organizational goals as perceived by managers .

It has to be acknowledged that unless the managerial perceptions are validated with those whose development is intended, the authenticity or legitimacy of intervention will remain doubtful. However, a caveat is in order here. Many times due to the historical process of deprivation, the sensibility of the poor gets blunted. The so called 'felt need' do not provide sufficiently precise and accurate indication of the recognition by these people of the need for newer technologies, resources or skills. The need for change is not felt. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that managers have to get a need felt which on a prior ground can be defended as necessary in the long-term interest of the local people. The moral Judgement are inevitable.

Optimal cocercion after all it is not zero (Paquet, 1985). But how does one distinguish between coercion that is guided by mass


welfare concerns and the coercion that reflects bureaucratic arrogance. Perhaps, the importance of developing plurality of perceptions about the work environment cannot be over emphasized in this context. Much of the organizational theory literature refers to organization-environment interaction in the narrow sense as defined by managers. Likewise much of the literature on people's participation refers to the ways of legitimizing managerial perception of the same. We discuss next some ways in which managerial subjectivity can be more dispassionality perceived and not always by those who would like to take up generally the liberating roles.

b) Spatial-sectoral-seasonal Stratification aspects of Rural Development

The Four-S model provides scope to the managers for identifying the Socio-ecological aspect of the developmental processes at macro level. As shown in the figure-1, each side of matrix can be dichotomized into contrasting dimensions. For instance the spatial dimension can be considered from the point of view of topography, population density, altitude, etc. Like wise the sectoral dimension can be looked at in terms of specialized or diversified economic activity mix, agriculture versus industry, single crop vis-a-vis multiple or mixed cropping, etc. The seasonal characteristics of a region or project can be affected by rainfall and other climatic factors; it could be presented as high or low rainfall, high or low seasonality with the implications for the environmental risks inherent in the context.

Fig-1

SPACE



SPACE - SEASON - SECTOR - SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

4-S MODEL

Thus a project or programme in low population density region with high seasonality, i.e. low rainfall (the mean rainfall in tropics is inversely correlated with variance) should be expected to have diversified occupational matrix amongst the households. The social structure in such settlements is likely to have stronger kinship networks. The nature of deprivation experienced by various class and the human risk adjustment mechanisms can be hypothesized.

The design of rural development programmes and implementation strategies can not be obviously independent of the survival strategies of the poor. The implication of linking theory with the implementation is that the training strategies can be more organically contextualized. The management function of the people in organizations is considerably modified if not determined by the socio-ecological context of the clients or target groups.

The way we tried to derive implications for the household resource management, we can also derive the options for the organizations (see Gupta, 1981).

The cost of transportation (of material and human resources) supervision, contact with clients (who in above context would be dispersed) and even providing services and generating feedback would be far higher in low-population-density-and-high-seasonality socio-ecological context compared to the regions with contrasting characteristics.


If the designers of the organization implementing a programme do not provide for proper accounting of these cost the externality of these organizations becomes the transaction costs of the clients. Likewise, more uncertain the environment, more decentralised may have to be the organizational structure.

Access, Assurance and Ability

The Four-S model provides the macro level implications of designing rural development programmes and understanding their training implications. The Three-A model helps us in understanding the micro level implications in context of the ecological resources, institutions, and technological skills of the households.

The access to resources is an important determinant of the generation of demand from the people for various types of institutional supplies. However, while it is a necessary condition it is not sufficient. The assurances available from different institutions about future returns from the present individual investments, about likely behaviour of others in a collective choice dilemma, and insurance against various risks involved in an investment modify considerably the management options. Given the access and the assurance, the poor people may not be able to participate in a developmental programme if they did not have the necessary skills or abilities or if the learning costs of the new skills are higher than the short term benefits. The technology of converting access and assurance into investments thus becomes the third necessary condition.

3-A MODEL



3-A MODEL

If the development is defined as widening the decision making choices and elongating the time frame of poor disadvantaged households, then 4-S and 3-A socio-ecological models provide a way to operationalize these concerns of the rural development managers. It does not have to be said that the historical context of the decision making choices has always to be taken as most basic condition for further planning and action. The implication is that the normative rational techniques linked to the project cycle should take less time in the Training Programme than discussion on politics of implementation inherent in an ongoing bureaucracy.

The fact that earlier programmes implemented in the same space or area, sector or by same department or even any other department, have an important bearing on the prospects of future programmes can not be disputed. Historicity of implementation is one of the most neglected aspect of rural development training next only to perhaps the lack of theoretical rigour in linking the objective reality (as attempted in the 4-S and 3-A model for details of socio-ecological paradigm see Gupta, 1984, 1985) with subjective assessment of the decision making choices.

2. Building Upon Experiential Knowledge

Rural development, it is said is like making a lion's den into a happy zoo (Siffin, 1976). The cordinations in rural society can not be resolved through any one or two sectoral programmes, particularly when many of this programmes work at cross purpose. Even the broad strategy of developing poor in rural areas is not

understood in the same manner by the leaders of different sectoral and regional programmes*.

Under such a condition to expect managers of these programmes at grassroot level to coordinate and develop a sense of common purpose is obviously not very realistic. At the same time one cannot become indifferent to these realities and throw one's hands in despair. There are people in public as well as private sectors and voluntary organizations who do make a difference. Perhaps by learning from the examples of those who have been able to change the situation in favour of the poor without any major structural reform can show us some way. This should at the same time not be a mechanism for undermining the need for those reforms which are warranted not merely on account of equity but also on account of efficiency.

