dc.contributor.author | S., Althaf | |
dc.contributor.author | G., Ramesh | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-12-05T13:34:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-12-05T13:34:45Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 2013-12-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 3rd Biennial Conference of the Indian Academy of Management (IAM), 2013 held at IIMA during 12-14 December, 2013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9788192080024 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/11607 | |
dc.description.abstract | The current endeavor attempts to understand how the management of public enterprises could be incentivized to work by putting their
maximum effort in the direction of the objectives set forth by the government as the owner. By bringing in principal-agent theory into context,
we see how performance contracts (here MoU contracts between PSEs and administrative ministries co-ordinated by Department of Public
56
Enterprises) works to incentivize the agents (management of PSEs) to work in line with the objectives of the principal (Government). The broad
agenda is to see
1. How to ensure alignment of goals of the agent through performance contract?
2. How incentive based performance contracts could be improved in operations and design? | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad | en_US |
dc.subject | Public Sector Enterprises - Organizations | en_US |
dc.title | Management of Agency Problem through Performance Contracts – Case of Public Sector Enterprises | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |