Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20443
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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb-
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-05T08:43:24Z-
dc.date.available2018-03-05T08:43:24Z-
dc.date.issued1990-01-01-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/20443-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we formalize the framework of an arbitration game, to accommodate a large class of situations where public decisions are implemented in a non-cooperative setting. We then present a method of computing the equilibrium strategies of the players under assumptions of bounded rationality, so that the solutions correspond to what is observed in any realization of an arbitration game.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Ahmedabaden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;849-
dc.subjectArbitration gameen_US
dc.titleArbitration by a Bayesian statistician and bounded rationalityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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