* Recently on an invitation from the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India to suggest improvements in training workshops of Project Director, DRDA from all over the country, author attended one of such workshops. It was very instructive to note that seven joint secretaries incharge of different components of Integrated Rural Development Programme never sat together (except in the inaugural session) to listen to the problems reported by the Project Directors. The problems faced in the field while implementing programmes designed and monitored by respective section of the central ministry had to be heard mainly by the the JS incharge of IRDP proper who despite his best attempts would not have been able to provide authoritative replies to the problems coming under the jurisdiction of his other colleagues. What the Government could not do through coordination and effective mutual-monitoring at top, it expected the project directors in the field to do through coordination, collaboration, competition or even manipulation. It does not have to be said that weakness in the structure at the top can only partly be compensated though individual initiative and enthusiasm at bottom.

Often, while commenting upon the international rural development

experience the scholars do not account for the underlying political and economic assumptions.

Many text book on agri-business (a concept developed at Harvard by Goldberg and others) referred to the experience of Phillipines as a success story. Many colleagues even at IIMA believe in the same definition of the agri-business. However, the recent changes in the polity of Phillipines should act as a pointer towards the dangers inherent in a developmental strategy that ignores the accountability of professionals and public administrators towards the affected people. Much of the frustrations in that society stemmed from the oppressive inequities caused on account of growth of large estates, agri-business firms and the lack of land reforms.

In this section we have discussed in a random sequence various aspects of coordination, administrative politics and administrator-politician interface, risk aversion, avoidance and insurance by the managers, Financial year end or "spring spending syndrom", problem of seeking individual level solution to the issues that are essentially collective choice problems; people's participation, cultural dimensions of development and Monitoring the Monitors, metaphors and myths etc. We have included in this draft only part of the data. There are many illustrations of the experiences of managers which they have shared with us in different training programmes. Idea is to make theory-in-use explicit so that the espoused theory of rural development can be critically commented upon.

Managerial Experiences : a Sampler of issues and Illustrations

Coordination

Historicity of managerial choices:

In any social development programme or project the same activity but with different antecedent context acquires varying meanings in otherwise similar conditions. Thus, the importance of taking historicity of managerial choices into account. For instance when a manager is confronted with a situation where people remember the case of earlier managers having failed in that particular enterprise he begins with a handicap. Thus the history can become a precedent in some cases and privelege in other. Several examples given here generate need for proper conceptualisation of the inter-organizational interactions in a historical context.

Area Demarcation Amongst New and Old Bank Branches

New banks branches have been opened in the areas where some banks had already been financing in past. The new branches will like to have a niche for themselves. The earlier Banks will not like to leave the well developed villages where the scope of business is high.

The new bank branches feel it unfair that older branches should monopolise the safer and surer niches. They use various strategies to oblige district administration more readily so as to ensure that old branches part with some of the better endowed villages. It is obvious that this competition is for only those

villages from where some deposit can be mobilised and or safer and large number of loans can be easily given i.e. where demand for credit already exists (also see Gupta,1986).

As several studies by the author have shown their remain niches of high risk and poor infrastructure where no bank would try to generate ^a demand for credit.

Several issues arises in this context:

How do different banks resolve their conflicts? Who acts as the arbitrator if one is needed? What are the parameters on which the area demarcation is done? What skill are brought into question?

Another example is of the Land development banks (LDBs) called earlier as land mortgage banks which had close links with the district level bureaucracy. Long before the commercial banks (CBs) started financing for agriculture in a big way they had the monopoly in medium and long term finance. The village level worker (VLW) in block development office (BDO) collected the applications from the farmers and forwarded the same to the LDBs. When CBs started financing decade ago they faced the problem of lack of demand in some areas because the VLWs did not disrupt their historical links with the LDBs. In 1979 this problem led one banker to suggest that Government should instruct BDOs and VLWs to forward the applications to the CBs too. He had anticipated the IRDP of eighties.

Why do we always neglect the historicity of administrative links

between different segments of bureaucracy in autonomous and non autonomous organizations? The culture of LDBs and BDOs had far more commonality than the culture of CBs and BDOs. How do we recognize the cultural aspects of inter-organizational relations forged or evolved over a period of time ?

The case of a Community irrigation scheme

In a community irrigation scheme several agencies were involved e.g. Revenue Department, drought prone area programme (DPAP), Zilla Parishad, district cooperative officer, the dealers of the oil engines, ground water survey department etc. As is usual with most rural development programmes the authority and responsibility were poorly matched. When the programme developed snags the several very typical problems were faced. For Instance:

- a) Too much was sought to be achieved too soon; target chase led to rather piquant situation generating many other distortions.
- b) The available guidance was not enough and was thinly spread.
- c) Due to simultaneous start of the programme activities in several villages there were localised shortages of certain type of skills.
- d) There were many cases of dysfunctional interdependence among different departments for instance, unless the ZP certified the depth of the well dug the BDO could not distribute the grains-part of the food-for-work for further deepening of the

e) Usual delays in supply of food grains and the cement (which had not been decontrolled till then).

There are numerous other instances of the coordination conflicts which reader must be familiar with. Many reflect just the inefficiencies of the managers who either did not indent the goods early enough or did not anticipate other contingencies. But many emerge because of the structural problems or laxity at the top.

Training programmes need to include sessions on the underlying factors which generate such obvious dysfunctional managerial responses. The cases are used in many training programmes, but they do not trigger off discussion on the basic issue of inter-organizational power and inter cadre power differences (the most common case being of IAS and promotee officers. In fact many IAS officers feel that if only they could write the confidential reports of the recalcitrant officers of the banks or other such departments the coordination will follow. They do not, however recognise that many departments that they control did not perform any better*1.

*1 See the case on Inter-Organizational Relations by Anil K. Gupta (1981) used in a course on DDDO (Design and Dynamics of Developmental Organizations), IIMA; Also Working paper no 649 Creating demand systems-based on the field experience of an action research project in three backward districts administered by three different state bureaucracies but inhabiting similar tribal people.

