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Threat bargaining games with a variable population
(1990-09-28)
In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions
to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat
bargaining games. We introduce three ...
An Axiomatic characterization of the value function for bimatrix games
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1990-10-01)
In this paper we obtain an axiomatic characterization of the value function for the class of all bi matrix games satisfying the equivalency and efficiency properties.
The revelation principle for arbitration games
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1990-03-01)
In this paper we prove the validity of the revelation principle for arbitration games and also establish that a large class of game forms can be represented as a Bayesian statistician. This adds force and appeal to the ...
Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and correlated beliefs
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1990-01-01)
In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with incomplete information and correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution without ...
Arbitration by a Bayesian statistician and bounded rationality
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1990-01-01)
In this paper we formalize the framework of an arbitration game, to accommodate a large class of situations where public decisions are implemented in a non-cooperative setting. We then present a method of computing the ...