Average welfare fair and egalitarian solutions for bargaining problems

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-21T12:17:35Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-21T12:17:35Z
dc.date.copyright	1991-04
dc.date.issued	2010-03-21T12:17:35Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1434
dc.description.abstract	In this paper e present an alternative characterization of the Egalitarian Solution for bargaining problems and show that the Egalitarian solution has the property that for any agent the incremental utility from bargaining is atleast as much as the average incremental utility of all other agents. Conversely, we show that any solution which is both weakly Pareto optimal and satisfies this latter property must be egalitarian.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1991/927
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Welfare	en
dc.title	Average welfare fair and egalitarian solutions for bargaining problems	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en