


# Working Paper



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CAUSALITY BETWEEN MONEY AND PRICE LEVEL IN INDIA REVISITED

Βу

Ram Lal Sharma



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## CAUSALITY BETWEEN MONEY AND PRICE LEVEL IN INDIA REVISITED

#### Ram lal Sharma\*

Sharma (1985), while using Sims' methodology to test causality between Money and Price level in India, concluded that: (i) for the sample period 1962-80 the causality from  $M_1$  to P was much stronger than the reverse causality from P to  $M_1$  and (ii) Bidirectional causality existed between  $M_3$  and P.

In this paper, we have reexamined the issue of causality between Money and Price level in India and have used only Granger's test for this purpose. We have found that there exists a unidirectional causality running from M, to P on the one hand and from M, to P on the other. These results are at sharp variance from those sharma reported earlier.

<sup>\*</sup>Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

While working on this paper, I had many discussions with Prof. G.S.Gupta on various issues involved in the paper and I am therefore, grateful to him.

However, I am solely responsible for any errors that still , remain.

<sup>1</sup> Sims' methodology can be put very simply as if M causes P then,

<sup>(</sup>i) a regression of P on past, current and future values of M should exhibit significant coefficients for past and current values out insignificant coefficients on future values; (ii) and a regression of M on past, current and future values of P should exhibit significant coefficients on future values of P (and may or may not exhibit significant coefficient on present and past values). Thus Sims' test involves testing of two sided distributed lag relationship between M and P which should be jointly covariance stochastic processes with zero mean.

The sample period used in this study is from 1954 to 1985. There is nothing specific about the year 1954 as the beginning point. It could have been 1951 as well. But since some observations were lost in the process of deseasonalizing and second differencing we preferred to work from 1954 and onwards. We hope, choosing 1951 or 1954 does not affect our conclusions.

Both annual as well as quarterly data have been used for estimation of the parameters of regression equations. But the annual data did not provide us with conclusive results because of limited degrees of freedom. We therefore, concentrated more on the quarterly data.

Granger's method of testing causality was originally proposed in terms of cross-spectrum analysis but Sims trans-formed the test to the conventional regression analysis. So the Granger's test can be expressed as:

(i) M causes P if predictions of P pased on all past information (including M) are better than those based on all past information excluding M.

<sup>2</sup> Granger, C.W.J. "Investing Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral Methods," Econometrica, 1969, 37, pp.424-38.

<sup>3</sup> Sims, Christopher, A., (1972), "Money, Income and Causality" American Economic Review, Vol.62, pp.540-52.

(ii) Similarly P causes M if predictions of M based on all past information (including) P are better than those based on all past information excluding P.

Accordingly a testable form of Granger's causality may be shown as

$$M_{(t)} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\alpha}(i) M_{(t-i)} + \hat{\beta} L \Gamma + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\delta}(i)^{P}(t-i) \qquad \dots (A)$$

$$P_{(t)} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{b}_{(i)} P_{(t-i)} + \hat{\beta} L P + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{f}_{(i)} M_{(t-i)} \qquad \cdots \qquad (B)$$

where  $\hat{\alpha}$ ,  $\hat{\beta}$ ,  $\hat{\delta}$ ,  $\hat{b}$  and  $\hat{f}$  are least squares estimates and M is stock of money and P is price level, wholesale price level chosen mainly because of its quick responsiveness (necessary for testing instantaneous causality) to policy measures particularly monetary ones.

The null hypothesis is that if M does not cause P, the parameters  $\hat{\delta}_{(i)}$  with i=1,...n are equal to zero. Similarly if P does not cause M, then the parameters f(i), i=1,...n should be equal to zero.

To begin with, we used the ratio to moving average method to deseasonalize the series on both sides of the regression equation. In order to stationarise the M and P dynamic series,

the method of second differencing was used. The latter became necessary because the M and P series after first differencing exhibited an upward trend so that means of the series were not constant over time, though the autocorrelation function declined rapidly. After second differencing the respective series, we again computed the sample means and auto-correlation functions. It was found that the mean of the series was not time-determined and the auto-correlation function dropped of: rapidly as k, the number of lags became large. The values of autocorrelation functions were also examined to see if already deseasonalized series differenced twice, still possessed any residual seasonality. Since those values (of auticorrelation function) declined without any cycles, there was no scope for such seasonality.

In order to produce zero mean of the jointly covariance stationary process, a constant term was included in the regression equations. 7

<sup>4</sup> box and Jenkins (1970) p.85) show that a stochastic dynamic series can be stationarised by either first differencing or second differencing. Also see, Pindyck, R.S., and Rubinfeld, D.I. (1976 pp.431-458).

<sup>5</sup> If the series  $Y_t$  is stationary, then the mean of the series defined as  $/^{U}y = E(y_t)$  must also be stationary, so that  $E(y_t) = E(y_t)$  for any t and m. Furthermore, the variance of the series must also be stationary so that  $var(y_t) = Var(y_{t+m})$ . See Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p.436.

<sup>6</sup> the autocorrelation function provides us with a measure of how much correlation there is between neighbouring data points in the series y. It is necessary for a stationary series that the autocorrelation function declines as the lag k increasess.

The equations (A) and (B) were estimated with second differenced data (stationarised so that time trend is reduced to a constant). Because our experience of estimation of the equations used to test causality in Sim's sense shows that the estimates from the second differenced data and the ones from the second differenced data transformed in view of empirically determined filters to ensure whitenoise residuals are almost similar.