The usual hasty and ill planned target chase (see for an excellent discription of this issue, Shah, 1985) which begins at the top creating pressures that generate dysfunctionalities all along the way, is not always because the concerned officer at top has not undergone proper training. However, the concentration on training, and that too generally at the middle level rather than at the top and the bottom levels, as a substitute for structural reforms may not take us very far*2. But then should the best be allowed to become the enemy of the better? Will it not generate tolerance for the mediocrity if the 'better' and not the best is aimed at? How else has the bureaucracy ingrained in itself so much of inertia?

Administrative Politics and Politician-bureaucrat Interface : Dealing with Power -A Dirty Cap Everyone Hates but Likes to Wear

In a district a new position has to be filled but the process is delayed through political pressure so that the man who is to be posted becomes eligible in the meanwhile. The other officers cite this as an example of the extent to which political interference can demoralise the burecucracy. However, what is easily ignored is that such cases do take place even when no political intereference exists. The Politics it must be noted is not the preserve of politician alone.

*2 See papers by Anil C Shah on 'Target Street' (1984) and Diary of a Field Officer (first published about 25 years ago but still sounding so true) which reveal facsinating account of what can be considered endemic features of the system.

It has been rightly observed as mentioned earlier the optimal coercion is not zero. However, under what conditions who makes whom work against his or her wishes is what gives the interaction between politicians and public officials so much poignancy.

There are several dimensions of this interaction which need to form the part of training curricula. We are merely suggesting some of the hypothesis which may provide basis for further work and action:

Creating demand system:

It has been suggested that if bureaucrats have to counter balance the demand from the vested interests on the delivery system then they should consider organizing groups of poor to make demand on itself in their own interest. The pros and cons of such a strategy can be debated among the participants of a training programme to clarify their respective professional, ethical and moral position with regard to the issue of organization of poor.

Need vis-a-vis Demand:

An important source of confusion in development discussions is the issue of defining felt needs of the poor. Numerous techniques are taught to the trainees assuming that there is an unwritten consensus on this issue. It is seldom recognised that if people demand what they think they can get then how to make them demand what they should or they could get? It is well known that history of deprivation desensitises the poor about many of needs they have but they don't feel. They do not miss many

things because those things never occupied any space in their consciousness in past. The blunted sensitivities generate apathy and tolerance towards inefficiency as well as deprivations. By delivering what people demand, bureaucracy can not absolve itself of the responsibility of generating new choice, widening the decision making horizon and expanding the repertoire of actual choices.

Administration and Political interface: ~~assumes several forms.~~

This interaction assumes several forms. A question which is often left undiscussed is that if politics is the use of power to move people/things/resources from one sector, space or section of society to another then when does the exercise of this power becomes an interference? This was indeed one of the most frequently mentioned irritation in the development process reported by the bureaucrats world over (Montgomery, 1987). The power play can take different forms. A fuller discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some hypothesis may be useful.

If politicians want to build their power base should they not want people to make demands on them rather than on the bureaucracy?

If performance by officials can be shown in the short run by relying on the existing leadership, why should they be expected to help in the emergence of alternative leadership? In any case who legitimises the corrupt or insensitive leadership? The members of the burecuracy, isn't it?

By letting people and their leaders at higher levels approach politicians, does one weaken the leadership at the local level?

Many times some of the adventurous officers try to intensify the class conflicts without recognizing the limits of their capacity and commitment properly. Every failure increases the probability of next failure. Should one, then, not attempt a change at all? Or should one after recognising the limits of one's power build appropriate network before challenging the existing basis of authority. In any case, generating false hopes may provide some charm and satisfaction to the concerned officer but it certainly infuses cynicism amongst the poor. At the same time the other side of such initiatives is that without participating in active struggles of the people one can not keep ones values clear and intact. Perhaps the answer thus lies in making the price to be paid by different actors in a struggle explicit. Nothing can be more unfair than a situation where a bureaucrat can munge with just a transfer while the people pay the price through sustained persecution or indifference by state or other forms of state repression by the successor.

Tensions between politicians and bureucracy are essential if the democracy has to survive. However, it should be just as much as to keep both sides on their toes; not so much that each starts considering itself the only repository of the people's faith in the state.

The political systems at local level operate in much longer time

frame than at higher level. This makes bureucracy-politician interactions at different levels have very different implications. (One can not make some assumption about the explanatory model at different levels of aggregation a mistake scholars often make).

In a training programme of IAS officers at Administrative Training Institute, U.P. in May 1987, several interesting instances were cited about above interactions. There were examples of both success and the failure.

Does the interface between ^{bureaucracy}~~democracy~~ and Politician become a matter of individual power or skill? If these skills have to be transferred what methods or pedagogical approaches will suit the programmes for officers at different levels? Our contention is that analysis of the administrator's own experiences in light of several hypothesis listed here may prove to be an useful way.

Risk Aversion, Avoidance and Insurance by Managers

There are several types of risks that a rural development manager faces such as: under or over insurance and consequent redundancy building; anticipating too many problems and thus building too many cautions leading to the crippling of individual initiative; achieving targets but failing to achieve objectives and vice versa; disturbing local power balance and thus inviting wrath of the vested interests; faster performance and inviting censure of colleagues or generating jealousies; failing to elicit participation of people in programmes that have been designed at

top without providing enough freedom; too close monitoring leading to conservative attitude amongst subordinates; etc.

Case of brown hopper attack on Paddy:

There was a heavy attack of brown hopper pest on paddy crop in one of the south Indian district when new technology was just being introduced two decades ago. The top officers the of the department of agriculture issued instructions to the district officers to procure the relevant pesticide and arrange the spray. The officers did an admirable job of pest control. However, this being the first time that such a large scale problem had taken place and most officers lacked experience. They were not able to anticipate the actual quantity of pesticide likely to be consumed .

Next year the pest attack did not take place. The officers at various levels had in the mean while been transferred. The unused stock of the left over pesticide had become time barred and thus unfit for use.

The new Director was trying to fix personal responsibility for the loss so incurred.

