




# Working Paper



## BUREAUCRACY FOR PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT: A CONTRADICTION OR CONGRUENCE?

Ву

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### BUREAUCRACY FOR PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT: A CONTRADICTION OR CONGRUENCE?

by

#### T.K. Moulik

Over the years there has been a phenomenal growth in the government bureaucracy in India both in its size and in its functional responsibilities. The followin account about the district administrative machinery of Rajkot district is revealing:

"In the Rajkot district, in 1973-74, this segment (the government administrative machinery) consisted of 7.386 functionaries. On an average, there were nearly 103 paid functionaries for a group of 12 villages, or one functionary for every 21 rural households or every 40 male persons above 14 years of age. ...In 1973-74. this segment of district administration spent about Rs 80 million, out of which 49% was on famine relief works. Of the remaining amount of Rs 41.2 million, about 56.7% was spent on welfare services like education, medical facilities, health, family planning, community development, cooperative and social welfare. Only 17.6% was spent on production-oriented activities like agriculture, irrigation, animal husbandry, industry, and forests and 17.6% was spent for infrastructure development such as construction of roads and buildings. Out of Rs 80 million, about 32.3% was spent on salary and allowances. If the expenditure on famine relief works was not considered, the expenditure on asalary, allowance, and contingencies formed about 62 per cent.

The all-embracing pervasive presence of the government bureaucracy in India becomes still more revealing if one examines its wide-ranging functional responsibilities. Today, there is hardly any activity of a private Indian citizen which does not come into the purview of some bureaucracy or the other. There is certainly no welfare and development activity which is not controlled and regulated by the government bureaucracy. It is therefore quite legitimate

Caikwad, V.R. and Parmar, D.S. Rural <u>Development Administration Under</u>

<u>Democratic Decentralization</u>, Wiley Eastern

<u>Ltd.</u>, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 49-51.

to postulate that given the pervasiveness of the government bureaucracy, one cannot but expect it to play the most pivotal role in India's development efforts. The question to be asked is whether the bureaucracy as it obtains today is capable and willing to play the expected role and if so, for what kind of development and for whom.

#### <u>Development Defined</u>

This question becomes crucial once we attempt to define the nature and task of development. At the very outset let us not make the atrocious mistake in equating growth with development. Given the country's widely uneven and skewed socio-economic structure and its historical context, a simple economic growth cannot be taken as a measure of development. Neither can we accept the totally useless theory of 'percolation' of growth-benefits. For, in actual practice the benefits do not percolate.

what then is meant by development? Development is the process by which the people's standard of living is raised with equitable distribution and control of wealth and means of production by all sections of the people. In other words, by development what is aimed at is the process of establishing production relations in such a way that it not only increases productivity and creates more wealth but also ensures equitable distribution of wealth without minority-control over the means of production. If we accept this proposition then it is clear that such a process of development can happen in India if only the people become conscious, conscientised and confident in actively participating in the development efforts exerting all their energies and rights as a vital part of the society. In short, this means people's development in order to harness the people's power. Again, under the prevailing

objective conditions, since the largest majority of India's population are discriminatingly and exploitatively kept out of consciousness and confidence in exercising their social and economic rights, the immediate task of development should inevitably be directed towards this large majority of lower-rung people living in abysmal poverty and exploitative conditions. In action terms, development in India means the development of this large majority of poor people, — the proletariat, consisting of landless labourers, small and marginal farmers, workers (especially the workers in unorganized sectors), which constitutes more than 80% of India's population.

In essence, therefore, people's development in India has to have a deliberate and discriminating bias towards the poor majority, — the proletariat. This is a very important and crucial point, often deliberately forgotten as ever looked. For, let us not waste our energy in beating around the bush in wishing away the stark social fact of existing class contradictions in India.