First of all, we report the results for the whole sample period: 1954-85.

Table 1	(Guarterly data 1954 I - 1985 II)				
Regression	D.F.	Ē <sup>2</sup>	F-ratio	D.W. test value	
(i) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 past M <sub>1</sub> and 4 past P	(12,103)	.8544	57.1997*	2.057 <sup>N</sup>	
(ii) $M_1$ on 8 past $M_1$	( 8, 107 <i>)</i>	<b>.8</b> 584	88.1140*	2.043 <sup>N</sup>	
(iii)P on 8 past P and 4 past M <sub>1</sub>	(12, 103)	.7296	26.8667*	2.012 <sup>N</sup>	
(iv) P on 8 past P	(8,107)	.6347	25.9794*	1.96 <sup>N</sup>	

\*Significant at 5 percent level N=No autocorrelation detected.

<sup>7</sup> A constant in a regression equation is equal to  $\bar{y} = \beta \bar{x}$ . Consider an equation  $y = a + \beta \bar{x}$  and substituting the value for a yields  $(y-\bar{y}) = \beta(x-\bar{x})$ . Obviously  $E(y-\bar{y})$  and  $E(x-\bar{x}) = 0$  and hence the mean of  $(y-\bar{y})$  and  $(x-\bar{x})$  will also be equal to zero.

<sup>8</sup> See Sharma (1985). We however, do not deny that the use of second differenced data duly transformed in view of empirically determined filters improve F values and makes them more reliable. What we want to emphasize is that (by and large) quantitatively and qualitatively, the conclusions remain the same.

	Table 2 Estim	ated lag profile	es (1954 I - 19	85 II)
-		M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past	P on 8 past P and 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>	P on 8 Fast P.
4 Past	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
M <sub>1t-1</sub>	-0.8999*	M <sub>lt-1</sub> -0.8955*	P <sub>t-1</sub> -0.0229	P <sub>t-1</sub> -0.1302
M <sub>lt-2</sub>	-0.8 <b>37</b> 5*	M <sub>1t-2</sub> -0.8515*	P <sub>t+2</sub> -0.2317*	P <sub>t-2</sub> -0.3722*
M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.8272*	M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.8225*	P <sub>t-3</sub> 0.0585	P <sub>t-3</sub> -0.0752
M <sub>lt-4</sub>	-0.1959	M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.1686	Pt-4 -0.0691	P <sub>t-4</sub> 0.1144
M <sub>1t-5</sub>	-0.0367	M <sub>lt-5</sub> -0.0419	P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.0065	P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.0885
M <sub>1t-6</sub>	-0.0455	M <sub>1t-6</sub> -0.0485	P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.2380*	P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.2915*
M <sub>lt-7</sub>	-0.0849	M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.0641	P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.0161	P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.1305
M <sub>1t-8</sub>	0.1832	M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.2094*	P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.0581	P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.1372
P <sub>t-1</sub>	0.0493		M <sub>1t-1</sub> 0.2938*	
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.0118		M <sub>1t-2</sub> .1842	
P <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0146		M <sub>lt-3</sub> .0184	
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.1021		M1t-40602	

<sup>\*</sup>Statistically significant at 5 percent level.

Regression	D.F.	₹ <sup>2</sup>	F ratio	D.W. test Value
(1) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and 4 past P	(12,105)	.6916	22.87*	1.9942 <sup>N</sup>
(2) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(8,109)	<b>.689</b> 9	33.53*	1.9757 <sup>N</sup>
(3) P on 8 past P and 4 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(12,105)	.6819	21.89*	2.03 <sup>N</sup>
(4) P on 8 Past P	(8,109)	.67	30.70*	2.016 <sup>N</sup>

## \*significant at 5 per cent level

N=No autocorrelation

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Table 4 Estimated lag Profile (1954-I - 1985 II) M<sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M<sub>3</sub> M<sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M<sub>3</sub> F on 8 Past F P on 8 Past F and 4 Past F anc 4 Past P  $^{N}$ 3t-2 -C.454C\*  $^{M}$ 3t-2 -C.4782\*  $^{P}$ t-2 -C.3692\*  $^{P}$ t-2 -C.3464\*  $M_{3t-3}$  -0.3422\*  $M_{3t-3}$  -0.3570\*  $P_{t-3}$  0.0397  $P_{t-3}$  -0.0076  $M_{3t-4}$  0.0908  $M_{3t-4}$  0.1167  $P_{t-4}$  0.1088  $F_{t-4}$  0.1622  $M_{3t-5}$  0.1381  $M_{3t-5}$  0.0998  $P_{t-5}$  -0.0338  $P_{t-5}$  -0.0878  $^{\rm M}$ 3t-6 - 0.0695  $^{\rm M}$ 3t-6 -0.1208  $^{\rm P}$ t-6 -0.3341\*  $^{\rm P}$ t-6 -0.3011\*  $M_{3t-7}$  -0.2313  $F_{t-7}$  -0.1198  $P_{t-7}$  -0.1666 M<sub>3t-7</sub> -0.1921 M<sub>3t-8</sub> 0.0887 P<sub>t-8</sub> 0.0385 P<sub>t-8</sub> 0.1043 M<sub>3t-8</sub> 0.0845 M<sub>3t-1</sub> 0.1501\* P<sub>t-1</sub> -0.1008 M<sub>3t-2</sub> 0.0051 P<sub>t-2</sub> -0.1347  $M_{3t-3} - 0.0006$ F<sub>t-3</sub> 0.0091 P<sub>t-4</sub> -0.1426  $M_{3t-4} - 0.0053$ 

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 5 percent level.

