Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260
Title: | Negotiation Procedures Converging to Bargaining to Solutions |
Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
Keywords: | Negotiation Procedures;Converging;Bargaining;Solutions |
Issue Date: | 17-Oct-2012 |
Series/Report no.: | WP;1992/1013 |
Abstract: | In this paper we study globally stable adjustment processes converging to the egalitarian and Nash solutions respectively in two person bargaining problems, that a rise under bilateral monopoly. The preference structures of the individuals are allowed to exhibit consumption externalizes and we impose plausible restrictions on them in order to guarantee convergence |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260 |
Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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WP 1992_1013.pdf | 308.35 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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