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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/504Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-12-12T06:31:23Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-12-12T06:31:23Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 1994-03 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-12-12T06:31:23Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/504 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper, to begin with we present a generalization of the independence of irrelevant expansions assumption to the situation with an arbitrary yet finite number of players, and with the help of a comparatively simpler proof than the one suggested by Thomas (19981), we uniquely characterize the Nash bargaining solution. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1172 | - |
| dc.subject | Axiomatic characterization | en |
| dc.title | A Note on axiomatic characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 1994_1172.pdf | 401.41 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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