Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1676
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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-27T06:08:27Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-27T06:08:27Z-
dc.date.copyright1995-02-
dc.date.issued2010-03-27T06:08:27Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/1676-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose restricted expansion independence as a criterion which may be satisfied by desirable choice functions and axiomatically characterize the proportional solution by using this criterion. We also show that the proportional solution satisfies an improvement sensitivity property on a reasonable domain. The theory of solutions to choice problems is used in the paper to define solutions for coalitional bargaining problems.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;1995/1233-
dc.subjectChoice Problemsen
dc.subjectChoice functionen
dc.titleRestricted Expansion Independence for Choice Problemsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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