Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260
Title: Negotiation Procedures Converging to Bargaining to Solutions
Authors: Lahiri, Somdeb
Keywords: Negotiation Procedures;Converging;Bargaining;Solutions
Issue Date: 17-Oct-2012
Series/Report no.: WP;1992/1013
Abstract: In this paper we study globally stable adjustment processes converging to the egalitarian and Nash solutions respectively in two person bargaining problems, that a rise under bilateral monopoly. The preference structures of the individuals are allowed to exhibit consumption externalizes and we impose plausible restrictions on them in order to guarantee convergence
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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