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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1619Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-25T04:43:25Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2010-03-25T04:43:25Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1988-07 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-03-25T04:43:25Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1619 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we obtain general inequality properties that max-min strategic solutions to Variable Threat Games satisfy under a set of very plausible assumptions. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1988/756 | - |
| dc.subject | Inequality | en |
| dc.subject | Threat games | en |
| dc.title | Max-min solution for variable threat games | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1988_756.pdf | 240.34 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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