Generalization of the raiffa-kalai smorodinsky solution in two person bargaining games
dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-24T09:00:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-24T09:00:19Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1987-10 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-24T09:00:19Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1580 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we present a generalization of the Raiffa - Kalai - Smorodinsky solution to two person bargaining games, to incorporate asymmetries in solution payoffs. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1987/714 | |
dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject | Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution | |
dc.subject | Nash-bargaining Solution | |
dc.title | Generalization of the raiffa-kalai smorodinsky solution in two person bargaining games | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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