




Working Paper



A CONSEQUENCE OF CHERNOFF AND OUTCASTING
AND SOLUTIONS FOR ABSTRACT GAMES

By

Somdeb Lahiri

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Abstract of :
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The purpose of this paper is to prove by induction the theorem (in Aizerman and Malishevski [1981]) that a choice function which satisfies Chernoff's axiom and Outcasting can always be expressed as the union of the solution sets of a finite number of maximization problems. In this paper we also show that the Slater solution for abstract games (see Slater [1961]) satisfies the Chernoff, Outcasting and Expansion axioms. On the other hand the solution due to Copeland [1951] , which has subsequently been axiomatically characterized by Henriot [1985], does not satisfy any of these three properties.

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to prove by induction the theorem (in Aizerman and Malishevski [1981]) that a choice function which satisfies Chernoff's axiom and Outcasting can always be expressed as the union of the solution sets of a finite number of maximization problems. The proof we offer is considerably simpler than the one in Aizerman and Malishevski [1981]. In Moulin [1985], a discussion of a similar result is available. Our framework closely resembles the one of choice theory as enunciated in Moulin [1985]. It is well known that a combination of Chernoff's axiom and Outcasting is equivalent to a property called Path Independence (See Moulin [1985]).

The idea of a function which associates with each set and a binary relation a non-empty subset of the given set has a long history whose exact origin is very difficult to specify and in any case is unknown to the author. In Laslier [1997] can be found a very exhaustive survey of the related theory when binary relations are reflexive, complete and anti-symmetric.

In a related paper (Lahiri [2000a]) we extend the above set of binary relations to include those which are not necessarily anti-symmetric. Such binary relations which are reflexive and complete are referred to in the literature as abstract games. An ordered pair comprising a non-empty subset of the universal set and an abstract game is referred to as a subgame. A (game) solution is a function which associates to all subgames of a given (nonempty) set of games, a nonempty subset of the set in the subgame. Lucas [1992] has a discussion of abstract games and related solution concepts, particularly in the context of cooperative games. Moulin [1986], is really the rigorous starting point of the axiomatic analysis of game solutions defined on tournaments, i.e. anti-symmetric abstract games. Much of what is discussed in Laslier [1997] and references therein carry through into this framework. In Lahiri [2000 b], we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions that an abstract game needs to satisfy so that every subgame has at least one von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.

In the final section of this paper we show that the Slater solution for abstract games (see Slater [1961]) satisfies the Chernoff, Outcasting and Expansion axioms. On the other hand the solution due to Copeland [1951], which has subsequently been axiomatically characterized by Henriot [1985], does not satisfy any of these three properties.

The Framework

Let X be a finite, non empty universal set. If A is any non-empty subset of X , let $[A]$ denote the set of all non-empty subsets of A . A choice function on X is a function $C: [X] \rightarrow [X]$ such that $C(A) \subset A \forall A \in [X]$.

Given $A \in [X]$, let $|A|$ denote the cardinality of A . C is said to satisfy:

- a) Chernoff Axiom (CA), if $\forall A, B \in [X], A \subset B$ implies $C(B) \cap A \subset C(A)$;
- b) Outcasting (O) , if $\forall A, B \in [X], C(B) \subset A \subset B$ implies $C(B) = C(A)$.
- c) Aizerman (A), if $\forall A, B \in [X], C(B) \subset A \subset B$ implies $C(A) \subset C(B)$.

Chernoff Axiom was originally proposed in Chernoff [1954]. Outcasting, which occurs under its present nomenclature in Aizerman and Aleskerov [1995], has been attributed to Nash [1950], by Suzumura [1983]. Aizerman has been in the literature for a while (for example, see Fishburn [1975]). However, its prominent role was recognized only recently (Aizerman and Malishevsky [1981]).

Clearly, Outcasting implies Aizerman. It is also quite easy to see that Aizerman and Chernoff together imply Outcasting. Hence, a choice function satisfies Aizerman and Chernoff if and only if it satisfies Outcasting and Chernoff.

