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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319| Title: | Incentive efficiency of correlated equilibria with state dependent payoffs |
| Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
| Keywords: | State dependence;correlated equilibria |
| Issue Date: | 15-Mar-2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | WP;1990/890 |
| Abstract: | In this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319 |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1990_890.pdf | 345.18 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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