Tables 1 to 4 give the F ratios,  $\bar{R}^2$ 's and estimated lag profiles pertinent for testing causality in Granger's sense. We carried out these tests for  $M_1$  and P and  $M_3$  and P.

An examination of table 1, reveals that all of the 4 equations have F ratios that are statistically significant and mone of the equations exhibit autocorrelation. 9 Under the circumstance, it is  $\overline{R}^2$  that can be the pasis of inference about causality. The first equation (table 1) besides including 8 Past M, as explanatory variablesalso includes 4 Past P. The second equation (table 1) has only 8 Past M, as the explanatory variables. The objective is to find out whether equation 1 explains the behaviour of  $M_1$  better than is done by equation 2. If equation 1 scores petter our inference would be that P affects  $M_1$  and therefore causes it. But, looking to the facts we find equation 2 has higher  $R^2$  and a higher F ratio when 4 Past P are excluded from the regression. Which implies that as far as changes in the behaviour of  $M_{\gamma}$  are concerned, 4 Past P donot have any explanatory power and therefore are recundant this establishes the fact that P does not cause  $M_1$ . But this conclusion is incomplete unless we show whether M<sub>1</sub> causes P.

<sup>9</sup> Although we are aware that when lagged dependent variables are entered as explanatory variables, use of D.W. test becomes a suspect. However for want of something better we have reported the D.W. test values.

We compare equations 3 and 4 (table 1) equation 4 has only 8 Past P to explain the changes in behaviour of P and has a value of  $\mathbb{R}^2$  equal to .6347. Now, in equation 3, 4 Past M<sub>1</sub> have also been included as additional explanatory variables besides 8 past P (present in equation 4). As a result  $\mathbb{R}^2$  increases to .7296 and the value of F also improves. In view of this, the inference is obvious. 4 Past M<sub>1</sub> are crucial in explaining the behaviour of P. But 4 Past P are not crucial in explaining the behaviour of M<sub>1</sub>. In other words, M<sub>1</sub> causes P and we have already established above that vice-versa (P causes M<sub>1</sub>) does not hold good.

Thus it can be said that there is a unidirectional causality running from  $M_1$  to P.

If we examine the estimated lag profile (table 2), the same story is repeated. Col.1 of table 2 shows that as far as behaviour of M<sub>1</sub> is concerned it is markedly characterised by autoregressive property. In time series models this is to be expected. It simply says that this year's stock of money holding would be adjusted in view of the behaviour of money stock held during the preceding 3 quarters (a sort of partial adjustment hypothesis).

The Effect of P on M $_1$  (Col.1, table 2) is almost zero.None of the coefficients (on  $P_{t-1}$ ,  $P_{t-2}$ ,  $P_{t-3}$  and  $P_{t-4}$ ) is significant

and none of them is sizeable. As a contrast, if we examine the coefficients of M's (Col.3 table 2), we find that the preceding quarter's money stock affects P the most followed by two quarter's preceding money stock. This influence diminishes as we go back further in the past. Thus, the estimated lag profile also supports the conclusion that causality is unidirectional and it runs from  $M_1$  to P.

As already mentioned, we have estimated equations to test causality between  $M_3$  and P also, mainly due to find out whether the conclusions based on  $M_1$  and P are reinforced.

In Table 3, are reported 4 equations concerning  $M_3$  and P and in table 4 are reported their estimated lag profiles. It is clear that the conclusions drawn from the contents of these two tables (tables 3 and 4) are identical with those drawn from the contents of tables 1 and 2 with regard to  $M_1$  and P. An examination of table 3 shows: (i) equations 1 and 2 are almost similar as far as  $\overline{R}^2$  is concerned; which means that the behaviour of  $M_3$  is auto-regressive (see Col.1 table 4) and that addition of 4 Past P as explanatory variables to equation 2 will be redundant (obvious from the coefficients of  $P_{t-1}$ 's in Col.1 Table 4), the inference to be drawn is that P does not cause  $M_3$ ; (ii) if we add 4 Past  $M_3$  to equation 4,  $\overline{R}^2$  increases which means (other things given) that  $M_3$  does explain a part of change in the behaviour of P.

Thus, in view of above, it may be said that causality is unicirectional and it runs from  $M_3$  to P also which goes to confirm our earlier conclusion that if (causality) is unidirectional and runs from  $M_1$  to P.

# Sub-period results

the Monetary theory of balance of payments suggests that a country which is not a reserve centre will gain full control over its monetary conditions only when it floats its exchange rate (Johnson 1973), Frankel and Roorique (1975)). Moreover, under a fixed exchange rate regime, the reserve centre can influence monetary conditions in a non-reserve centre by in-fluencing worldwide monetary conditions.

since two decades of our sample period (1954-1973) are characterised by the fixed exchange rate regime and since a non-reserve country (like India) is not supposed to have complete control over its monetary policy during such a regime it is likely that the exigencies of the fixed exchange rate may prevent full realization of the influence of monetary policy on price level. On It may therefore be argued that it is only under flexible exchange rate period that the true causality between

<sup>10</sup> Suppose a non reserve country decides to expand its money supply to accommodate the requirements of domestic origin, which is not in line with the monetary conditions in the reserve country, then the balance of payments situation may induce the monetary authorities to reverse their previous monetary policy with sufficient rapidity to prevent any causality from money to price level to materialize.

money and price level can be observed. In view of this the estimates of causality were obtained for 1954-1973 and 1974-85 sub periods which correspond with fixed and flexible exchange rates respectively.