On the one extreme, there is the miniscule minority consisting of the comprador burgeoisie and capitalists, feudal and semi-feudal big landlords and on the other is the huge majority of ruthlessly oppressed and exploited poor, hungry, maked, houseless and unemployed peasants, workers, students and petty-burgeoisie. In India's semi-feudal rural economy, for example, about 80% of the land is concentrated in the hands of the 20% of the landlords and rich peasants, while 80% of the rural population has no land or very little land. Added to this extremely skewed landownership pattern is the extortionate usurious credit, forcible eviction of tenancy, exherbitant rent charged from the tenants and sharecroppers, continuing serfdom and

bonded labour system, unabated miseries and oppression of scheduled castes and tribes.

The role and capability of the pervasive government bureaucracy in the process of people's development should naturally be examined in relation to this vast majority of the poor suffering class as the target clientele. For, the other minority class owning and controlling all the means of production, including socio-political power does not necessarily deserve any development efforts from the government bureaucracy. It is an irrefutable fact that an officially sponsored development programme to be implemented by the State machinery can assume its proper meaning and relevance only if the programme serves the interest of the large majority of the downtrodden and exploited masses.

If we accept this premise, which is often conveniently neglected in our debate, then we can easily identify the constraints and limitations of the government bureaucracy. Sasically these constraints arise out of two historical factors: the class composition of the government bureaucracy and the nature of bureaucratic functions.

The same concern is increasingly voiced by many intellectuals, politicians and policy planners in various parts of the world.

See, for example, Korten, D.C. and Alfonso, F.B. (eds.)

Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap, McGraw Hill International Book Company, Now Delhi, 1981.

#### Class Character of Bureaucracy

For the purpose of this article, let us take the relatively higher echelons of the government bureaucracy. It is, in fact, this section of the bureaucracy which determines the policy, implementation and the general direction of the government development programmes. There are three distinct types of people discernible who are found to man this section of the government bureaucracy:

- (i) the most important and a large majority is the group of the nationally selected administrative service cadres (e.g. IAS, IPS, IFS, IEC etc.) including State Service cadres. These are the elite brahmins of the government bureaucracy, an exclusive club by itself, having largely generalist educational background without any specialisation (mostly graduates and postgraduates in arts and science). Apart from the basic formal educational background, their only specialisation is in the fact that they are selected in the 'so-called' national or state-level competitive examinations of talent-search. In fact, it is this competitive examination alone which bestows them with the brahminical exclusivity in the government bureaucracy.
- (ii) A very small minority group of the scientists or technocrats or management experts, politicians, who catapulted to the government bureaucracy at various levels. The process by which this category of people, often eminoric in their field of profession, get into bureaucratic positions is characterized by various factors ranging from nature of the job, political linkages and manouvering, to personal ambition for bureaucratic power and control. Be that as it may, this is still a very miniscula group in the Indian bureaucracy, but ambitious enough to claim a share of the cake of the bureaucratic power and political recognition.

(iii) Below the above mentioned groups is a huge army of lower level bureaucrate. This is a mixed group of technocrats, generalists, scientists v and subject matter specialists (e.g. extension workers, foresters, etc.), who are basically deployed to implement and supervise the programmes initiated and imposed by the higher echelon of the bureaucracy i.e., the two groups mentioned above. In their professional knowledge and field level experiences, this group of bureaucrats are probably far more equipped than the other two but have no decision-making power in influencing the policies and programme centent. Numerous though they are, there is a process of selection through stiff competition and for most of them the life-ambition is to grow up through the rank in the hierarchy of bureaucracy.

