Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/11718/9081
Title: | Threat bargaining games with a variable population |
Authors: | Lahiri, Somdeb |
Keywords: | Strategic Stability;Strategic Monotonicity;Population |
Issue Date: | 28-Sep-1990 |
Abstract: | In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games. We introduce three new concepts for equilibrium threat strategies called strategic stability, strategic monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents and strategic constancy. Our primary objective in this paper is to show that familiar assumptions satisfied by bargaining games with a variable population yield equilibrium threat strategies which satisfies in a very natural way the concepts we have introduced. |
Description: | International Journal of Game Theory, Rountledge, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1990), pp. 91-100 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/9081 |
Appears in Collections: | Journal Articles |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Threatbargaininggame.pdf Restricted Access | 458.79 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
Items in IIMA Institutional Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.