Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/17448
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dc.contributor.authorRaghavan, T.E.S-
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-05T09:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2016-02-05T09:10:55Z-
dc.date.copyright2016-01-28-
dc.date.issued2016-01-28-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/17448-
dc.descriptionThe R & P seminar held at Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on January 28, 2016 by Prof. T.E.S. Raghavan, University of Illinois at Chicago on "Game theory - The Mathematics for Conflict Resolution".en_US
dc.description.abstractGame theory can be broadly classified into cooperative and non cooperative games. In non-cooperative games the key solution concept is the notion of a Nash equilibrium. In cooperative games, the key issue is how to split the cooperative output among the participants of the game. Here one has several solution concepts and one may have to tailor the appropriate solution to the model at hand. The talk will motivate via simple examples to illustrate the solution concepts for both non-cooperative and cooperative games. Some classic examples will be chosen to illustrate the basic ideas, like the value and optimal strategies for zero sum games, and the notions of Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium via Cournot models, Prisoner's dilemma and the battle of sexes. For Cooperative games we will introduce the solution concepts like the Shapley value, Core and the nucleolus using some simple examples from Bohm Bawerk's horse market, legal disputes, real state pricing etc.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management, Ahmedabaden_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectMathematicsen_US
dc.subjectConflict Resolutionen_US
dc.subjectBohm Bawerken_US
dc.titleGame theory - The Mathematics for Conflict Resolutionen_US
dc.typeVideoen_US
Appears in Collections:R & P Seminar

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