The concerned officer who was facing the case many years after the matter, wondered whether he should advise his youngsters to ever take such risk of trying to implement a policy in letter and spirit? It was also not clear whether capabilities of the officers can be developed if no investment in their learning was to be made .

When does an expenditure become an investment or a loss become gain? How does one prepare a balance sheet of intended unintended errors and thus costly and not so costly lessons. Who pays the cost of learning to unlearn? How to encourage manager take risks in 'good faith and without negligence'?

How much contingent planning is acceptable in an organization and how to find that out? What is the right amount of insurance?

Whose risks should take primacy—the officers' or the peoples'? How does one make an inventory of these risks?

How much time do the training programmes allocate strengthening the ability of the managers to appreciate various types of risks and develop the risk adjustment strategies?

Spring Spending Syndrome The havoc played by financial year rush to spend money.

In many developing countries in which the financial year ends in March, as much as 30 to 40 percent targets are some times achieved in these months. Huge purchases are made just before the budget is about to lapse; targets are revised or at least the revisions are communicated late; not infrequently the budget which is supposed to be spent over a whole year is released just a few months before the financial year end.

The spending spree in Spring leads to many chronic deficiencies in the implementation of rural development programmes many of which are known to every body at all levels but the changes are slow to come by. No amount of training to the middle and lower

level officers will help this problem emanating at the top.

Training the Top

Apparently the ignorance is not always the cause of inefficiency. As is often said, you can take a horse to water but not make it drink. What are the methods which make a horse drink the water? In an action research project it was discovered that to institutionalize even a small change at micro level several changes simultaneously were required at higher levels as well as in other supporting systems. The tendency to explain the variance in implementation problems at local level with the help of the variables applicable at micro level was criticised (Mathur and Gupta, 1984). The trouble often lay at the top level where the officials who had been away from the active field experience for decades tended to still see every thing from the point view of their own experience. While the credit for success was often taken; the blame invariably was passed on to the lowest rung of bureaucracy. Given the fact that peer group size was small at top level the probability of deviant action was also accordingly very small. This made the task of training top managers all the more difficult. Of late many civil servants have started earning Ph.Ds (of what ever quality) for various reasons. Some of them thus consider expert knowledge even irrelevant. Nevertheless there are exceptions.

The question thus is what training innovations are necessary for the top level to make policy makers and top bureaucracy more responsive to the imperatives of good development management?

Some of the concern mentioned here were communicated to Ministry of Rural Development recently as mentioned here. While the spirit in which the workshop of Project Directors, DRDA was organised was quite appreciable, there remained a scope for considerable improvement.

Belling the Cat i.e. training of the top management in government in the field of rural development has not attracted any attention by any of the training institutions in the country so far. The training like any other reform should really begin from the top. The three tier programme at IIMA does attend to this issue in the industrial context. Likewise a similar programme is being planned on the subject of agricultural research management for risky ecological regions. The strategies will have to obviously vary for each tier.

Collective Choice:-

Seeking individual level solutions to the problems that are essentially collective choice problems

One of the greatest weaknesses of most training programmes is to reinforce the notion that in a resource scarce society same solutions will hold good that may be appropriate in a resource rich society. Perhaps international training programmes on rural development contribute a lot in perpetuating this myth.

The issues which follow are: What are the rules of the game which would enable collective choice solution to developmental problems; What is the nature of match or mismatch between the

risk adjustment strategies of the vulnerable populations involving generally the group or common property based approaches and the respective strategies of the implementing officers; who prefer individual level approach.

People's Participation: organization of poor vis-a-vis the organization of those who want the poor to actually organize.

There is a considerable emphasis on the people's participation in the plan documents but what are the 'techniques' or the 'successful models'? Organization of the poor is mentioned as a topic in many training curricula but not many institutions have tried to do it themselves. (We tried to understand some implication *of* this in the project on creation of Demand Systems)

Those who advocate it the loudest often refer to such examples (for instance the thousands of dairy coopeartives under Opeartion Flood 1 and 2, see Korten, 1982) that do not invoke much credibility. The plan documents mention in most countries about the need for the same and yet there are numerous examples of what happens when some people in bureaucracy or outside try to actually do it. The 'developmental deviants or organizational insurgents' as I prefer to call them have to pay quite a heavy price for implementing some of the rural development policies which are not to be implemented in 'spirit' though in 'letter' these must be. How can training programmes avoid generation of cynicism? One of the ways could be to help the minority of those participants, who are genuinely interested in doing things differently, recognise that they are not alone. There are others

like them though scattered. Just the way poor can not survive in the 'long run' unless they organize themselves, these 'deviants' too can not survive without networking. The role of the trainer then transcends the restrictive boundaries conventionally defined. He or she has to help in networking vertically, horizontally and of course diagonally. The trainer should also build upon the few successful cases. The care should be taken while defining the success. A bad example will undo what hundreds of good words could have done. And there are good examples even if very few.

Cultural dimensions of the Rural Development; training to be sensitive:

Case of the Coconut Plantation and the Rat Control:

In a coastal island state the coconut plantations were affected by a massive rat menace. Several control devices were used including placing warfarin blocks on the crowns of the coconut palms. The programme picked up momentum and registered a great success. No rat nuisance was reported for at least nine to ten months after the application of chemicals. All the costs were met by the government.

The tree climbers were paid the minimum wages by the government for placing the chemical in the crowns of the palms. There was a custom in this place that whenever a climber would climb a tree for harvesting coconuts he would get free a coconut as his share. In view of this each climber took a coconut when he climbed the tree for placing the chemical. The owners of the trees did not

mind in the beginning. For another three or four years there was no problem. Afterwards a few owners started objecting to the collection of a coconut per climb. They did not want to share a coconut because, the climbers got their minimum wages from the government. Majority of the tree owners were willing to let the programme continue as it was. But the campaign required that no pocket of coconut should be left untreated and therefore consent of all the tree owners was necessary. The rats could otherwise seek refuge on the untreated trees.

