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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1764Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-28T13:44:15Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2010-03-28T13:44:15Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1991-10 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-03-28T13:44:15Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1764 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the properties of "welfare optimal rules" and rationalizability of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics. This latter condition leads to anonymous bargaining solutions which satisfy "metric respect for unanimity." | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1991/975 | - |
| dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
| dc.title | Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1991_975.pdf | 1.16 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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