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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1625Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-25T08:47:26Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2010-03-25T08:47:26Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1992-10 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-03-25T08:47:26Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1625 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we model threat bargaining problems as fixed threat bargaining games (with the threat point at the origin) and show that the utilitarian solution to threat bargaining problems is not manipulable. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1992/1062 | - |
| dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
| dc.subject | Utilitarian solution | en |
| dc.title | The non manipulability of the utilitarian solution | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1992_1062.pdf | 203.07 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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