Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319
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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-15T10:41:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-15T10:41:43Z-
dc.date.copyright1990-08-
dc.date.issued2010-03-15T10:41:43Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;1990/890-
dc.subjectState dependenceen
dc.subjectcorrelated equilibria-
dc.titleIncentive efficiency of correlated equilibria with state dependent payoffsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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