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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/812| Title: | Top cycle and uncovered solutions for abstract games: axiomatic characterizations |
| Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
| Keywords: | Axiomatic - Characterization |
| Issue Date: | 18-Jan-2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | WP;2000-11-02/1626 |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider binary relations which are reflexive and complete. Such binary relations are referred to in the literature as abstract games. Given an abstract game a (game)solution is a function which associates to each subset a non-empty collection of points of the subset. In this paper we provide axiomatic characterizations of the top cycle and uncovered solutions for abstract games. In a final section of the paper, the similarity between a game solution and a choice function of classical rational choice theory is exploited to axiomatically characterize the top cycle and uncovered choice functions. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/812 |
| Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WP 2000_1626.pdf | 778.04 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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