Having characterized the hierarchy of bureaucracy, it is now easy for us to examine their class background. It should be clear to even a casual student of Indian history that there could be hardly anybody in this bureaucratic system with truly proletarian background, not at least among the first two critical categories. By the sheer weight of the historical process and given the prevalent skewed socio—economic structure, educational system and the general political conditions, proletariat class is bound to remain excluded in the competitive process of selection. The classes which normally come into this bureaucratic stream are largely the feudal or semifeudal landlords, land-rich farming gentry, comprador elite bourgeoisie and capitalists. In other words, they are mostly people from the rich and middle class categories and that too largely with urban background. It is only among the third category of bureaucracy, as mentioned above, one may find some from among the petty-bourgeoisie class. It is often argued that

the Indian bureaucracy is being increasingly represented by the poor down-trodden class by citing examples of the entry of some scheduled castes and scheduled tribes under reservation rules. Not only they are invisibly small in number, but most of their class background also is not truly representative of the large masses of the scheduled castes and tribes. They are really brahmins among their caste and tribal groups in terms of socio-economic class.

#### Functions of Bureaucracy

Given the class background of the Indian bureaucracy, it looks as if the normal bureaucratic roles, functions and responsibilities are tailor-made for them. Whether the class background of the bureaucracy determines the nature of its functions and roles or vice versa is a question representing the two sides of the same coin. In other words, both the hypotheses seem to be valid, irrespective of some of the radical politico-economic programmes and slogans enunciated by the government more as a matter of political expediency rather than ideological commitment. What then are the normal bureaucratic functions and roles?

Since the modern Indian State bureaucracy has its historical roots in the British colonial rule of 200 years, its character in the post-independence period is still largely determined by the colonial legacy of the past. Thus, in the pre-independence colonial period the major thrust of the bureaucratic functions and responsibilities have been mainly concerned with law and order and revenue collection, while in the most independence era one more additional function is emphasized and that is, the regulatory and monitoring functions in relation to various projects and programmes (governmental and non-governmental). In either case, however, the bureaucratic roles and responsibilities are bound by a set of rules and regulations goared around a definite time-

bound targets and budgetory expenditure. Armed with the financial and regulatory power, the bureaucracy with its class background, easily assumes the role of a 'giver' as against a vast mass of poor 'receivers'. This point needs some more explaining.

Be it developmental or non-developmental, a bureaucracy is generally identified with an administrative hierarchy built around specific programmes/ projects or activities. The objectives of these programmes/projects are normally broken down into some specific time-bound targets with budgetary outlays. Thus the state bureaucracy is essentially an administrative machinery to operate a delivery system through which the time-bound targets are aimed to achieve and the budgeted amount of money spent. So far so good. But in the process, two distinct trends develop in the bureaucracy: first, over-concern and over-emphasis of the delivery system at the cost or even at the detriment of the people's participation and interest i.e. the receiversystem. Second, bigger the target and budgetary allocation for a programme more conspicuously prestigious and powerful the concerned bureaucracy is perceived. The later trend seems to be inevitable given the mobility and temporary nature of the bureaucrats in one particular position, and the emphasis on target achievement and expenditure of budgeted amount in evaluating the performance of the bureaucracy.

#### Bureaucratic Response

Thus the bureaucracy manned by a selected group and class of people through competitive methods is again thrown into a severe cut—throat competition in the operational field. Human nature as it is, the response of the bureaucrats

follows the very expected pattern. Firstly, almost all of its energy and efforts are concentrated in regulating, monitoring and expanding the delivery system in order to achieve the most visible targets as quickly and as easiest way as possible. To the bureaucrats this means three types of actions:

(1) To follow mechanically the rules and regulations and precedence irrespective of the situation required. For, any change in the system requires the painful process of thinking, analytical study and prolong persuasion at the risk of being deviant and causing either delay in the target—achievement or even failure; (2) To work through the existing power structure and contacts, a path of least resistance. For, otherwise it would require lot more efforts and time to establish alternative structural contacts which may often lead to conflicts and confrontation with the existing power structure; (3) To concentrate in establishing linkages and contacts with the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and the political system in order to ensure personal rise in the hierarchy.

