Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/19836
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dc.contributor.authorDutta, Bhaskar-
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-15T05:25:40Z-
dc.date.available2017-09-15T05:25:40Z-
dc.date.issued2017-08-17-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/19836-
dc.descriptionThe R & P seminar held at Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on August 17, 2017 by Prof. Bhaskar Dutta, Ashoka University & University of Warwick on The formation of partnerships in social networks.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the formation of partnerships in social networks. Agents randomly request favors and turn to their neighbours to form a partnership. If favors are costly, agents have an incentive to delay the formation of the partnership. In that case, for any initial social network, the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium results in the formation of the maximum number of partnerships when players become infinitely patient. If favors provide benefits, agents rush to form partnerships at the cost of disconnecting other agents and the only perfect initial networks for which the maximum number of partnerships are formed are the complete and complete bipartite networks. The theoretical model is tested in the lab. Subjects generally play according to their equilibrium strategy and the efficient outcome is obtained over 78% of the times. Decisions are affected by the complexity of the network. Two behavioural rules are observed during the experiment: subjects accept the formation of the partnership too often and reject partnership offers when one of their neighbours is only connected to them.en_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Ahmedabaden_US
dc.subjectSocial networksen_US
dc.subjectPartnership formationen_US
dc.titleThe formation of partnerships in social networksen_US
dc.typeVideoen_US
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