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http://hdl.handle.net/11718/817
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-18T08:45:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-01-18T08:45:14Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2001-02 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-01-18T08:45:14Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/817 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A Federation Boolean Vote Aggregator allows a finite set of coalitions to unilaterally elect any candidate from a set containing exactly two candidates. There are several special types of Federation Boolean Vote Aggregators, all of which share a property: the candidates are assigned weights, and for a coalition to be decisive, it is necessary that the sum of the weights of its members exceed a pre-assigned quota. In this paper we address the following question: When is a Federation Boolean Vote aggregator a Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregator? | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;2001-02-02/1637 | - |
dc.subject | Axiomatic - Characterization | en |
dc.title | Axiomatic characterisation of weighted boolean vote aggregators | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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WP 2001_1637.pdf | 792.18 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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