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Title: | Redundancy of additional alternatives and solutions to bargaining problems |
Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
Keywords: | Bargaining;Problems solving |
Issue Date: | 28-Mar-2010 |
Series/Report no.: | WP;1989/791 |
Abstract: | In this paper we propose a new axiom called the redundancy of additional alternatives axiom, which is satisfied by the proportional solution. A weaker version of the same axiom is satisfied by the Kalai-Smorodinsky (3) solution. The Nash solution satisfies neither. This new axiom seems to be a reasonable compromise between accepting the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom and rejecting it outright, from the realm of axiomatic models of bargaining. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1714 |
Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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WP 1989_791.pdf | 202.41 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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