The issue here is the following theorem in Aizerman and Malishevski [1981] :

Theorem 1: Let C be a choice function on X which satisfies CA and O. Then there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and functions $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}, i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\forall A \in [X]$,

$$C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{x \in A / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \forall y \in A\}$$

Before we provide a new proof of this theorem, let us provide two examples to show that neither CA nor O is alone sufficient for the above theorem.

Example 1 : Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$, $C(X) = \{x\}$, and $C(A) = A \forall A \in [X], A \subset X$. Clearly C satisfies CA but not O Towards a contradiction suppose there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and functions $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}, i = 1, \dots, n$ such that

$$C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{a \in A / f_i(a) \geq f_i(b) \forall b \in A\} \forall A \in [X].$$

Then $C(X) = \{x\}$ implies $f_i(x) > \max \{f_i(y), f_i(z)\} \forall i$.

However, $C(\{x,y\}) = \{x,y\}$ implies $f_i(y) \geq f_i(x)$ for some i , which contradicts what we obtained before.

Example 2 : Let $X = \{x,y,z\}$, $C(X) = X$, $C(\{x,y\}) = \{x\}$, $C(\{y,z\}) = \{y\}$, $C(\{x,z\}) = \{z\}$, $C(\{a\}) = \{a\} \forall a \in X$. Clearly C satisfies O but not CA . Towards a contradiction suppose there exist $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and functions $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i = 1, \dots, n$ such that

$$C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{a \in A \mid f_i(a) \geq f_i(b) \forall b \in A\} \forall A \in [X].$$

Then $C(X) = X$ implies there exists $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $f_i(y) \geq f_i(x)$. However, then $y \in C(\{x,y\})$, contrary to our definition of C .

Proof of Theorem 1 :

We will prove this theorem by induction on the Cardinality of X .

If $|X| = 2$, then there are two possibilities :

a) $C(X) = X$: then define $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as follows :

$$f(a) = 1 \forall a \in X.$$

b) $C(X) \neq X$: then define $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as follows :

$$f(a) = 2 \text{ if } a \in C(X)$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } a \in X \setminus C(X).$$

Clearly $C(A) = \{a \in A \mid f(a) \geq f(b) \forall b \in A\}$.

Hence suppose the theorem is true for $|X| \in \{1, \dots, m-1\}$ and suppose $|X| = m \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $C(X) = \{x_1, \dots, x_p\}$, for some $p \in \mathbb{N}$. For each $x_i \in C(X)$, let $Y_i = X \setminus \{x_i\}$.

Then

$$\forall (\emptyset \neq) A \subset B \subset Y_i, C(B) \cap A \subset C(A)$$

$$\forall (\emptyset \neq) A \subset B \subset Y_i, \text{ if } C(B) \subset A \text{ then } C(A) = C(B).$$

Let $C_i: [Y_i] \rightarrow [Y_i]$ be defined as follows :

$$C_i(A) = C(A) \forall A \in [Y_i], i \in \{1, \dots, p\}.$$

By the induction hypothesis $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, p\}$, there exists $m_i \in \mathbb{N}$ and $g_i^j: Y_i \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $j = 1, \dots, m_i$ such that

$$C_i(A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}, \forall A \in [Y_i].$$

$$\text{Let } g_i^j(x_i) = [\max\{g_i^j(a) / a \in Y_i\}] + 1,$$

$$\forall j \in \{1, \dots, m_i\}, i \in \{1, \dots, p\}.$$

Now suppose $A \in [X]$.

Suppose $A \subset Y_i \forall i \in \{1, \dots, p\}$.

$$\text{Then } C(A) = C_i(A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\} \forall i \in \{1, \dots, p\}.$$

$$\therefore C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^p \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}.$$

Hence suppose $A \not\subset Y_i$ for some $i \in \{1, \dots, p\}$.

