Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11607
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dc.contributor.authorS., Althaf
dc.contributor.authorG., Ramesh
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-05T13:34:45Z
dc.date.available2013-12-05T13:34:45Z
dc.date.copyright2013-12-12
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citation3rd Biennial Conference of the Indian Academy of Management (IAM), 2013 held at IIMA during 12-14 December, 2013en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9788192080024
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/11607
dc.description.abstractThe current endeavor attempts to understand how the management of public enterprises could be incentivized to work by putting their maximum effort in the direction of the objectives set forth by the government as the owner. By bringing in principal-agent theory into context, we see how performance contracts (here MoU contracts between PSEs and administrative ministries co-ordinated by Department of Public 56 Enterprises) works to incentivize the agents (management of PSEs) to work in line with the objectives of the principal (Government). The broad agenda is to see 1. How to ensure alignment of goals of the agent through performance contract? 2. How incentive based performance contracts could be improved in operations and design?en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Ahmedabaden_US
dc.subjectPublic Sector Enterprises - Organizationsen_US
dc.titleManagement of Agency Problem through Performance Contracts – Case of Public Sector Enterprisesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:3rd Biennial Conference of the Indian Academy of Management (IAM), 2013



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