Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1694
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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-27T06:33:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-27T06:33:43Z-
dc.date.copyright1993-08-
dc.date.issued2010-03-27T06:33:43Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/1694-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we prove that any bargaining solution to group decision problems which satisfies individual rationality, strong symmetry, efficiency and strong improvement sensitivity also satisfies mid-point domination.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;1131-
dc.subjectBargaining solutionen
dc.subjectTheoremen
dc.titleOn a theorem due to sobelen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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