Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11718/21884
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dc.contributor.authorAgarwal, Shubham
dc.contributor.authorGhosh, Diptesh
dc.contributor.authorChakrabarti, Anindya
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-19T02:59:45Z
dc.date.available2019-05-19T02:59:45Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationAgarwal, S., Ghosh, D.,Cha krabarti, A Self -organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules. The European Physical Journal B, 89(266). Retrieved from DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2016-70464-0en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/21884
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, N agents play a coordination game repeatedly, which has exactly N pure strategy Nash equilibria, and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of N possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied, although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies versus the efficiency of such a solution.en_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.subjectsociophysics literatureen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen_US
dc.titleSelf-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rulesen_US
dc.title.alternativeTHE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNALen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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