Case 1 : $C(X) \subset A$

Then, by (O), $C(A) = C(X)$.

$$\therefore C(A) = \{x_1, \dots, x_p\} = \bigcup_{i=1}^p \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}.$$

Case 2 : $C(X) \not\subset A$.

Let $A = \{i / x_i \notin A\} \neq \emptyset$

Thus $A \subset Y_i \forall i \in A$.

By the induction hypothesis,

$$C(A) = C_i(A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}, \forall i \in A.$$

Hence,

$$C(A) \subset \bigcup_{i=1}^p \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}.$$

Now suppose $i \notin A$. Thus $x_i \in C(X) \cap A$. By CA, $x_i \in C(A)$

$$\therefore \bigcup_{i \notin A} \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\} \subset C(A).$$

$$\text{But, } C(A) = C_i(A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}, \forall i \in A.$$

$$\therefore \bigcup_{i=1}^p \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\} \subset C(A).$$

$$\text{Hence } C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^p \bigcup_{j=1}^{m_i} \{a \in A / g_i^j(a) \geq g_i^j(b) \forall b \in A\}, \forall A \in [X].$$

The theorem was shown to hold for $|X| = 2$ and has now been shown to hold for $|X| = m$ if it holds for $|X| = m-1$. Hence it is true for all finite non-empty X .

Q.E.D.

Remark: In Moulin [1985], there is a property called Expansion. C is said to satisfy Expansion (E) , if $\forall A, B \in [X], C(B) \cap C(A) \subset C(A \cup B)$.

The result due to Schwarz [1976], which we refer to in the introduction as the one available in Moulin [1985] implies the following:

Let C be a choice function on X which satisfies CA, E and O. Then there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and functions $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\forall A \in [X]$,

$$(1) C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{x \in A / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \forall y \in A\} \text{ and } (2) C(A) = \{x \in A /$$

$x \in C(\{x, y\}) \forall y \in A\}$. Conversely (1) and (2) imply C satisfies CA, E and O.

The following example shows that (1) above may be satisfied even if C does not satisfy E.

Example 3 : Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$, $C(X) = \{y, z\}$, $C(\{x, y\}) = \{x, y\}$, $C(\{y, z\}) = \{y, z\}$, $C(\{x, z\}) = \{x, z\}$, $C(\{a\}) = \{a\} \forall a \in X$. Clearly C satisfies CA and O but not E, since $x \in C(\{x, a\}) \forall a \in X$ and yet $x \notin C(X)$. Let $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i = 1, 2$ be such that $f_1(y) = 3 > f_1(x) = 2 > f_1(z) = 1$ and $f_2(z) = 3 > f_2(x) = 2 > f_2(y) = 1$. However,

$$C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^2 \{a \in A / f_i(a) \geq f_i(b) \forall b \in A\} \forall A \in [X].$$

Quasi-Transitive Binary Relations

A binary relation Q on X is any non-empty subset of $X \times X$. Given a binary relation Q on X its asymmetric part denoted $P(Q) = \{(x, y) \in Q / (y, x) \notin Q\}$ and the symmetric part of Q denoted $I(Q) = \{(x, y) \in Q / (y, x) \in Q\}$. A binary relation Q on X is said to be

- (i) reflexive if $(x, x) \in Q \forall x \in X$;
- (ii) complete if $x, y \in X$, $x \neq y$ implies $(x, y) \in Q$ or $(y, x) \in Q$;
- (iii) quasi-transitive if $\forall x, y, z \in X$, $(x, y) \in P(Q)$ and $(y, z) \in P(Q)$ implies $(x, z) \in P(Q)$;
- (iv) a quasi order if it is reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive.

We are concerned here with the following theorem, which may be found in Roberts [1979], Aizerman and Malishevsky [1981], Moulin [1985] (and which has been generalized in Lahiri [1999] to the case where the universal set X is possibly infinite) and which now follows as an easy corollary of our Theorem 1:

Theorem 2: Q is a quasi order on X if and only if there exists a positive integer n and functions $f_i: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $Q = \{ (x, y) \in X \times X / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \text{ for some } i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \}$.