The matter was discussed between the citizen council and the administration many times. The climbers would not agree for the compensatory wage rise. They wanted their customary right.

Due to this conflict the rat menace again assumed alarming proportions in the so affected island. At long last the recalcitrant owners came around.

Latter the problem became serious in some other islands due to same conflicts.

Why did these conflicts occur in the first place? Did the way programme was designed contribute to the implementation problems? How do we sensitise the managers to these dimensions. Will exhortation work or the cost effectiveness of one alternative over another would suffice? This again, is an aspect which often is ignored. The officer who narrated this example in a training class mentioned about the dominant biases against respect for such customary rights amongst the bureaucracy itself. May be in

some cases the cultural values have to be modified (for instance in health programmes where one comes across many not so healthy practices in prevalence amongst poor and not all forced by poverty). However, the managers required to work in such places have to learn anthropological skills or participant observation methods so that they can understand the various implications of the 'rational resistance' by the people.

Monitoring the monitors : managing programmes and not projects:

Training on project management unfortunately takes precedence over the programme management. Much of the rural development involves programming skills which are quite different and difficult compared to project management skills. The latter include dealing with defined goals, tasks, precise organizational boundaries and clear reporting relationships all of which are nearly absent in case of programmes which are ongoing, diffused, multi-organizational, multi-objective (certain projects could also have these characteristics but such projects tend to graduate into programmes) etc. The monitoring of such activities requires reconceptualization of the principles of monitoring. Some of the alternative propositions/theorems are listed below. These have evolved over last several years during author's interactions with the field practitioners.

- a) a change not monitored is a change not desired*;
- b) too close monitoring can cripple and too lax may confuse (it is like redundancy - too much can cripple and too little constrain);
- c) monitoring only compliance leads to conformity and routinization (do not complain that innovations do not take place!);
- d) Monitoring context changes content. This an age old axiom which has not lost any of its relevance over all the centuries that this has been known. Yet it is conspicuous by its absence in most programmes.
- e) Monitoring only through those people who participate tells you only part of the story. Monitoring through those who did not/will not/could not/ or have not participated tells the rest of the story .
- f). Mutual monitoring is a reality, i.e. every participant in a rural situation monitors what others are doing, saying or not saying or doing. If left unattended it breeds suspicion when organised it generates accountability.
- g) Horizontal accountability i.e., between people and the officials, can not exist without vertical accountability i.e. between higher and lower level officials.

* For details, see Gupta Anil K., 1984, Why Don't we Learn IIMA Working Paper No.542, 1987, Organizing and Managing Poor client Oriented Research Systems : Can Tail Wag the Dog? IIM Ahmedabad, paper presented at ISNAR, The Hague, September 1-5, 1987. Why do not Poor Co-operate, 1987 in Research Relationship, Politics and Practice of Social Research, Ed. Clark G. Wenger, Allen and Unibin, London.

h) Monitoring Metaphors can be a very powerful means of unravelling the underlying currents of a programme. For instance the T&V system was often called the Touch and Vanish system and not without any significance. Likewise I came across from a bank officer's mouth a very revealing interpretation of IRDP. The saying in Hindi was "Inhe rin dena padega" implying that they (the poor) will have to be given loans". The fact that the borrowers were not identified by the banks but the district officers led bankers to develop a feeling of helplessness. The monitoring generates design as Weick once said. It makes the underlying structures apparent. It connects informal power with the formal one, informal objectives with the formal ones.

While certain principles found valid in corporate context can certainly be applied in unorganized sector, the task of developing valid concepts has to progress in close consultation with the 'developmental deviants'.

i) Monitoring access implies designing counters and not corridors.

Often the bureaucracies are designed to deal with 'back door's and 'side windows' although the access is monitored only at the 'front' window or 'door'. The planners prefer to exhort the poor to organize rather than make access rules less complex. The bureaucracies prefer to design rules of fair access but resent any pressure from below in the form of protests or organized demand for accountability. The resultant compromise

between planners' intentions and bureaucrats' profession leads to design of 'corridors' or elbow room where multiple interpretations of the rules are negotiated.

Designing counters implies 'defining precise rules of queuing' (Gupta, 1984). However, as Schaffer once said the itemization creates greater chances of poor not being able to gain access because every new rule has to be interpreted which complicates the process. On the other hand the absence of rules provides scope for arbitrariness. Finding a golden mean between the two extremes is the real challenge before the RDMs. Perhaps institutionalizing the processes of horizontal and vertical accountability as mentioned earlier is more effective than mere reliance on the rules about the rules.

Converting poor marginal investors into 'developmental entrepreneurs' requires developing public risk absorption mechanisms.

The training to generate risk taking ability amongst the RDMs is critical because risk ~~aver~~^{age} poor take risks and thus grow or develop .

The RDMs have to learn to design risk negotiating, diffusing and managing options such that poorest do not remain out of the reach of the developmental programmes.

- k) Monitoring through Camps and campaigns-- the ultimate weapon in the arsenal of developmental planners to shoot the 'target'-- confirms the contempt planners and managers have towards the concept of participation.*

Often in the name of decentralized planning and implementation, bureaucratic machinery chose to organise camps and campaigns to demonstrate its apparent anxiety to deliver results through people's participation. But what do these camps and campaigns really achieve:

- The participation ends where it should begin,
- Routine is converted into celebration,
- People are immobilized in normal times such that every camp generates a greater need for still another camp,
- Tolerance or homeostatic level of people as well as bureaucratic officials, increased so much that unless camps or campaigns were held, system did not perform its normal activities. People as well as officials were desensitized,
- People often interpreted the camps as a sign of helplessness on the part of senior officials who failed to galvanise their machinery to act in the absence of it (camps),
- Need for internal tension to generate pressure for action was met probably by creating external pressure through these camps.

