Correlated equilibria under bounded and unbounded rationality

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-19T11:40:38Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-19T11:40:38Z
dc.date.copyright	1990-08
dc.date.issued	2010-03-19T11:40:38Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1374
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we establish an isomorphism between the set of correlated equilibria of a game on the one hand and the set of ordered pairs of coordination mechanisms and equilibrium decision rules for the same game on the other, in the case of bounded and unbounded rationality. The paper develops a systematic theory establishing an injection from the set of ordered pairs of coordination mechanisms and equilibrium decision rules tot he set of correlated equilibria. The converses follow easily from the methods of the proofs. As an intermediate step, we introduce the concept of a conditionally correlated equilibrium under bounded rationality.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1990/887
dc.subject	Isomorphisms	en
dc.subject	Mathematics	en
dc.title	Correlated equilibria under bounded and unbounded rationality	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en