Proof:- It is easy to see that if there exists a positive integer n and functions $f_i: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $Q = \{ (x, y) \in X \times X / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \text{ for some } i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \}$ then Q is a quasi order. To prove the converse assume that Q is a quasi order. For $A \in [X]$, let $C(A) = \{x \in A / (x, y) \in Q \forall y \in X\}$. Clearly $C(A) \neq \emptyset$ whenever $A \in [X]$, since Q is a quasi order. Hence C as defined above is a choice function. Further it is easy to verify that C satisfies CA and O. Hence, by Theorem 1, there exists a positive integer n and functions $f_i: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, such that $C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{x \in A / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \forall y \in A\} \forall A \in [X]$. Since $(x, y) \in Q$ if and only if $x \in C(\{x, y\})$, and since $x \in C(\{x, y\})$ if and only if $f_i(x) \geq f_i(y)$ for some $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the proof of the theorem is thereby complete.

Q.E.D.

Stronger Consequences

The following lemma permits to strengthen the two theorems obtained above:

Lemma 1 : Let $f: X \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ (:the set of real numbers) be given. Then, there exists a positive integer n and one to one functions $f_i: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\{ (x, y) \in X \times X / f(x) \geq f(y) \} = \{ (x, y) \in X \times X / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \text{ for some } i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \}$.

Proof :- Let $\{f(x) / x \in X\} = \{s_1, \dots, s_q\}$ where q is a positive integer and $s_j < s_{j+1} \forall j \in \{1, \dots, q-1\}$. Let $n_j = |\{x \in X / f(x) = s_j\}|$ and let $n = (n_1)! \times \dots \times (n_q)!$

Let $g: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be defined as follows:

$$g(x) = n_1, \text{ if } f(x) = s_1$$

$$g(x) = n_1 + \dots + n_j, \text{ if } f(x) = s_j$$

Clearly, $\forall x, y \in X : [f(x) \geq f(y) \text{ if and only if } g(x) \geq g(y)]$.

A function $\pi : \{1, \dots, n_1 + \dots + n_q\} \rightarrow X$ is called a restricted permutation if $\forall k \in \{1, \dots, n_1 + \dots + n_q\}$: (1) $[\pi(k) \in \{x \in X / f(x) = s_1\}]$ if and only $(1 \leq k \leq n_1)$ & (2) $[\pi(k) \in \{x \in X / f(x) = s_i\}]$ if and only $(n_{i-1} \leq k \leq n_i \text{ and } 1 < i \leq q)$. Let Π denote the set of all restricted permutations. Since X is finite so is Π . For $\pi \in \Pi$, define $f_\pi : X \rightarrow \{1, \dots, n_1 + \dots + n_q\}$ as follows: $\forall x \in X, f_\pi(x) = k$ if and only if $\pi(k) = x$. It is now easy to verify that, $\{(x, y) \in X \times X / f(x) \geq f(y)\} = \{(x, y) \in X \times X / g(x) \geq g(y)\} = \{(x, y) \in X \times X / f_\pi(x) \geq f_\pi(y) \text{ for some } \pi \in \Pi\}$. This proves the lemma.

Q.E.D.

In view of Lemma 1 and Theorems 1 and 2 we have the following:

Theorem 3: Let C be a choice function on X which satisfies CA and O. Then there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and one to one functions $f_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}, i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that

$$\forall A \in [X], C(A) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{x \in A / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \forall y \in A\}.$$

Theorem 4: Q is a quasi order on X if and only if there exists a positive integer n and one to one functions $f_i: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}, i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $Q = \{(x, y) \in X \times X / f_i(x) \geq f_i(y) \text{ for some } i \in \{1, \dots, n\}\}$.

