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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1714Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-28T11:11:29Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2010-03-28T11:11:29Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1989-03 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-03-28T11:11:29Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1714 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we propose a new axiom called the redundancy of additional alternatives axiom, which is satisfied by the proportional solution. A weaker version of the same axiom is satisfied by the Kalai-Smorodinsky (3) solution. The Nash solution satisfies neither. This new axiom seems to be a reasonable compromise between accepting the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom and rejecting it outright, from the realm of axiomatic models of bargaining. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1989/791 | - |
| dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
| dc.subject | Problems solving | en |
| dc.title | Redundancy of additional alternatives and solutions to bargaining problems | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1989_791.pdf | 202.41 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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