Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-15T10:41:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-15T10:41:43Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 1990-08 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-15T10:41:43Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1990/890 | - |
dc.subject | State dependence | en |
dc.subject | correlated equilibria | - |
dc.title | Incentive efficiency of correlated equilibria with state dependent payoffs | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
WP 1990_890.pdf | 345.18 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in IIMA Institutional Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.