Even if we were to disregard the influence of fixed and flexible exchange rates on money and price level in India (in the context of monetary approach to balance of ayments), division of the total sample period into sup-periods would be useful as it will then enable us to say that causality of a particular type holds even in the sup-periods thereby lending support to the overall conclusion based on the whole sample period, we take the estimates of 1954 to 1973 first.

Table 5	(1954-1	- 1973-IV)	quarterl	y est <b>i</b> mat	.es
Regression		D.F.	$\bar{R}^2$	F katio D	.W. test valu <b>e</b>
(1) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub>		(8,61)	.95 <b>63</b>	189.74*	2.07 <sup>N</sup>
(2) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub> 4 Past P.	and	(12,57)	.9544	121.49*	2.098 <sup>N</sup>
(3) P on 8 Past P		(8,61)	<b>.7</b> 325	20.867*	1.919 <sup>N</sup>
(4) P on 8 Past P a 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>	nd	(12,57)	.7609	19.278*	1.9511 <sup>N</sup>

N = No autocorrelation

significant at 5 percent level

Table 6 (1954 I - 1973 IV) quarterly estimates

## Estimated lag profiles

and 4 Past P (1) (2) (3) (4)  M <sub>1t-1</sub> -1.1111* M <sub>1t-1</sub> -1.1015* P <sub>t-1</sub> -0.0329 P <sub>t-1</sub> -0.136  M <sub>1t-2</sub> -0.8536* M <sub>1t-2</sub> -0.8524* P <sub>t-2</sub> -0.3021* P <sub>t-2</sub> -0.738  M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.9339* M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.9255* P <sub>t-2</sub> 0.1623 P <sub>t-3</sub> 0.0116  M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.5226* M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.4725* P <sub>t-4</sub> -0.1750 P <sub>t-4</sub> 0.1406  M <sub>1t-5</sub> -0.3622 M <sub>1t-5</sub> -0.3095 P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.0321 P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.098  M <sub>1t-6</sub> -0.6021* M <sub>1t-6</sub> -0.5612* P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.2216* P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.181  M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4922* M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4812* P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.0223 P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.229  M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0372 M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0552 P <sub>t-8</sub> -0.0797 P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.234  P <sub>t-1</sub> 0.0359
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.9339* M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.9255* P <sub>t-2</sub> 0.1623 P <sub>t-3</sub> 0.0116  M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.5226* M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.4725* P <sub>t-4</sub> -0.1750 P <sub>t-4</sub> 0.1406  M <sub>1t-5</sub> -0.3622 M <sub>1t-5</sub> -0.3095 P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.0321 P <sub>t-5</sub> -0.0986  M <sub>1t-6</sub> -0.6021* M <sub>1t-6</sub> -0.5612* P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.2216* P <sub>t-6</sub> -0.1816  M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4922* M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4812* P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.0223 P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.2296  M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0372 M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0552 P <sub>t-8</sub> -0.0797 P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.234
$M_{1t-4}$ -0.5226* $M_{1t-4}$ -0.4725* $P_{t-4}$ -0.1750 $P_{t-4}$ 0.1408 $M_{1t-5}$ -0.3622 $M_{1t-5}$ -0.3095 $P_{t-5}$ -0.0321 $P_{t-5}$ -0.0988 $M_{1t-6}$ -0.6021* $M_{1t-6}$ -0.5612* $P_{t-6}$ -0.2216* $P_{t-6}$ -0.1818 $M_{1t-7}$ -0.4922* $M_{1t-7}$ -0.4812* $P_{t-7}$ -0.0223 $P_{t-7}$ -0.2298 $M_{1t-8}$ 0.0372 $M_{1t-8}$ 0.0552 $P_{t-8}$ -0.0797 $P_{t-8}$ 0.234
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M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4922* M <sub>1t-7</sub> -0.4812* P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.0223 P <sub>t-7</sub> -0.229 M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0372 M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0552 P <sub>t-8</sub> -0.0797 P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.234
M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0372 M <sub>1t-8</sub> 0.0552 P <sub>t-8</sub> -0.0797 P <sub>t-8</sub> 0.234
$P_{t-1}$ 0.0359 $M_{1t-1}$ 0.2792*
P <sub>t-2</sub> -0.0202 M <sub>1t-2</sub> 0.1677
P <sub>t-3</sub> 0.1077 M <sub>1t-3</sub> -0.0287
P <sub>t-4</sub> 0.0101 M <sub>1t-4</sub> -0.2367

<sup>\*</sup> significant at 5 per cent level.