Game Solutions

A binary relation R on X is said to be transitive if $\forall x, y, z \in X, [(x, y) \in R \ \& \ (y, z) \in R \text{ implies } (x, z) \in R]$ and it is said to be anti-symmetric if $[\forall x, y \in X, (x, y) \in R \ \& \ (y, x) \in R \text{ implies } x = y]$.

$\in R$ & $(y, x) \in R$ implies $x = y$]. Given a binary relation R on X and $A \in [X]$, let $R|A = R \cap (A \times A)$.

Let Π denote the set of all reflexive and complete binary relations. If $R \in \Pi$, then R is called an abstract game. An ordered pair $(A, R) \in [X] \times \Pi$ is called a subgame. Given a binary relation R on X and $A \in [X]$, let $G(A, R) = \{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A : (x, y) \in R\}$. Given $A \in [X]$, let $\Delta(A)$ denote the diagonal of A i.e. $\Delta(A) = \{(x, x) \mid x \in A\}$.

The following example shows that given $R \in \Pi$ and $A \in [X]$, $G(A, R)$ may be empty:

Example 4: Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$ and let $R = \Delta(X) \cup \{(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)\}$. Clearly $G(X, R)$ is empty.

Let Λ be a non-empty subset of Π .

A (game) solution on Λ is a function $S: [X] \times \Lambda \rightarrow [X]$ such that:

- (i) $\forall (A, R) \in [X] \times \Lambda: S(A, R) \subset A$;
- (ii) $\forall (A, R), (A, Q) \in [X] \times \Lambda: R|A = Q|A$ implies $S(A, R) = S(A, Q)$.

Let S be a solution on Λ and let $R \in \Lambda$. Let $S(R): [X] \rightarrow [X]$ be defined thus: $\forall A \in [X]: S(R)(A) = S(A, R)$. Clearly $S(R)$ is a choice function.

If $\forall (A, R) \in [X] \times \Lambda$, $G(A, R)$ is non-empty valued then the associated solution is called the best solution on (X, Λ) .

Given an abstract game R , it is said to be a transitive abstract game, if R is a transitive binary relation. Let Ω be the set of transitive abstract games. It is well known that $R \in \Pi$ if and only if there exists a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ such that $\forall x, y \in X: (x, y) \in R$ if and only if $f(x) \geq f(y)$.

The Hamming distance on Π denoted $H: \Pi \times \Pi \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ (or simply H) is defined as follows: $H(R, Q) = |R \setminus Q| + |Q \setminus R|$. It is easy to see that H is a metric on Π .

Given $R \in \Pi$, let $\Omega(R) = \{Q \in \Omega \mid \forall Q' \in \Omega: H(R, Q) \leq H(R, Q')\}$.

Example 5 : Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$ and let $R = \Delta(X) \cup \{(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)\}$. Let $Q_1 = (R \cup \{(x, z)\}) \setminus \{(z, x)\}$, $Q_2 = (R \cup \{(y, x)\}) \setminus \{(x, y)\}$, $Q_3 = (R \cup \{(z, y)\}) \setminus \{(y, z)\}$. $\forall i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$: $H(R, Q_i) = 2$. Towards a contradiction suppose that Q is a transitive game with $H(R, Q) < 2$. $H(R, Q) > 0$, since R itself is not transitive. Hence suppose that $H(R, Q) = 1$. Thus either $Q \subset\subset R$ and $|R \setminus Q| = 1$ or $R \subset\subset Q$ and $|Q \setminus R| = 1$. If $Q \subset\subset R$ then Q cannot be complete and thus Q is not a transitive game. Thus, $R \subset\subset Q$ and $|Q \setminus R| = 1$. But then Q is not transitive. Hence $\Omega(R) = \{Q_1, Q_2, Q_3\}$.

We have thus established the following:

Proposition 1: There exists an abstract game R such that $\Omega(R)$ contains more than one element.

