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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1637| Title: | Bargaining with a variable population for games with a reference point |
| Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
| Keywords: | Bargaining;Population |
| Issue Date: | 25-Mar-2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | WP;1988/773 |
| Abstract: | We consider axiomatic models of bargaining defined over a domain of problems containing different numbers of agents, define a concept called restricted monotonicity with respect of changes in the number of agents, and show that a solution due to Lahiri (1988), which satisfies monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point, meets the aforementioned requirement. Finally, we consider a class of solutions which are defined with respect to a reference point [concept due to Thomson (1981)] and show that this class satisfies our axiom of restricted monotonicity. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1637 |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1988_773.pdf | 309.2 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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