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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1294| Title: | Revelation principle for general principal: agents problems with incomplete information |
| Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
| Keywords: | Agents problems |
| Issue Date: | 15-Mar-2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | WP;1990/860 |
| Abstract: | In this paper we propose a model of a general principal - agents problem (with many agents) in which players choose actions and signals as pert of their strategy. Subsequently we show that any principal - agents problem admits a Bayesian - stackelberg equilibrium if and only if there exists another principal - agents problem where truthful revelation of types by the agents is possible at an equilibrium. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1294 |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1990_860.pdf | 278.87 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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