Nobody need be reminded about what happened after the camps or campaigns were over. The absurdity of this approach could be gauged from the fact that some of the patently obvious acts of routine nature in various organizations/delivery systems had to be recalled and celebrated through camps e.g., a bank celebrating

customer - service week, district collectorate organizing
mutation camps or the new famous credit-camps.

There is a need to systematically catalogue such camouflaged
attempts to seek participation of people. While one can
understand periodic reminders about major objectives of any
organization, treating them as substitutes for regular activities
betrayed sincerity.

3) Review of Training Strategies often used in India

Government of India has recently compiled The Compendium of Training Programmes for 1987-88 (GOI, 1987) including a selection of programmes from 131 training institutions. Out of about 4000 programmes there were about 16 on the subject of rural development. There were 26 on other related subjects like social forestry, rural industrialization etc.

Different types of institutes organize these programmes. National Institute of Rural Development is the nodal institute for CIRDAP besides being apex institute for such training programmes as far as government sponsored programmes are concerned. Indian Institute of Public Administration is another apex institute of public administration which organizes some programmes on the subject of rural development. There is at least one or more than one institute of public administration in most of the states which may organize programmes on the subject. Further the ICSSR sponsored institutes of Social Science Research organize programmes on rural development in addition to conduct of research. There are four Indian Institutes of Management and one Institute of Rural Management which organize one or more training programmes on the subject. There are some other institutes as well which conduct seminars and programmes on various aspects of rural development.

As is to be expected the focus, curricula and training strategies differ among most of these institutes. However,

there are some commonalities too. Most programmes were based on the assumptions that:

- a) project planning was the corner stone of rural development;
- b) the kit bag of rural development manager need be filled with good intentions, good behaviour, empathy, positive attitudes (whatever that means), awareness about the need for integration and some general sensitivity to the recent concerns of the policy planners;
- c) mere exhortation on people's participation will help without recognising the price to pay for letting people decide, what managers should be doing and how;
- d) problems of multi level planning can be and need be resolved mainly at the local level where the action is.

There was no attempt to take a Eco-political-economic view of the development process so that the conflicts inherent in the design and implementation of the rural development programmes can be squarely faced.

No systematic theoretical perspective was built up with the result that contingency approach to planning was assumed and reinforced.

The experiential knowledge was not drawn upon except in the form of cases based on the ~~field~~ ^{field} conditions. Some organizations had used simulated games to trigger discussion. But no organization tried to document the insights of the participants as an essential process of the two way transfer of skill and

knowledge . It was assumed that the purpose of the training was to instill skills amongst the participants and learning from their need not be of much consequence at least explicitly.

The problem solving focus was a bit more pronounced at some of the IIMs and IRMA (Institute of Rural Management, Anand). The programmes at IIM Ahmedabad had greater proportion of sessions of agri-business and agro-industry than other institutions. The discussion on political aspects was higher at IIPA than at other institutes.

The NIRD* brought out at the behest of government of India, a report on Training of Rural Development functionaries (NIRD 1984) including both the strategies and curricula for training middle and lower level functionaries. Interestingly enough, the report dealt with the training needs and strategies relevant for only officials of the rank of project Director or District Collector and below (up to village level worker). It was assumed that training was an input required only or primarily at the lower levels. Further, the report outlined the issues which were supposed to form the basis for training programme in each of the state level apex institute for rural development. At IIPA, IIM-Calcutta and IIM-Bangalore the issues of Training Rural Development Managers (RDMs) have attracted considerable attention. IIM-Ahmedabad collaborated for five years with

* Training of Rural Development Functionaries - a comprehensive paper, National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad 1984.

National Academy for training IAS officer During 1973-77**. The curriculum included subjects like environment analysis, programme/project formulation, implementation, Evaluation, organization development, information and control, statistical method for data analysis, work study and O&M, small scale industries development, health, public distribution system, presentation of district experience, etc.

The feedback from the programmes showed that generally the sessions dealing with tools and techniques (PERT/CMP, cash flow analysis, performance budgeting, linear programming) went off very well with the participants (Gaikwad, 1980 :1 00). Further it was noted that the topics such as environmental analysis and organization behavior could not be discussed without bringing in the emotions and value judgements. And thus the participants felt little agitated about the same (1980 : 100). Amongst other things the participants own analysis of their experience and presentation to class was found to be quit effective.

A Committee on Training for Rural Development appointed by the Centre for Management in Agriculture (CMA) at IIM-A proposed a new and innovative area of training. The concept of Development Entrepreneur (DE) was proposed based on an action-research project (see, Ravi J Mathai, Experiments in Educational

** See for details of other aspects of training at a IIM-A, Gaikwad V.R., 1980, Manual for trainers and consultants on Management of Rural Development, Report submitted to ILO. CMA, IIM-A Mimeo.

Innovation: Jawaja Project : first Phase, Ahmedabad : Indian Institute of Management, 1979). The idea was to "identify potential DEs, "Who would operate in rural areas and undertake economic activities which would generate an accelerated learning process in rural India" (1980 : 80).

Another study after reviewing various rural development programmes concluded that most of the training programmes had theoretical orientation, were insufficiently planned, had short duration, followed ad hoc selection of trainees, etc. (Gupta, Ranjit, 1987). A Study of training of agricultural administrators in India (Giakwad, 1985) concluded that during 1960s and 1970s the focus of training programme was towards changing the orientation of public administrators, providing subject matter training and skills related to project formulation, implementation, monitoring and review. It was noted that the organic link between training and personnel management has not been maintained. The postings, transfers and skill upgradation have no correspondence with each other. The report noted that involvement of science and technology institutions and agri-business were two other aspects ignored in the training programme.

We can conclude this section by making three important observations with regard to the future options:

- a) Given the nature of on-going developmental programmes in rural areas the project approach cannot be a significant

instrument of change any more. In the early 1970s when several lines of credit from World Bank became available to the country such an emphasis was the direct off-shoot of world bank influence. There is a need to take note of this suggestion and embark upon appropriate changes in the tools and techniques.