The Slater solution $SL: [X] \times \Pi \rightarrow [X]$ is defined as follows: $\forall (A, R) \in [X] \times \Pi$: $SL(A, R) = \bigcup \{G(A, Q) / Q \in \Omega(R)\}$.

A solution S on a non-empty subset Λ of Π is said to be a Slater selection if for all R in Λ there exists Q in $\Omega(R)$ (possibly depending on R) such that for all A in $[X]$: $S(A, R) = G(A, Q)$. A Slater selection is by its definition a very well-behaved solution.

A solution S on a non-empty subset Λ of Π is said to satisfy:

- a) Chernoff Axiom (CA^*), if $\forall R \in \Lambda$: $S(R)$ satisfies CA ;
- b) Outcasting (O^*), if $\forall R \in \Lambda$: $S(R)$ satisfies O ;
- c) Expansion (E^*), if $\forall R \in \Lambda$: $S(R)$ satisfies E .

By Theorem 1, SL satisfies both CA^* and O^* . It may be of some interest to find out whether SL satisfies E^* . However, we can prove the following:

Proposition 2: There exists a solution S on Π different from SL which satisfies CA^* and O^* .

Proof :- Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$ and $Q = X \times X$. For $R \in \Pi \setminus \{Q\}$, let $S(A, R) = SL(A, R)$. Let $S(X, Q) = \{x, y\}$ and let $S(A, Q) = A$ otherwise. Clearly S satisfies CA^* and O^* , although $S \neq SL$.

Q.E.D.

Proposition 3 :- Let $R \in \Pi$. Then there does not exist Q, Q' in $\Omega(R)$ and x, y, z in X , such that : (a) $\{(x, y), (y, z), (x, z)\} \subset Q \subset \Delta(X) \cup \{(x, y), (y, z), (z, y), (x, z)\}$;

(b) $\{(z, y), (y, x), (z, x)\} \subset Q' \subset \Delta(X) \cup \{(z, y), (y, x), (x, y), (z, x)\}$.

Proof :- Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists Q, Q' in $\Omega(R)$ and u, v, w in X , such that : (a) $\{(u, v), (v, w), (u, w)\} \subset Q \subset \Delta(X) \cup \{(u, v), (v, w), (w, v), (u, w)\}$; (b) $\{(w, v), (v, u), (w, u)\} \subset Q' \subset \Delta(X) \cup \{(w, v), (v, u), (u, v), (w, u)\}$. Suppose without loss of generality that $X = \{x, y, z\}$. Thus, $H(Q, Q') \geq 4$. If R is a transitive abstract game then clearly the above is not possible since then $\Omega(R) = \{R\}$. Hence suppose that R is not transitive. By the triangle inequality, $H(R, Q) = H(R, Q') \geq 2$.

Case 1: $(x, y) \in P(R)$, $(y, z) \in P(R)$ and $(z, x) \in R$. In this case $\Omega(R)$ is either a singleton (i.e. if $(z, x) \in I(R)$) or as in Example 5, contrary to the above .

Case 2: $(x, y) \in P(R)$, $(y, z) \in I(R)$ and $(z, x) \in R$. In this case $\Omega(R) = \{R \setminus \{(y, z)\}\}$, which is also a singleton and the above situation cannot arise.

Case 3: $(x, y) \in I(R)$, $(y, z) \in P(R)$ and $(z, x) \in R$. In this case $\Omega(R) = \{R \setminus \{(x, y)\}\}$, which is also a singleton and the above situation cannot arise.

Case 4: $(x, y) \in I(R)$, $(y, z) \in I(R)$ and $(z, x) \in P(R)$. In this case $R \cup \{(x, z)\} \in \Omega(R)$, and $H(R, R \cup \{(x, z)\}) = 1 < 2$. Hence the above situation cannot arise.

Case 5: $(x, y) \in I(R)$, $(y, z) \in I(R)$ and $(z, x) \in P(R)$. In this case $R \cup \{(x, z)\} \in \Omega(R)$, and $H(R, R \cup \{(x, z)\}) = 1 < 2$. Hence the above situation cannot arise.