Table 7 (1954 I - 1973 IV)

Regression	D.F.	₹ <sup>2</sup>	F-ratio	D.W.test value
(1) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(8,61)	.913	91.065*	1.9433 <sup>N</sup>
(2) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and 4 Past P	(12,57)	.917	65.25*	1.8745 <sup>N</sup>
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,61)	.6871	19.94*	1.9941 <sup>N</sup>
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(12,57)	.7013	14.5*	2.01 <sup>N</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> significant at 5 per cent level N = No autocorrelation

	Table 8 (1						
$M_3$ on	8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	M <sub>3</sub> on	8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	Fon 8	Past P Past Ma	Pon	S Past P
and 4 .	Past P )	(	2)				(4)
	-0.9520*		-0.9700*				
	-0.8222*	M3t-2	-0.9543*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.4434*	Pt-2	-C.4525*
	-0.7165*		-0.9014*				
	-0.3826	<sup>M</sup> 3t-4	-0.5364*	P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.0189	F <sub>t-4</sub>	0.1115
M <sub>3t-5</sub>	* 469.4*	<sup>M</sup> 3t-5	-0.5107*	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-c.c84c	F <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.1085
<sup>M</sup> 3t-6	-0.4335*	M3t-6	-0.5218*	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.2806	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.1816
M <sub>3t-7</sub>	-0.5024*	<sup>M</sup> 3t−7	-0.5695*	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.0748	F <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.2044
<sup>M</sup> 3 <b>t</b> ~8̃	0.0602	<sup>M</sup> 3t-8	0.0305	P <sub>t-8</sub>	0.0741	F <sub>t-8</sub>	0.1915
F <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1745			M3t-1	00.2863*		
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.0157			M3t-2	0.2509		
P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0647	•		M <sub>3t-3</sub>	0.1787		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	0.1259		•	M3t-4	-0.0944		

\*significant at 5 per cent level.

Table 9 (1974 I - 1985 IV)

Table 9 (1974 1 $-$ 1985 1V)							
Regression	D.F.	Ē2	F-ratio	D.M. test value			
(1)M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(8,31)	.7376	13.99*	1.9437 <sup>N</sup>			
(2)M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub> and 4 Past F	(12, 27)	.7025	8.2823*	1.9892 <sup>N</sup>			
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,31)	.4350	4.5611*	1.9819 <sup>N</sup>			
(4)P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(12,27)	.6623	7.156*	1.8842 <sup>N</sup>			

<sup>\*</sup> significant at 5 percent level

N = No autocorrelation detected

Table 10 (1974 I - 1985 IV)
 Estimated lag profiles

			- 5 4				
M <sub>1</sub> en and 4		M <sub>1</sub> on	8 Past M <sub>1</sub>	Pon and 4	Past P	Pon	8 Past P
		4.0		,	<b></b>	1	4.)
(1	<u>)</u>	(2	<u> </u>		3)		4)
M <sub>1t-1</sub>	-0.7843*	M <sub>1t-1</sub>	-0.7599*	<del>-</del> -	0.0031		
M <sub>1t-2</sub>	-0.7.160*	M <sub>1t-2</sub>	<b>-</b> 0.7703*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	0.0680	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.4021
M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.7095*	M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.7072*	P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0441		
	-0.1393	M <sub>1t-4</sub>	-0.0697	Pt-4	<b>-</b> 0.1034	P <sub>t-4</sub>	0.0368
	-0.1036	M <sub>1t-5</sub>	-0.1031	P <sub>t-5</sub>	0.0684	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.0888
	0.0341	M <sub>lt-6</sub>	0.0412	F <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.2301	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.4235
	-0.0320	M <sub>1t-7</sub>	0.0174	P <sub>t-7</sub>	0.0752	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.0339
	0.1380	M <sub>1t-8</sub>	0.1977	P <sub>t-8</sub>	0.2279	Ft <b>-</b> 8	-0.0232
P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1623			M 1t-1	0.4285*		
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.0100			M <sub>1t-2</sub>	0.3023*		
P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0164			M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.0400		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.2023		• ,	M1t-4	-0.0201		

<sup>\*</sup> significant at 5 percent level.

Table 11 (1974 I - 1985 IV)

Regression	D.F.	₹²	F-ratio	D.W.Test Value
(1) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(8, 31)	.6764	11.1901*	2.1731
(2) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and 4 Past P	(12, 27)	.6640	7.4235*	2.13
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8, 31)	.4350	4.5611*	1.9819
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(12,27)	.5904	5.6842*	1.8097

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 5 per centlevel.

Table 12 (1974-1985) Estimated lag Profiles

M <sub>3</sub> on and 4	8 Past M.3 Past P	M <sub>3</sub> on	8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	P on and 4	8 Past P Past M <sub>3</sub>	Pon	8 Past P
	1)		)		3)		4)
M <sub>3t-1</sub>	-1.0288*	M3t-1	-1.0217*	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1810	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1583
	-0.4078*	M <sub>3t-2</sub>	-0.4046*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.2462	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.2645
	-0.0319	M <sub>3t-3</sub>	<b>-0.</b> 0632	P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0551		-0.0492
<sup>M</sup> 3t-4	0.1627	M3t-4	0.1711	P <sub>t-4</sub>	0.1698	Pt-4	υ <b>.196</b> 8
M <sub>3t-5</sub>	0.0190	M <sub>3t-5</sub>	0.0073	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.1116	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.0945
M3t-6	-0.0608	M <sub>3t-6</sub>	-0.0388	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.5631*	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.477c
<sup>M</sup> 3t-7	0.0657	M3t-7	0.0529	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.1682	Pt-7	-0.1673
M <sub>3t-8</sub>	0.1879	M <sub>3t-8</sub>	0.1389	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.0756	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.0747
$P_{t-1}$	0.0476			M <sub>3t-1</sub>	C.0264		
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.0786			M3t-2	-0.2014		
Pt-3	0.1632	•		M3t-3	-0.1891		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.2218			M3t-4	0.0012		

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 5 percent level.