- b) While attitudinal change is relevant and may be useful, it cannot be brought about through exhortations or sermons. It is necessary that precise relationship between values and the choice of techniques at higher level as well as lower level is demonstrated so that whatever biases still exist may remain not without a feeling of discomfort. The training can serve only a limited purpose unless it is a part of overall organizational change policy. The emphasis on bureaucratic reorientation as a major plank of developmental strategy is misplaced (Gupta, 1985). The organizational redesign and change in the monitoring system are necessary if compatibility between attitude and actions has to be achieved in the changed perspective.
- c) Just like any other sub-set of the rural development process is ridden with conflicts, the bureaucracy also cannot be conceptualized as a homogenous mass. The emphasis should be as mentioned earlier in the paper on identifying the organizational insurgents or developmental deviants and helping them network with each other. It follows logically that the professionals who would be interested in networking such deviants would also be operating at margins themselves

(also see Chambers, 1986, Gupta, 1985, 1987a,b). Therefore, the designers of training programmes and curriculum must identify this element as one of the core element for innovations in further training programmes that will make difference to the process of development.

4) Conclusions:

Training Strategies for the Future

To conclude one could argue that if training programmes for equipping rural development managers appropriately have to be designed then the curricula and the pedagogy would have to reflect the complexity that the rural development process is endowed with. The access, assurance, and the ability of the household will have to be matched with the access of the managers to resources, their skills or abilities, and the organizational and institutional assurances that they have for safeguarding their career in the event of failure. While there are skills which any manager in any situation would have to imbibe the need for learning analytical skills should be given primacy over technique led discussions.

The implications of the Four-S model for the decision making environment of the managers have to be drawn out. The organizational strategies of adjusting with risk cannot be independent of the household strategies of adjustment with risks. Therefore, in low population density high risk/high seasonality

regions with diversified occupational matrix, the network form of decentralised organizational structure and loosely coupled will have greater chances of success than a centralized tightly knit structure. Given the fact that systems in an organization both follow as well as influence the structure, the monitoring system and coordination or negotiating skills will also have to be accordingly ingrained in the managers.

It is obvious that no outsider howsoever closely he or she observes the development process at the grassroots level can substitute the insights which are available to the practicing managers and workers in the field. The question therefore, is how do we tap the experiential knowledge which would need to be then interpreted in light of a valid theoretical framework.

There are several pedagogical strategies that can be tried. We give below the step-wise process that can be followed in this regard.

A. Iterative Learning : Demystifying the expert Knowledge

- a) The participants from diverse background are called for a week long briefing about the basic concepts, approaches, contradictions and the frequently occurring dilemma that confront them.
- b) The trainers demystify their knowledge by asking the participants to prepare a checklist of key issues which should be kept in view while managing different types of rural development projects/programmes. The trainers would

also prepare separately a checklist on the similar lines.

- c) After the participants have prepared their checklist the same would be compared with that of the trainers to prove empirically two points (i) there are issues in the checklist of the trainers which majority of the participants may find either irrelevant, inappropriate, or even naive, and (ii) there would also be certain issues in the list prepared by the participants that have not been included in the list of the expert trainers.
- d) The above step would demonstrate to the participants that there are areas where trainers would lack insight or competency compared to the participants. This will reduce the awe with which participants may see the trainers. This might also hopefully generate greater collegiality in the mutual interactions.
- e) Having identified the areas of respective competencies the participants should be asked to go back to the departments to try out the alternative approaches to problem solving which emanated from a week or ten days long orientation programme.

After three to six months depending upon the nature of activities in which the participants are engaged they should be invited back for a week to (i) share their experience with regard to the applicability of ideas and insights shared in the orientation programme, (ii) to offer critique in a manner that trainers would confess the limitation of whatever they had said in the

orientation programme if the evidence is convincing enough, (iii) to document their experience both with regard to what they would have done if they had not attended the training programme and also what they actually did, (iv) to evaluate each other and present individual as well as collective feedback.

In the above process the programme would communicate messages which would have been internalized within the training mode of thinking. It also has some characteristics of operation research/action research. Further the demystification of expert knowledge would ensure that the experiential Knowledge gains similar credibility as the academic knowledge.

B. Interactive Learning : Bulding upon Historical Insights

This methodology can be used for equipping both the middle as well as the top management levels with relevant skills and sensitivities within short duration programmes:

- a) The trainees drawn from different backgrounds are invited for a period of about a week to a place away from their day-to-day work.
- b) The whole agenda for the training programme is presented to the participants by the entire faculty team in the order in which faculty considered it more important. Later the participants are invited to add, delete or modify the order of items on agenda. Alternatively the participants may be asked to draw up an agenda for seven days and later be presented with the schedule of sessions already prepared

by the faculty to compare, contrast, and modify.

It is obvious that a step like this involves considerable commitment from the faculty to accept the change in their role, sequence of their presentation, and even recasting the entire subject matter. In case there appears a considerable common list, immediately the trainers gain considerable credibility and respect.

After drawing up the agenda, the first two days are used for presenting the concepts as well as review of the research that has been done together with implications for action. The sessions will have to be very dense requiring trainees to do some exercises aimed at consolidating and crystallising the main points to be conveyed in each session.

On the third day the trainees are requested to write one or two instances which confirm, reject, modify or add dimensions discussed or not discussed in the earlier two days. The experience is that these write-ups by and large are quite crisp and dense. In fact some of them need elaboration.

All these experiences are xeroxed and presented to the faculty. Subsequently in the afternoon of the third day discussion continues on some of the key ideas included in the earlier agenda.

In the evening faculty goes through the experiences,

discusses the important ones and develops a strategy for using these experience without revealing the identity of the writer. They may choose different forms of discussion such as panel, individual, game or role playing.

