Bargaining with a variable population for games with a reference point

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1637

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb	-
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-25T09:00:38Z	-
dc.date.available	2010-03-25T09:00:38Z	-
dc.date.copyright	1988-12	-
dc.date.issued	2010-03-25T09:00:38Z	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1637	-
dc.description.abstract	We consider axiomatic models of bargaining defined over a domain of problems containing different numbers of agents, define a concept called restricted monotonicity with respect of changes in the number of agents, and show that a solution due to Lahiri (1988), which satisfies monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point, meets the aforementioned requirement. Finally, we consider a class of solutions which are defined with respect to a reference point [concept due to Thomson (1981)] and show that this class satisfies our axiom of restricted monotonicity.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1988/773	-
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Population	en
dc.title	Bargaining with a variable population for games with a reference point	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
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