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dc.contributor.authorParekh, Sandeep
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-26T10:24:40Z
dc.date.available2011-05-26T10:24:40Z
dc.date.copyright2009-11-15
dc.date.issued2011-05-26T10:24:40Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/10834
dc.description.abstractThe takeover of substantial number of shares, voting rights, or control in a listed Indian company attracts the provision of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. The regulations have been amended nearly 20 times since inception, though the amendments have mainly concentrated on areas which needed no amendment. At the same time a vast number of obvious problems have not been rectified in the regulations. The large number of amendments have also created requirement of a compulsory tender offer of such unnecessary complexity as to make it virtually unintelligible to even a well qualified professional. This paper argues that the complexity in the trigger points for disclosure and tender offer introduced over the years lacks a philosophy, and most of the amendments can not only be deleted but a very simple structure can be introduced making compliance of the regulations straight forward and easy to understand by management of listed companies. Certain other areas which need amendments have also been discussed. Chief amongst these are the provisions relating to consolidation of holdings, conditional tender offers, hostility to hostile acquisitions, definitional oddities, payment of control premium in the guise of non compete fees, treatment of differential voting rights, treatment of Global Depository Receipts, and disclosure enhancements.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesW.P.No. 2009-11-06;
dc.titleIndian Takeover Regulation: Underreformed and Overmodifieden
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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