Threat bargaining games with a variable population

IIMA Institutional Repository

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1698

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb	-
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z	-
dc.date.available	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z	-
dc.date.copyright	1989-01	-
dc.date.issued	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1698	-
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1989/776	-
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Population	en
dc.subject	Capital structure	en
dc.subject	Finance institutions	en
dc.subject	Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India	en
dc.title	Threat bargaining games with a variable population	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
Appears in Collections:	Working Papers

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
WP 1989_776.pdf		314.89 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open