Now showing items 21-30 of 201
Monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point and risk sensitivity of a new solution to nash's bargaining problem
We propose a solution to the bargaining problem which responds appropriately to certain changes in the disagreement point, for a fixed feasible set. If di increases, while for j i, dj remains constant, our solution recommends ...
Max-min solution for variable threat games
In this paper we obtain general inequality properties that max-min strategic solutions to Variable Threat Games satisfy under a set of very plausible assumptions.
The egalitarian equivalent solution to bargaining problems in economic environments
In this paper we set up an analytical framework to study bargaining (or object division) problems in economic environments, propose some new solutions and study the egalitarian equivalent bargaining solution. This analysis ...
Risk sensitivity in bargaining and a monotone to nash's bargaining problem
In this paper we show that for a new solution to Nash's bargaining problem, proposed by Lahiri (1988) ("Monotonicity with Respect to the Disagreement Point and a New Solution to Nash's Bargaining Problem", IIM, Ahmedabad, ...
Algorithm for the min - max loss rule for claims problems
In this paper we provide an algorithm which gives us the unique solution to the problem of minimizing the maximum loss (where loss is measured by unsatisfied demands) for a claims problem. The answer lies crucially on the ...
Threat bargaining games with a variable population
In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games.
Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information
This paper is a revised version based on two of my earlier papers Lahiri (1989c) and Lahiri (1990). For useful suggestions and discussions I am grateful to Jim Jordan, T.Parthasarathy, Prakash Chander, Arunava Sen and the ...
Bargaining with a variable population for games with a reference point
We consider axiomatic models of bargaining defined over a domain of problems containing different numbers of agents, define a concept called restricted monotonicity with respect of changes in the number of agents, and show ...
Constrained equal awards solution for claims problems
In this paper we propose a variable population framework for the study of claims problems and obtain characterizations of the constrained equal award rule using the following properties: envy-freeness, individual rationality ...
Revealed preference and independence of irrelevant alternatives: a note
Our objective here is to establish an equivalence between the IIA axiom which plays a significant role in axiomatic models of bargaining, and a generalization of WARP which plays a significant role in demand analysis.