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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20434Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-05T03:48:32Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-03-05T03:48:32Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 1990-01-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20434 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with incomplete information and correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;840 | - |
| dc.subject | Threat bargaining games | en_US |
| dc.title | Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and correlated beliefs | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1990_840.pdf | WP_1990_840 | 191.67 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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