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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-17T08:41:54Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-10-17T08:41:54Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1992-03 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-10-17T08:41:54Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we study globally stable adjustment processes converging to the egalitarian and Nash solutions respectively in two person bargaining problems, that a rise under bilateral monopoly. The preference structures of the individuals are allowed to exhibit consumption externalizes and we impose plausible restrictions on them in order to guarantee convergence | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1992/1013 | - |
| dc.subject | Negotiation Procedures | en |
| dc.subject | Converging | en |
| dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
| dc.subject | Solutions | en |
| dc.title | Negotiation Procedures Converging to Bargaining to Solutions | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1992_1013.pdf | 308.35 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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