The second kind of response of the bureaucrats is a continuous effort to expand the empire in terms of subordinate manpower, control over increasing infrastructural facilities like cars, vehicles, office premises etc. and lobbying for more and more financial allocations. For, only through such expansion of his empire, a bureaucrat deems to gain in competition, prestige and power. Thus, there is hardly any bureaucrat who is found not to crib about the shortage of manpower and other infrastructural facilities for the implementation of a programme/project. In fact, one of the constant items in the project planning is the demand for additional subordinate manpower and other infrastructural facilities. It is interesting to observe the pervasive

zeal of the bureaucrats in building his empire of the delivery system to the extent that even their offices assume almost a monotonous look in terms of furniture, interior decorations, exclusiveness, distance from the subordinates and the general public.

#### Giver Syndrome

The 'giver-syndrome' of the bureaucrats vis-a-vis the huge mass of 'receivers' i.e. the people particularly the poor, can be understood now in view of the above-mentioned two types of response pattern. None of these responses can bring the bureaucrats nearer to the people. In fact, there seems to be a deliberate design to maintain a distance so that the emperor bureaucrat can play the role of paternalistic feudal lord or a tyrant 'giver' with unquestioned authority and according to his own conveniences. Since the receivers, particularly the poor down-trodden masses, are largely illiterate. ignorant of their rights and unorganized, there is hardly any pressure to bring the bureaucracy to the level at which there can be meaningful active participation of the people in the process of development. Neither is it in the interest of the bureaucrats that such pressure from the receiver-system develops which will clip their wings of power and authority. To organize. to educate and to actively involve people means to share power and authority, and reduce the dependence of the receivers that is, to be at the level of the people and be one among them. This is too high a price to pay for a bureaucrat who thinks that he has earned his position of authority and power as a 'giver' through hard labour against severe competition. On the other hand, being addicted to the power as a 'giver', bureaucrats seem to privately enjoy and often publicly demand a deference from the subordinates and the people. In the process, a bureaucrat, depending on the size and scope of has

empire, often is found to nurse in his heart an overt or covert desire to be treated with equal pomp and show as a private nadir. A state machinery fuelled by public money and supposedly having public responsibility becomes almost a private ownership of the bureaucrat. It is not surprising therefore when a senior bureaucrat handling % 200 crores annually grumbles that he is entitled for a mere Ambassador car for his use, while a private owner or a manager of a private enterprise handling the same amount of money or even less would have a Mercedes car. It is striking that the bureaucrat conveniently forgets that not a single paise of % 200 crores is from his own pocket; rather he is a mere public servant hired by the public to use the public money as the public desired.

Another manifestation of the same empire-building phenomenon can be observed in the creation of the semi-government or semi-autonomous corporations. The only differences between a direct state bureaucracy or department and a semiautonomous corporation are the perks and facilities enjoyed by the bureaucrats in the corporation and the flexibilities in terms of rules and regulations followed in the normal government bureaucracy. In other words, a corporation is one step ahead towards the coveted image of a bureaucrats private empire. In the recent years there has been a mushroom growth of such corporations in India headed and manned by the bureaucrats. This phenomenon is partly based on the oft-repeated argument the bureaucrats perform most efficiently in crisis-management. It is implied that in the absence of the restrictions of the normal rules and regulations and provided that there is freedom of actions a bureaucrat performs better.

This means as if the bureaucrat can be efficient only when there is a full play of his 'giver' role without much restrictions and restraints. The crisis management like flood and famine relief provides the bureaucrat such unfettered and unbriddled opportunities. The idea of the semi-government semi-autonomous corporations seems to have been effected with the same logic. It was not surprising when a top most bureaucrat of a State, the Chief Secretary, laments that he would prefer to be a Managing Director of a prestigious Corporation rather than heading the State bureaucracy because of extra perks, facilities, foreign trips, power and authority, that is a 'giver' par excellence.

