Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1695
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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-27T06:34:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-27T06:34:33Z-
dc.date.copyright1993-09-
dc.date.issued2010-03-27T06:34:33Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/1695-
dc.description.abstractThe main purpose of this paper is to formalise the concept of a compromise function. Subsequently, given a compromise function, we define a voting equilibrium and prove the existence of such an equilibrium. Finally, we close our analysis by showing that under some assumptions a voting equilibrium is Pareto optimal.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;1993/1140-
dc.subjectVoting equilibriumen
dc.titleOn the existence and efficiency of a voting equilibrium for a public good economyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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