- h) On the fourth day depending upon the strategy worked out the instances are used for triggering discussion in the class either by individual faculty members or group of them. Sometimes it does happen that there is a polarization between faculty and the participations. On the issues of ethical responsibility towards poor, or professional values in terms of junior and senior level with in the organizations the normative view of the faculty may often be at variance with that of the participants. It is advisable that in such situations one should announce unscheduled breaks to allow participants to think loudly and perhaps become conscious of their own contradictions.
- i) After discussing the experience for two days, a workshop is held on the last day in which the participants develop some sort of guidelines for implementing developmental programmes that can provide a new frame of reference. Alternatively the workshop can be used to document whether the programme has led to any modification in the hypothesis about rural development with which participants had come in the beginning. If such a style has to be observed then on the very first day of the programme trainees should be asked to list down the important variables which influence developmental programmes and the important relationships

among these variables. These lists should be given back to the participants on the last day to suggest modification. In the last session, Faculty may also like to list individually the insights which they feel have been added to their repertoire.

The above approaches are only illustrative.

Alternative ways exist for linking theory with praxis drawing upon historical insights while communicating better alternatives. It must be added here that several techniques such as PERT/CPM which occupy considerable weight in many rural development programmes must be adequately modified before being used. For instance we had used the network aspect of the PERT and modified it in the form of MOSED (monitoring of Social Effect of Developmental Project/Programmes, Gupta, 1981). Our contention was two fold, one that unlike the projects where social effects start accruing after the project has been implemented, in the rural areas the effects start taking place right from the moment the ideas of the project become known to the people, two there is a sort of sequential synergism in developmental planning, i.e., certain questions asked in the beginning have a far greater pay off than if asked later. What we had done was to document these questions on a network chart so that as the activities proceed a manager knows the questions to ask and to whom.

k) In training programmes one can develop such networks charts not so much for time and cost calculations as for developing a list of questions that needed to be asked at different stages of the programme. It must be recognised that these techniques evolved in military projects with very clear objectives and a single line of control in the organization. Most of the resources were under the command of single authority and the range of variability was very narrow. Given the fact that most rural development programmes are inter-organizational and have objectives which are ill defined , such techniques have only limited utility if used without modification.

Evaluation of training programmes is biased by the cultural values which characterize the organizations implementing and evaluating those training programmes. For instance, in many institutes the programmes take the policies as given and orient the participants in conventional techniques and perspectives. So much so that there is no allowance made for building upon the historical knowledge of participants. The government programmes and policies even if found extremely illogical are generally legitimised in terms of grandiose objective and the complexity of the implementation environment.

We have argued in this paper that by building upon the participants knowledge one can certainly make the programmes more germane to the operating environment of the trainees. At the same time we also suggest that one need not draw upon only the recent experiences as suggested by Montgomery (1987) but should

instead/in addition to build upon those experiences which have generated dilemma of one sort or the other even in long past. Such a strategy can be criticised on account of the possibility that if certain values are not cherished by the administrators then these would just not invite the dilemma on this account. To that our reaction is that one of the important purposes of the training programme if not the most important is to let managers make their own value positions explicit. Whether this process would generate conflict is immaterial. It is inevitable that in the process of making values explicit the managers would begin to see their experiences atleast from one more stand point.

Another aspect of development training which has received only limited attention is the interaction amongst different publics for instance politicians, administrators and people and even people and politicians. There have been some training programmes at IIPA in which non-officials have been invited. However, this practice is restricted to only local level officials and non-officials. As far as the senior politicians are concerned barring two or three programmes in the country during last year (most notably at ASCI, Hyderabad) there have not been many attempts to bring them to a discussion table. Even in these two or three programmes the concerned training institutions used T-Group and others OB techniques rather than raising the issues in policy making keeping various publics in account.

We may conclude by suggesting that design of curricula and training strategies for rural development managers cannot be independent of the political and economic context of the development process. Some of the striking differences in the African and Asian data presented by Montgomery underline this aspect. However, rather than seeking explanations for these differences in only cultural or organizations terms one should bring the political economic variables in the mainstream discussion of the training programmes. The implication is that given the nature of state and its avowed policies, the managers must be made sensitive to both what "is" and what "ought to be" As Sen (1981) argued, the description can be used for prescription as well as prediction. The choice in the matter has to be exercised prudently and explicitly. Therefore, how do we define the development process is related to how do we want to train managers in managing this process such that more liberating alternatives emerge.

The Four-S and Three-A models discussed in this paper facilitate such an analysis of any development process and therefore may help in generating more useful knowledge. The responsibility of academics towards the researchers, researched, and other publics has to be considered at the time of designing training strategies (Gupta 1987). Whether trainers would like to demystify their knowledge would depend upon whether they recognise such a step as necessary for communicating with practitioners.

Various alternative methods of enabling managers to manage uncertainty and risks inherent in rural development process to bridge the gap between theory and the practice should deal with the match or mis-match that exists between the household strategies of risk adjustment vis-a-vis organizational strategies of risk adjustment (Gupta, 1986). The organizational theory has neglected the environmental variables amenable to unambiguous measurement. The socio-ecological paradigm under which we have discussed the four-S and three-A model fills this gap to some extent.

Let us not end up blaming politicians who do not represent the interest of poor people, administrators who do not implement the policies aimed at reaching the poor and the poor people themselves who do not protest when politicians and administrators both choose to play truant (Gupta, 1982). Perhaps bringing people, public-administrators, and politicians together would help extend the frontiers of theory and practice of development training. At the same time we must not end up finding out explanations for poor performance of developmental programmes only at the local level just because the interface between people and programme takes place most at that level. The training must begin at top where the power to change policies and rules of the game of implementation lies. Till this happens, the managers in the middle have to explore ways to both bell the Cat and keep bolder Mice together.

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Note :

This is a revised and expanded version of the paper presented at an International meeting On Designing Training Strategies and Curricula for Rural development held at Kennedy school,Harvard University,June,1987.