Negotiation Procedures Converging to Bargaining to Solutions

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2012-10-17T08:41:54Z
dc.date.available	2012-10-17T08:41:54Z
dc.date.copyright	1992-03
dc.date.issued	2012-10-17T08:41:54Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11260
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we study globally stable adjustment processes converging to the egalitarian and Nash solutions respectively in two person bargaining problems, that a rise under bilateral monopoly. The preference structures of the individuals are allowed to exhibit consumption externalizes and we impose plausible restrictions on them in order to guarantee convergence	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1992/1013
dc.subject	Negotiation Procedures	en
dc.subject	Converging	en
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Solutions	en
dc.title	Negotiation Procedures Converging to Bargaining to Solutions	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en