#### Committed Bureaucracy

It is in this context the oft-repeated bogey of committed bureaucracy needs to be understood. When the bureaucracy is asked for commitment, it means the commitment to the existing power structure ciling the existing delivery system, not the commitment to the people to serve and to strengthen the receiver system. The basic purpose of this bogey of committed bureaucracy is to reduce the deviance and dissonance between the bureaucracy and the existing socio-economic structure, — a structure in the maintenance of which the existence of the present political power depends. The fear of the deviance and dissonance arises out of various legal and developmental programmes which if implemented true to spirit may endanger the existing social order. By asking for commitment, the bureaucracy is given the signal that the implementation of various developmental and legal programmes should be limited to the extent that it should not turn the apple—cart of the existing social order.

In other words, there is a difference in the intent and purpose in the declared policies and programmes of development. To the bureaucracy, as a characterised earlier, this hypocrasy and underlying difference between the intent and purpose suits perfectly. Thus, the kind of commitment asked for from the bureaucracy comes by easily for most of the bureaucrats — a path of least resistance by sailing along the wind.

Be that as it may, this question of committed bureaucracy and the undercurrent campaign for commitment among the bureaucrats by the existing political power structure, demonstrate the existence or potentialities for deviance and dissonance among a section of the bureaucrats. Such a threat exists for two reasons, often interdependent and inter-related. Firstly, irrespective of the class background, many young bureaucrats carry over with them at the entry point various shades of ideological walues and attitudes acquired consciously or unconsciously in their young days, mostly in the colleges and universities. In many cases this preentry ideological consciousness and values are totally different or even diametrically opposite from the ideological base (if there is any) of the ruling elite. Most of these young newly recruited bureaucrats who run headlong into a crisis of ideological conflict with the ruling elite are the middle class bourgeoisic. Eventhough, their ideological consciousness are more often not yet steeled with the social practice, this middle class bourgeosic background and linkages with the left-out peer group keep their ideological consciousness alive for some time. Initially, these young bureaucrats attempt to implement various developmental policies and programmes with their pre-entry level of ideological values thereby creating a dissonance in the existing bureaucratic system and socio-economic power structure.

Second reason lies in the very nature of some of the developmental policies and programmes which are for some political reasons or the other promoted or perhaps forced to be promoted, but are essentially aimed at changing the existing socio-economic order. The programmes and policies like land reform, cooperative credit and marketing facilities, various loans and subsidy schemes, SFDA/MFL schemes, Antyodaya schemes, removal of rural indobtedness and bonded labour system, minimum wages act, MRTP act, nationalization of the banks and various similar other programmes including "Garibi Hatao" slogan and 20 point programme come into mind. Ostensibly, these programmes are promoted to benefit the downtrodden proletariat. Many of thom are quite radical or revolutionary in the sense that they, if truly and properly implemented, can upset the apple-cart of the existing socio-economic power structure considerably. In other words, these developmental programmes and policies have the potentialities to create imbalance in the system to the extent that it may threaten the existing coio-economic structure. Now, the young bureaucrates with different (from the ruling elite) ideological constructs may use these programmes and policies in their delivery system true to its overt intent and purpose defeating the covert purpose of the ruling power. Hence the concern of the ruling elite for the committed bureaucracy. Many of these policies and programmes are promoted by the ruling power merely as an eye-wash for consolidating the vote-bank as political expediency and often as a result of intense class struggle. It is in fact naive to think that the ruling elite will like to demolish the same socio-economic structure which keeps them in power.