Case 6: $(x, y) \in I(R)$, $(y, z) \in I(R)$ and $(x, z) \in P(R)$. In this case $R \cup \{(z, x)\} \in \Omega(R)$, and $H(R, R \cup \{(z, x)\}) = 1 < 2$. Hence the above situation cannot arise.

This proves the proposition.

Q.E.D.

The following is obtained as an easy consequence of Proposition 2:

Theorem 5 : SL satisfies E^* .

Proof : Let $(A, R) \in [X] \times \Pi$. By proposition 3, if $|A| \leq 3$ then $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \subset \cup\{G(A, Q) / Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. Suppose that if $|A| \leq K$, then $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \subset \cup\{G(A, Q) / Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. Let $|A| = K + 1$, and towards a contradiction suppose that $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \not\subset \cup\{G(A, Q) / Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. Thus there exists $y \in G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \setminus$

$\cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. If $\cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$ is a singleton then clearly $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) = \cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. Hence let $x, z \in \cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$ with $x \neq z$. By the induction hypothesis, $y \in (\cup\{G(A \setminus \{x\}, Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \cap (\cup\{G(A \setminus \{z\}, Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\})$. Let $Q_1 \in \Omega(R)$ such that $y \in G(A \setminus \{x\}, Q_1)$ and let $Q_2 \in \Omega(R)$ such that $y \in G(A \setminus \{z\}, Q_2)$. Clearly $(x, y) \in P(Q_1), (y, z) \in Q_1, (z, y) \in P(Q_2)$ and $(y, x) \in Q_2$. This contradicts the conclusion of Proposition 3. Hence, $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \subset \cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$. By a standard induction argument $G(A, \cup\{Q \in \Omega(R)\}) \subset \cup\{G(A,Q)/Q \in \Omega(R)\}$ for all A in $[X]$. This in conjunction with CA^* , which SL satisfies proves the theorem.

Q.E.D.

Given $R \in \Pi$, $A \in [X]$ and $x \in X$ let $s(x, A, R) = |\{y \in A \mid (x, y) \in P(R)\}| - |\{y \in A \mid (y, x) \in P(R)\}|$.

The Copeland solution $Co: [X] \times \Pi \rightarrow [X]$ is defined as follows:

$\forall (A, R) \in [X] \times \Pi: Co(A, R) = \{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A: s(x, A, R) \geq s(y, A, R)\}$.

Proposition 4: (a) Co does not satisfy CA^* ; (b) Co does not satisfy O^* ; (c) Co does not satisfy E^* ; (d) there exists R such that $G(A, R)$ is not a subset of $Co(A, R)$ for some A in $[X]$.

Proof: - Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$. (a) Let $R = \Delta(X) \cup \{(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)\}$. Now, $Co(X, R) = X$ and $y \in Co(X, R) \cap \{x, y\}$. However $y \notin Co(\{x, y\}, R)$. Thus Co does not satisfy CA^* . (b) Let $R = \Delta(X) \cup \{(x, y), (y, x), (y, z), (z, x), (x, z)\}$. $Co(X, R) = \{y\} \subset \{x, y\}$. However, $Co(\{x, y\}) = \{x, y\} \neq \{y\} = Co(X, R)$. Thus Co does not satisfy O^* ; (c) Let R be as in (b). Now $x \in Co(\{x, y\}, R) \cap Co(\{x, z\}, R)$. However, $Co(X, R) = \{y\}$. Thus Co does not satisfy E^* . (d) Let R be as in (b) and (c). $x \in G(X, R)$ but $Co(X, R) = \{y\}$. Thus $G(X, R)$ is not a subset of $Co(X, R)$.

Q.E.D.

Thus the Copeland solution apart from not satisfying either CA^* or O^* , fails other tests that a desirable solution may be required to satisfy.

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