The Nash-Bargaining solution for public sector pricing problems
dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-22T10:01:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-22T10:01:52Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1991-09 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-22T10:01:52Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1504 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we study some issues in positive second-best theory, specifically the theory of optimal pricing of private goods produced by public firms: i.e, firms whose objective departs from profit maximization. The approach in this paper differs from earlier analysis of the so-called Ramsey pricing problem, in that we embed our problem in a bargaining theory framework. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1991/966 | |
dc.subject | Nash bargaining solution | en |
dc.title | The Nash-Bargaining solution for public sector pricing problems | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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