Table 13 (1977-85)

Regression	D.F.	Ē <sup>2</sup>	F-ratio	L.W. test Value
(1) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(8,17)	.7702	11.4756*	2.1139
(2) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub> and 4 Past P	(12,13)	.7547	7.4102*	1.8768
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,17)	.7942	13.0627*	2.6057
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(12,13)	.9195	24.7940*	2.3665

<sup>\*</sup>Significant at 5 percent level.

Table 14 (1977-85) Estimated lag profiles .

	Table 14	(1977-85)	Estimated	rad b	[OIIIes )		
M. on	8 Past M <sub>1</sub>			Pon	8 Past P	P on	8 Past P
-		*	-	and 4	Past M <sub>1</sub>		i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
and 4	Past P	(2)	i	(	3)		(4)
<u>(1</u> )							
M <sub>1t-1</sub>	0.00 <b>0</b>	M1t-1	-0.7265*	P <sub>t-1</sub>	0.0235	Pt-1	-0.4438
M <sub>1t-2</sub>	0.4064	M <sub>1t-2</sub>	-0.6274*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0. <b>6</b> 645*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.5122
M <sub>1t-3</sub>	- 2672	M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.6509*	P <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0097	Pt-3	-0.1146
M <sub>1t-4</sub>	- •064	M1t-4	-0.1210	P <sub>t-4</sub>	00.0777	P <sub>t-4</sub>	0.2997
M <sub>1t-5</sub>	- 1011	=	0.1097	P <sub>t-5</sub>	0.1497	F <sub>t-5</sub>	0.0952.
M1t-6	056	M1t-6	0.0977	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.1470	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.2012
M <sub>1t-7</sub>	A 2241	M <sub>1t-7</sub>	0.1364	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.0686	Pt-7	-0.2140
M <sub>1t-8</sub>	2000	M <sub>1t-8</sub>	0.4731*	.Pt-8	0.0034	Pt-8	0.0085
P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.8407	•		M <sub>1t-1</sub>	0.1631*		
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.3907			M1t-2	-0.0994		
F <sub>t-3</sub>	0.2634	•		M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-0.0227		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.0699			M1t-4	-0.0009		

\*significant at 5 per cent level.

Table 15 (1977 - 85)

Table 15	(1977 - 8)	35)	·	
kegression	D.F.	<u>R</u> 2	F-ratio	D.W.test value
(1) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(8,17)	.7409	9.9366*	2.099
(2) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and	(12,13)	.7432	7.0303*	1.8632
4 past P				
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,17)	.7942	13.0628*	2.6058
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(12, 13)	<b>.862</b> 2	14.039*	2.69

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 5 percent level.

Table 16 (1977-85) Estimated lay profiles

	Table 16	(1977-85)	) Estimate	ed lay :	profiles		
	8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	M <sub>3</sub> on 1	B Past M3	Pon	8 Past P Past M <sub>3</sub>	P on 8	3 Past P
	Past P 1)	(2	)		(3)		_(4)
	-1.4517*	M <sub>3t-1</sub>	-1.5145*	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1961	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.4438*
M <sub>3t-2</sub>	-1.3022*	<sup>M</sup> 3t-2	-1.5001*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.6462*	$P_{t-2}$	-0.5122*
M <sub>3t-3</sub>	1 0564+	M3t-3	-1.3838*	F't-3	-0.0624	P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.1146
M <sub>3t-4</sub>	-0.9052	M <sub>3t-4</sub>	-1.0992*	Pt-4	0.2061*	P <sub>t-4</sub>	0.2997*
M3t-5	-0.8776	<sup>M</sup> 3t-5	-0.9986*	Pt-5	0.1342	P <sub>t-5</sub>	0.0952
M <sub>3t-6</sub>	-0.5981	<sup>M</sup> 3t-6	-0.7106	P <sub>t-6</sub>	.=0.3300*	Pt-6	-0.2012
M 3t-7	-0.2488	M3t-7	-0.4649	P <sub>t-7</sub>	0.0637	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.2140
M <sub>3t-8</sub>	-0.0241	<sup>M</sup> 3t-8	-0.1573	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.1640	Pt-8	0.0086
P <sub>t-1</sub>	0.1289	-		M3t-1	-0.0656		
P <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.08159				2 -0.1893		
Pt-3	0.1127				3 -0.0444		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.3768			M3t-	4 -0.0975		

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 5 percent level.

Table 17 (1953-54 to 1984-85) Annual data

Regression	D.F.	R <sup>2</sup>	F-ratio (	D.W.test value
(1) M <sub>1</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(8,15)	.2855	2.1489	1.8816 <sup>N</sup>
(2) $M_1$ on 8 Past $M_1$ and	(12,11)	.4019	2.2879	2.169 <b>7</b> <sup>N</sup>
4 Past P				
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,15)	.3994	2.9117*	1.9991 <sup>N</sup>
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>	(12,11)	.5213	3.0872*	1.8 <b>73</b> 5 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> significant at 5 percent level

N = No autocorrelation.