Few in number as they are, these recalcitrant bureaucrats do indeed pose

a threat to the existing power structure. As a result, they attract all kinds of pressure and arm-twisting from the socio-political and administrative hierarchy in order to pull them into line. The pressure takes the form of carrot and stick in the sense of incentive promotion, coveted posting, foreign trips, study leave etc. on the one hand and the threat of punishment in the form of transfer, delay in promotion, posting to infrastructurally difficult areas or to not-so-important decorative positions, various other official and non-official harassment etc. Given the notso-firm ideological commitment and the middle class bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisic background, most of these recalcitrant bureaucrats soon succumb to the pressure. Many senior bureaucrats, for example, readily submit that within a short period of between 2 to 4 years since the entry point, all their enthusiasm, motivation and ideological values in relation to bringing about basic socio-economic changes become streamlined into a stereotype. In other words, within a period of 2-4 years, a young intelligent person becomes a typical moron bureaucrat. It is true that in the process there remains a few who continue to resist the pressure, fight incessantly with firm commitment irrespective of punishment or incentive. But the number of such bureaucrats are very few and fat between. On the other hand, there is always a relatively large number of them who having succumbed to the pressure still continue to feel dejected and disappointed about themselves and about the whole system and yet perform the routinised bureaucratic functions like robots. This is the group of people who are perhaps sitting in the fence and given the right kind of environment and socio-political development would jump to the other side of the fence, but will not initiate the process of change by themselves. In the other extreme, are a large mass of people who very easily and comfortably shift or continue

from the beginning to enjoy the stereotyped role of bureaucrats as discussed before. It is only a very insignificant few for whom the existing system appears to be too everhearing and contradictory to their ideological commitment to continue in the service and therefore they reject the system like rebels by getting out of the service voluntarily with protests.

#### Bureaucratic Ethos

Apart from the ideological conflicts and mounting pressure for stereotyping in the line of the existing socio-economic structure, there are two other most important binding limitations of the government bureaucracy for people's development. Firstly, there is the age-old tradition of India's state administration, which has been and still continues to be aimed at maintaining and safeguarding the existing property relationship. In fact, all the procedures - civil and criminal laws and judicial procedures and practices, - are oriented towards safeguarding the property ownership and its resultant production relationship. The bureaucracy is specifically trained and geared in this bosic traditional ethos of administration. This in turn strengthens the second but most important binding constraint, that is, the caste-class background of the bureaucrats. There is a clear tendency of coalescing of interests between the bureaucrats and the landlord-capitalist-comprador class. A very senior bureaucrat of a state in charge of land reform, for example, had no hesitation to say, "How do you expect me to implement the land reform measures which are going to hurt my father and several of my relatives?". Even when the bureaucrats have no connection with land, coming from urban middle class without any linkage with the landed gentry, - they seem to maintain on attitude of

either hostile neutrality or a conspicuous paternalism towards the down-trodden proletariat rather than emptthy. On the other extreme, where caste-class feelings are traditionally strong and nurtured by feudal or semi-feudal production relationships, the bureaucrats fail to take impersonal and officially legal stance in the event of caste-class struggle. A Rajput Collector in Bihar, for example, did not find it bureaucratically unethical to publicly assure the Rajput landlords of all official help and support against the minimum wage demand of the low caste landless labourers. The Adivasis and the scheduled castes are increasingly victimised by the same tendency of the bureaucrats.

As a result, when the benefits of the special development projects (e.g. SFDA, MFAL, land reform, cooperative credit, tribal development etc.) specifically targetted for the downtrodden do not reach the target group and instead grabbed by the richer class, it does not disturb the bureaucrats as it should have been. Neither is the performance of the bureaucrats appraised on the basis of his efficiency in reaching the benefits to the target group. That most of the benefits of the target-group oriented programmes are going to be grabbed by the non-target group, that is, the secio-economically richer sections, is almost accepted both officially and unofficially as inevitable. In fact, there seems to be a "1/3rd-syndrome" of efficiency running across the bureaucracy in the sense that there is a great Pan-fais of appreciation if any such development programme benefits reach at least 30% of the target group.

