Triangle Effect and the Connotative Meaning of Trust in Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract

Two hundred and forty-nine male Postgraduate student of management played the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Deutsch) and filled out post game questioner measuring attitude toward the “other player”. Striking differences resulted between trusting and trustworthy subject on the one hand and suspicious and untrustworthy subject on the other with respect to different meanings given to the dimension of the trust (cooperation) in the interaction. As predicted, trusting behavior of the other player was given a positively evaluative meaning good versus bad by the trusting and trustworthy subjects and negatively dynamism meaning weak versus strong by the suspicious and untrustworthy subjects. The trusting player expected the typical other to make either trusting or suspicious moves, whereas the specious, yielding a high Triangularity index (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970), most provocatively, while 51% of trusting subjects thoughts that the other player was a female 81% from among the suspicious subjects though so, Some implication of the results in interpersonal and organizational situations are discussed.