Table 18 (1953-54 - 1984-85) Annual data Estimated lag Profiles

<del></del>		M <sub>1</sub> on	8 Past M <sub>1</sub>	P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>1</sub>		P on 8 Past P	
and 4 1			•		(3)	(4)	
M <sub>1t-1</sub>	-0.6731*	M <sub>1t-1</sub>	<b>-</b> 0.6330*	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-1.0320*	P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.8102*
	-0.5797	M <sub>1t-2</sub>	-0.5809	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-1.2560*	P <sub>t-2</sub>	-1.1018*
M <sub>1t-3</sub>	. 06144	M <sub>1t-3</sub>	-1.0084*	P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.9740*	P <sub>t-3</sub>	<b>-</b> 0.8862*
M <sub>1t-4</sub>	-0.5878	M1t-4	-0.7929*	P <sub>t-4</sub>	-1.0681*	Pt-4	-1.1315*
M <sub>1t-5</sub>	-0.5720	M1t-5	-0.6700	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-1.2304*	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.9778*
M <sub>1t-6</sub>	-1.0909*	<sup>M</sup> 1t-6	-0.9149	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-1.2999*	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.8199*
M <sub>1t-7</sub>	<b>-</b> 0.5608	M1t-7	-0.4152	P <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.9342*	Pt-7	-0.3803
M <sub>1t-8</sub>	-0.9307	Mlt-8	-1.0364*	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.3378	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.1591
P <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.5386			M1t-1	0.0719		
Pt-2	-0.6269			M <sub>1t-2</sub>	0.4677*		
P <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.2319			M <sub>1t-3</sub>	0.5231*		
P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.0585			M <sub>1t-4</sub>	0.2018		

\*significant at 5 percent level.

Table 19 (1953-54 - 1984-85) Annual data

Regression	D.F.	Ē <sup>2</sup>	F-ratio	D.W. test value
(1) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(8,15)	.1535	1.5214	2.0023 <sup>N</sup>
(2) M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and	(12,11)	.3671	2.1115	2.0112 <sup>N</sup>
4 Past P				
(3) P on 8 Past P	(8,15)	.3994	2.9117*	1.9991 <sup>N</sup>
(4) P on 8 Past P and 4 Past M <sub>3</sub>	(12,11)	.3930	2.2412	2.045 <sup>N</sup>

\*significant at 5 percent level

N = No autocorrelation

Table 20 (1953-54 - 1984-85) Annual data Estimated lag Profiles

M <sub>3</sub> on 8 Past M <sub>3</sub> and 4 Fast F		M <sub>3</sub> on	8 Past M3	M3 Pon 8 Past F and 4 Past M3			
	1)	(2)		(3)		(4)	
14 3t-1	-C.6249*	M <sub>3t-1</sub>	-0.4656*	F <sub>t-1</sub>	-c.8366*	F t-1	-0.8102*
	-C.3576*	<sup>M</sup> 3t-2	-C.4C91	F <sub>t-2</sub>	-1.1963*	F <sub>t-2</sub>	-1.1018*
M3t-3	6 3634	<sup>M</sup> 3t- 3	-0.5950*	Pt-3	-0.9762*	F <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.8862*
M <sub>3t-4</sub>	500	M 3t-4	<b>-</b> 0.1988	P <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.8621*	Pt-4	-1.1316*
M <sub>3t-5</sub>	-0.4710	<sup>M</sup> 3t-5	-0.5330	P <sub>t-5</sub>	-1.0138*	F <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.9 <b>7</b> 78*
Mi3t-6	-0.5053	M3t-6	<b>-</b> C.0646	P <sub>t-0</sub>	-0.9105*	F <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.8199*
<sup>M</sup> 3t <b>-7</b>	-0.6006*	<sup>M</sup> 3t <b>-7</b>	-0.4375*	Pt-7	-0.5262	F <sub>t-7</sub>	-0.3803
M 3t-8	-0.1775	M <sub>3t-8</sub>	0.1616	P <sub>t-6</sub>	-0.0570	P <sub>t-8</sub>	-0.1591
F <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.3108*			M 3t-1	-0.1634		
F <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.2978			M3t-2	0.1998		
F <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.2603			M3t-3	6 0.9580*		·
F <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.0173			M3t-4	-0.1369		

\*significant at 5 percent level

The first sub period results (1954-I - 1973 IV) corresponding to the period of fixed exchange rates, amply show that  $M_1$  causes P and P does not cause  $M_1$ . This conclusion emerges from a comparison of equation (1) with (2) and (3) with (4) in table 5. Addition of 4 Past P to equation (1) results in a fall in  $\mathbb{R}^2$  showing that for explaining the behaviour of  $M_1$ , P

is not important whereas addition of 4 past  $\mathrm{M}_1$  to equation (3) leads to an improvement in  $\overline{\mathrm{R}}^2$ , which goes to demonstrate that  $\mathrm{M}_1$  does explain the behaviour of P. A look at table 6 Col.(1) corroborates this conclusion. Particularly examining the coefficients of  $\mathrm{P}_{t-1}$ 's (Col.1) shows them to be insignificant and not sizeable, whereas Col.(3), reveals that the behaviour of preceding two quarters'  $\mathrm{M}_1$  is important for explaining the behaviour of P.

Information about causality running from  $M_3$  to P for the sub-period (1954 I = 1973 IV) is shown in table 7. Comparing equation (1) with (2) shows a negligible increase in  $\overline{R}^2$  (equal to .004) while doing so for equation (3) with (4) (table 7) shows an increase of  $\overline{R}^2$  from .6871 to .7013. This should not be taken to mean a case of pidirectional causality between  $M_3$  and P. Because we have to see whether lag profiles support this inference.

is highly auto repressive and most of the coefficients on  $M_{3t-1}$ 's are significant and sizeable, the coefficient on  $M_{3t-1}$ 's are significant and sizeable, the coefficient on  $M_{3t-8}$  being an exception. As far as coefficients on  $F_{t-1}$ 's (same Col. table 8) are concerned, they are incorrectly signed, statistically insignificant and not sizeable compared to the ones on  $M_{3t-1}$ 's. Therefore, on the basis of these coefficients we

can't infer that they affect the behaviour of  $M_3$ . On the contrary, Col.(3) of table 8 makes it very clear: (i) that 3 of the 4 coefficients on  $M_{3t-1}$ 's are correctly signed; they affect P positively; (ii) they are sizeable compared to the ones on  $P_{t-1}$ 's and (iii) one coefficient on  $M_{3t-1}$  is statistically significant. This is sufficient information to say that causality running from  $M_3$  to P (even in the sub-period) is unidirectional.

In view of this (causality running from M<sub>1</sub> to P and M<sub>3</sub> to P) two conclusions can be drawn. First, that fixed exchange rate regime has not affected causality in any way as is presumed and second that causality runs from M to P for the whole sample period as well as for the first sub-period.

The second subperiod (1974-I - 1985 IV) corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime and that of managed float.

Let us see whether this state improves the results for causality?

Tables 9 and 10 contain evidence on causality from  $M_1$  to P. Examined from any angle (whether regressions or their estimated lag profiles), they are the lest results so far obtained (for  $M_1$  and P). Adding 4 Past P to equation (1) reduces  $\bar{R}^2$  from .7376 to .7025. Looking to other statistics and lag profile (columns 1 and 3 of table 10), this strongly proves

that the behaviour of  $M_1$  can't be explained by P in any way. Addition of 4 past P to equation (3).table (9) produces a drammatic increase in  $\overline{R}^2$ . It increases from .4330 to .6623. Read with lag profile, this proves that  $M_1$  is the most important variable affecting the behaviour of P. As far as evidence on  $M_3$  and P is concerned, it is almost of similar type. Although lag profile for  $M_3$  and P is not as good as that for  $M_1$  and P, (However, it does not, in any case suggest that there is biderectional causality or causality runs from P to  $M_3$ ), the results of table 11 leave little about about the fact that causality runs from  $M_3$  to P.

In view of the estimates of the second sub-period it can be stated that: (i) flexible exchange rates probably make causality clearer as was mentioned at the beginning of the sub-period results. However, we can't be certain there might be other factors working to strengthen the causality during the second sub-period like oil crisis and increase in world food prices; (2) unidirectional causality from M to P holds over all sub-periods.

The keserve Bank of India began to publish a new series of money supply from January 1977 in the form of  $M_1$ ,  $M_2$ ,  $M_3$  and  $M_4$ . Earlier money supply data are not available in this form. In order to make the earlier money supply data (i.e.  $M_1$ 

and M<sub>3</sub> that we have used in this study) conform to the new money supply series we used the method of professor G.S.Gupta 11 so all our data pefore 1977 are based on a constructed series and how far they capture the spirit of new supply series is difficult to judge.

We therefore, used the actual money supply series published by the Reserve Bank of India for establishing causality to see whether our results are corroporated. Since some observations were lost in deseasonalizing and stationarizing, 1977-1985 formed a small sample. We did not expect this sample period to reveal all aspects of causality. However, it is surprising to note, that all our earlier conclusions are upheld by this new exercise. Equations 1 to 4 Table 13 establish unidirectional causality as far as M, and P are concerned. Even the lag profiles (table 14) show that though ecoefficients on  $P_{t-1}$ 's (Col.1, table 14) are sizeable, are negatively signed and insignificant, whereas in col.(3), coefficient on  $M_{3t-1}$  is significant. The only new development to be noted is that due to small sample D.W. value in equations (3) and (4) (table 13) have become inconclusive. But high F values and  $\bar{R}^2$  support our conclusions. As far as  $M_3$  and P are concerned, almost similar

<sup>11</sup> Gupta, G.S. (1984), "Monetary Target Setting" A Study sponsored by the Committee to Review the working of the monetary system set up by the RBI, pp.115-117.

type of results have been generated. Addition of 4 Past P to equation (1) table 15, increases  $\overline{R}^2$  by .0023 which is almost equal to zero whereas when 4 Past M<sub>3</sub> are added to equation (3),  $\overline{R}^2$  increases from .7942 to .8622 which is definitely not trivial and goes to show that M<sub>3</sub> causes P.

Thus our conclusion is that the actual new money supply series published by the Reserve Bank of India also establishes that causality is unidirectional from M to P.

We have used annual data also to find out whether they yield similar type of results. They are given in tables 17 to 20. It is strange the first two equations in table 17 do not have significant F ratios. Therefore, it is not possible to interpret results on the basis of values of  $\overline{R}^2$ . However, equations 3 and 4 (table 17) have significant F ratios and prove that  $M_1$  causes P. This becomes very clear if we look at the coefficients on  $M_{t-1}$ 's (in col.3 of table 18).

As far as the results in tables 19 and 20 are concerned, it is difficult to infer the direction of causality. We suspect that such results as have been obtained reported in tables 17 to 18, are an outcome of a small sample and consequently small degrees of freedom.

## Conclusion:

In this study we have used Grangers' test of causality as interpreted by Sims and found out that causality is unidirectional running from money to price level, this conclusion is incependent of the type of definition of money used and is valid whether we choose time period characterized by fixed exchange rate regime or flexible exchange rate regime.

## A note on Data

We have collected our data from the various issues of the RBI Bulletins. However, thereafter we constructed the  $\mathrm{M}_1$  and  $\mathrm{M}_3$  series (as already noted in the text) of money supply so as to make them conform to the new money supply series published by the Reserve Bank of India.

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