Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1757
Title: Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity
Authors: Lahiri, Somdeb
Keywords: Bargaining
Issue Date: 28-Mar-2010
Series/Report no.: WP;1991/974
Abstract: In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the properties of "welfare optimal rules" and rationalizability of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics. This latter condition leads to anonymous bargaining solutions which satisfy "metric respect for unanimity."
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1757
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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