Revelation principle for general principal: agents problems with incomplete information

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-15T04:26:46Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-15T04:26:46Z
dc.date.copyright	1990-04
dc.date.issued	2010-03-15T04:26:46Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1294
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we propose a model of a general principal - agents problem (with many agents) in which players choose actions and signals as pert of their strategy. Subsequently we show that any principal - agents problem admits a Bayesian - stackelberg equilibrium if and only if there exists another principal - agents problem where truthful revelation of types by the agents is possible at an equilibrium.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1990/860
dc.subject	Agents problems	en
dc.title	Revelation principle for general principal: agents problems with incomplete information	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en