#### Limitations

What then could we expect from the bureaucracy in relation to people's

development? Given the nature and character, it is certain that we cannot expect the bureaucracy to bring about any fundamental socio-occommic change affecting the existing socio-economic structure. Neither can we expect the bureaucrats to have empathy towards the downtrodden proletariat in order to encourage them to actively participate in the development process. It is utterly naive and idle dreaming for anyone who thinks that the bureaucrats, as they are, will have time, patience, willingness and empathy to organise the largely unorganized downtrodden proletariat in order to turn them from a mere receiving system to demand system. For, the very process of organizing the poor proletariat as an articulate and vigilant demand system defeats the interest and authority of the bureaucracy, eventhough there may be and often is a general feeling among some bureaucrats and ruling politicians for the necessity of organising the poor into a demand system. As explained earlier in the paper, much of those feelings and official utterances are either the result of intellectual masterbation or a mere expression of the imbeciles with the hope that somewhere somehow somebody will do the job of people's development through organising the poor into a demand system without hurting or depiriving their own interests and power. On the other hand. there are clear historical evidence to prove that whatever so-called radical or liberal measures or poor-oriented development programmes the existing socio-economic-political structure have undertaken are the direct or indirect results of some form or other class struggle threatening the balance of poliical power. Most of such development programmes are at best ameliorative r at werst a simple mechanism of hoodwinking the unorganized poor with falso romises in order to divert or diffuse the class conflict, without any change in the existing socio-economic power structure. In fact, the bureaucracy is usually found to take the side of the existing socio-economic power structure in any class conflict to the extent that it even promotes er instigates a counter-organization of the rich in order to deal with the organized and legal demand of the poor.

It is often argued that what is needed for the people's development is a "well knit and well ordered structure of administration". Some people, even think that there is no alternative to "this basic requirement". Having made the prophecy, the same people then argue that this so-called well-knit administration of bureaucrats will deliver the goods only when it is properly directed by the democratically elected political leaders. The fallacy in this argument is obvious. It is sheer inconceivable to think that such political leadership with sufficient strength can come up from the existing power structure as to direct and enforce the bureaucrats to organise and educate the poor into a demand system. On the centrary, with the cealescing of interests of the bureaucrats and ruling power structure, their basic aim is to repress or urge the oppressed and the poor to be cautious in pressing the needs of any basic change in the present socio-conomic structure too hard.

#### Alternative Approach

It is often pleaded by some cowards that there is an alternative approach for people's development without class struggle and basic institutional change, an approach of technological innovations and gradual incremental reforms.

B. Sivaraman, "The Alternative", Kurukshotra, Vol. 29, No.1, Oct.1, 1981, p.6

Among this group of people there are fow who wishfully believe that by the sheer force of history and democratic processes, the present political leaders will increasingly learn to align themselves with the downtrodden proletariat and would learn to consider the proletariat as the stable constituency or vote-bank. Once this happens, they would enforce the bureaucracy to implement the development programme for the poor and with the poor as a process of people's development in order to maintain their hegemony of power. Either the protagonists of this gradualist thesis is blind to the historical process or mentally deranged to learn from the history in the sense that they are only telling the half-truth. Apart from the inordinate delays with various interacting unknown forces in achieving this gradualist stage, people's development cannot and will not take place by merely enforcing the giver-bureaucrats to streamline the delivery system. Attempts to push through such strategy of development and change, in the absence of basic changes in the existing socio-economic power structure, have taught us that it only results into the perverse offect of retardation, frustration, discontent through pushing out large masses of latent productive forces from participating in the process of development. only way therefore is to turn the existing pyramid of the socio-economic power structure, with only 10% of the ruling clite and urban workers at the top upside down, with organized poor and downtrodden proletariat at the top. This is possible only when there is genuine people's development programme in educating, politicising, conscientising and organizing the poor with class solidarity and continuous class struggles. Who can do such mobilization work and how this can be done is discussed in a separate article by the author.

For the present, it is suffice to surmise that bureaucracy as it obtains in the present socio-economic order cannot perform the role of people's development; at best they could operate as givers, a motherten and often corrupt delivery system. To opt for bureaucracy for people's development means to opt for '1/3rd-efficiency' syndrome without people's development. On the other hand, if the pyramid of power structure can be turned upside down, it is possible that a large part of indifferent and hesitant bureaucrats sitting on the fence will gain courage to join the proletariat programme for people's development.