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Now showing items 11-19 of 19
Some concepts of distributive justice in bargaining problems
(2010-07-27)
In this paper we study the problems associated with distributive justice in an abstract framework originally conceived for the analysis of social choice and bargaining problems. Induced social choice correspondences are ...
Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
(2010-07-27)
In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. ...
Two characterizations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
(2010-03-25)
In this paper we propose alternative characterizations of the Independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, as conceived in bargaining theory. We provide two distinct characterizations, which allows us to view both ...
Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity
(2010-03-28)
In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the ...
Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity
(2010-03-28)
In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the ...
Resource monotonicity of bargaining solutions
(2010-07-13)
In this paper we establish that main solutions to bargaining problems display a resource monoticity property in bilateral monopoly situations when preferences exhibit consumption externalities. Suitable assumptions are ...
The non manipulability of the utilitarian solution
(2010-03-25)
In this paper we model threat bargaining problems as fixed threat bargaining games (with the threat point at the origin) and show that the utilitarian solution to threat bargaining problems is not manipulable.
Redundancy of additional alternatives and solutions to bargaining problems
(2010-03-28)
In this paper we propose a new axiom called the redundancy of additional alternatives axiom, which is satisfied by the proportional solution. A weaker version of the same axiom is satisfied by the Kalai-Smorodinsky (3) ...