Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/19468
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dc.contributor.authorNagar, Neerav
dc.contributor.authorSen, Kaustav
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-22T08:42:55Z
dc.date.available2017-06-22T08:42:55Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationNagar N., Sen K. (2016). How Does Regulation Affect the Relation Between Family Control and Reported Cash Flows? Comparative Evidence from India and the United States. Corporate Governance (Oxford), 24(5), 490-508.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/19468
dc.description.abstractManuscript Type: Empirical. Research Question/Issue: We conduct a two-country study to understand (i) how family and non-family firms engage in classification shifting to manage reported operating cash flows in each country; (ii) how this behavior varies between the two countries; and (iii) how corporate governance regulation introduced independently in each country moderates the observed behavior. Research Findings/Insights: We find that family ownership has different effects on quality of cash flow reporting in the two countries. Furthermore, country-level regulation moderates these effects differently. In particular, (i) firms in both countries engage in manipulating operating cash flows, but the evidence is stronger in the United States; (ii) family firms in India engage in more shifting than non-family firms, but this is not observed in the United States; and (iii) family (non-family) firms in India increase (reduce) shifting, whereas only non-family firms in the United States increase shifting after regulation. Since non-family firms in India raise more external capital than family firms after regulation, we infer that family firms in India reacted to this competition for capital and resorted to shifting. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Most studies assume that the incentives for family firm behavior are the same in different market settings. However, factors such as efficiency of public capital markets, enforcement of corporate laws and regulations, and other institutional practices can cause differences in family firm behavior across different market settings. We investigate the behavior of family and non-family firms in each of these markets and study how a feature of the national governance system, regulatory design, moderates this behavior. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings should be useful to global investors and regulators in both emerging and developed markets. The results indicate how similar regulation in the two different settings can trigger differences in the behavior of firms.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.subjectCash Flow Manipulationen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectFamily Firmsen_US
dc.subjectOperating Cash Flowsen_US
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.titleHow does regulation sffect the relation between family control and reported cash flows? comparative evidence from India and the United Statesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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