Incentive efficiency of correlated equilibria with state dependent payoffs

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-15T10:41:43Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-15T10:41:43Z
dc.date.copyright	1990-08
dc.date.issued	2010-03-15T10:41:43Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1319
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1990/890
dc.subject	State dependence	en
dc.subject	correlated equilibria
dc.title	Incentive efficiency of correlated equilibria with state dependent payoffs	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en